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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Over the past three decades, Indonesia has undergone drastic institutional changes, 
driven by simultaneous decentralization and democratization processes that strongly 
impacted the entire society. In fact, Indonesia transformed in this period from a 
centralized authoritarian regime into one of the largest and most decentralized 
democracies in the world. Amongst others, this transformation had far-reaching 
consequences for the level and evolution of inequality across individuals and regions 
as well as the organization and accessibility of public services like health and 
electricity.  
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia followed a “big bang” 
decentralization policy to decentralize the responsibilities and budgets of the central 
government. Where the country had 316 kabupaten/kota or municipalities in 1999, 
this number had grown to 539 kabupaten/kota by 2014 (Ministry of Home Affairs 
2019). Alongside this process, successive reforms have introduced the direct election 
of the president (2004), the governor and bupati/mayors and district heads (2005), as 
well as members of parliament (2009).  
Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, a profound debate on inequality in Indonesia 
emerged that broadly resonates to society. The debate has been fueled by the 
observation that the distribution of income has become more skewed, with the top 
income groups performing better than the low income groups in terms of income 
growth. This raised global public concern, which is evidenced by statements that 
inequality is rising rapidly (World Bank 2016), the gap between the richest and the 
rest in Indonesia is increasing faster (Oxfam 2017) and the number of billionaires in 
Indonesia has grown rapidly, from just one in 2002 to 20 in 2016 (Forbes 2016). 
Inequality is not a question solely of income and wealth (outcomes). It also concerns 
unequal access to health services and reliable power supply, where the latter is 
characterized by clear spatial inequalities between central and more peripheral parts 
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of the country. This thesis tries to demonstrate how the various dimensions of 
inequality are often closely related. 
This thesis starts from the presumption that the institutional reforms have 
shaped socio-economic development, including patterns of economic growth and 
income inequality as well as quality of public service provision. Aggregate economic 
development of Indonesia has been positive from the late 1960s onwards (see Figure 
1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1 Per Capita GDP in Indonesia: National Level 1960–2018 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Per capita GDP (measured in constant price USD 2011) increased with a factor six 
from 690 USD in 1960 to 4,284 USD in 2018. Figure 1.1 shows that per capita GDP 
started to increase in the early 1970s with an average annual growth rate of 8 percent 
until 1998. After the economic crisis in 1999, the economy has not returned to the pre-
crisis growth rates, but continued to grow at an average of 5.25 percent. Recently, 
Indonesia’s economy grew at 5.6 percent in 2019 resulting in a GDP per capita level 
of about USD 11,606 (World Bank 2020, measured in PPP).  
Indonesia has also played a key role in the economic development of Southeast 
Asia, maintaining positive growth after the global financial crisis of 2008/9, but 




showing signs of macroeconomic weaknesses in the last few years (World Bank 
2019). At the same time, income inequality, as measured by a Gini index, remains 
high with a Gini coefficient of 38.4 in 2019 (BPS 2020). These figures attest to the 
complex relationship between inequality and development. 
 




A closer look at the evolution of inequality in Indonesia in Figure 1.2 shows that since 
1960 income inequality in Indonesia – as measured by the Gini index1 – fluctuates, 
with a declining tendency until the early 1990s (briefly interrupted by the Oil Bonanza 
in the late 1970s). Since then, however, inequality started to increase rapidly 
(interrupted only by the Asian crisis in 1998) to reach a peak in 2012 and decrease 
somewhat after the commodity boom ended in 2014. In this thesis we show that a 
similar pattern is also found when looking at the regional level, both for islands as 
well as provinces.  
Several events may have caused these fluctuations. First, in the early 1970s, 
Indonesia benefited from windfall profits of the oil boom, followed by the 
 
1 We use the terms Gini Index and Gini Coefficient interchangeable as those terms refer to 
the same definition. 
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implementation of an industrialization policy in combination with substantial 
protection (known as an import substitution industrialization policy). However, since 
the mid-1980s as a result of the oil price shock in 1982 where export values dropped 
significantly, Indonesia moved towards an export promotion policy accompanied by 
liberalization and a banking reform in 1996 (Booth 2000). This new policy formed a 
new high-income class and thus increased the Gini index during that period. 
Subsequently, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 resulted in lower inequality and 
economic growth. The implementation of decentralization policies in 2000 marked 
the beginning of a sharp rise in inequality, especially since the recovery of the 
economy after 2002.  
Following the big-bang decentralization, the introduction of democratization 
in 2005 was another major event resulting in the local district leadership to be directly 
elected through local elections that require huge campaign funds. On the other hand, 
the majority of Indonesia’s billionaire wealth was generated in the industries prone to 
cronyism (Oxfam 2017). Thus, this finding suggests that political capture has played 
a role in creating many of Indonesia’s modern billionaires, and has thus fueled 
inequality,  
Besides these episodes, an increasing demand for commodities such as coal, 
palm oil, natural gas and rubber doubled Indonesian exports since 2004 and reached 
its highest level in 2011 (interrupted by the 2009 global crises). This commodity boom 
era seems to have instigated a rise in Gini index from 35.2 in 2004 to a peak of 41.2 
in 2012. The slowdown of China’s growth brought the commodity boom to an end 
after which the Gini coefficient tended to decline. This inequality trend bears a certain 
resemblance with the situation in the late 1970s after the oil boom ended and when 
the Gini also started declining. In an international perspective, Indonesia is catching 
up in terms of per capita GDP and is still characterized by a relatively low income 
inequality compared to many other countries, although inequality in per capita income 
has increased at national, island and provincial level since 2001 (see chapter 2 of this 
thesis for further details). 
At first sight, it appears that inequality in Indonesia is mainly triggered by 
external factors, i.e. increasing commodity prices which benefited the high income 
class more, especially in commodity-exporting provinces. The spikes in the inequality 




trend – resulting from several events such as the oil Bonanza in the mid-1970s, the 
banking reform in the mid-1990s, democratization in the mid-2000s, and the 
commodity boom by the end of 2010 – suggest that the elite benefited 
disproportionately from these economic tailwinds, whereas they experienced a 
deterioration of their relative position after liberalization of the economy in early 
1980s as well as during the Asian crisis in late 1990s and the fall of commodity prices 
in 2012. Thus, an increasing trend of Gini index could be perceived in two ways: as a 
positive sign of the effectiveness of market mechanism or as a negative sign of 
widening income gap across Indonesia. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
Interconnections between inequality and development, particularly economic growth, 
can be explained by two way causal theories. The first describes how economic 
development affects inequality. The seminal work of Simon Kuznets (1955) provides 
a foundation for this relationship. He argued that as the economy grows inequality 
first increases and later decreases: the well-known inverted U-shape hypothesis. The 
second causal relationship describes how inequality affects economic development. 
Different strands of literature on the impact of inequality on economic development 
have developed, including in economic growth theory. Dominant perspectives on this 
relationship include: the classical approach (focusing on the impact on saving rates), 
the political economy approach (focusing on the impact of redistribution), the credit 
market imperfections channel, the rent-seeking approach, the social unrest (political 
instability) approach, and the unified theory of inequality and growth. A recent 
contribution to theories on capitalism is provided by Piketty (2014), who argues that 
in economies organized by capitalism over longer periods of time the rate of return on 
capital is persistently larger than the rate of economic growth, which will cause 
increases in wealth inequality. 
According to the Classical approach, inequality is beneficial for growth. This 
theory suggests that the savings rate is relatively high among the wealthy (Lewis 1954; 
Kaldor 1956; Galor 2011). In this approach, inequality distributes resources to those 
individuals with higher marginal propensity to save, resulting in higher aggregate 
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savings and more capital accumulation, subsequently increasing economic growth. 
Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996), and Aghion et al. (1999) find opposite 
relationships through various mechanisms. In addition to those criticisms, Venieris 
and Gupta (1986) also demonstrate that the bulk of savings is, in fact, produced by 
the middle-income class and not by the rich. 
According to the Political economy approach, income inequality is harmful to 
growth, because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not allow 
full private appropriation of returns from investment. High inequality will lower 
growth because the poor majority would vote for redistributive rather than growth-
enhancing policies. The median voters choose redistribution policies (taxes and 
transfers), and in an unequal society, they are poorer than the mean. Taxes imposed 
on the margin are distortionary and slow down economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 
1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994). 
The Credit Market Imperfections Channel proposed by Galor and Zeira (1993) 
demonstrates that in the presence of credit market imperfections and fixed costs 
associated with investments in education, occupational choices (and thus the efficient 
segmentation of the labour force between skilled and unskilled workers) are affected 
by the distribution of income. In particular, if the interest rate for borrowers is 
significantly higher than that for lenders, inequality may result in an under-investment 
in human capital. 
Rent-Seeking theories explore the situation in which a widening gap between 
the rich and the poor results in the rich having a greater temptation to engage in rent-
seeking or predatory activities at the expense of the poor (Benabou 1996). Other 
researchers have also proposed an institutional mechanism in which a wealthy elite 
will suppress democracy and equal rights before the law so as to preserve their 
privileged position (e.g. Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). 
Social Unrest or Political Instability argues that the poor people’s motivation 
to engage in crime, riots, and other disruptive activities is due to the wealth and 
income inequality (Barro 2000). Political institutions’ stability may even be 
threatened by revolution so that laws and other rules have a shorter expected duration 
and more significant uncertainty. When the poor people participate in crime and other 
anti-social actions, it represents a direct waste of resources because their time and 




energy are not spent for productive activities. Moreover, the threats to property rights 
discourage investment. Through these various dimensions of sociopolitical unrest, 
more inequality tends to reduce the productivity of an economy, and then economic 
growth declines accordingly. 
In the Unified Theory of Inequality and Growth (Human Capital Mechanism), 
one can reconcile the classical and the credit market imperfections approach. If 
imperfect capital markets exist that associates with investment in education, human 
capital cannot be accumulated because of the majority of poor people. On the other 
hand, the effect of inequality on growth depends on the relative return to physical and 
human capital. Physical capital is a prime engine for growth in the early stage of 
industrialization, but later it is substituted by human capital and the relative return to 
physical capital decreases. Thus, the impact of inequality on growth changes from 
positive to negative (Galor and Zeira 1993; Galor and Moav 2004; Galor 2011). 
Finally, in his famous book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty 
(2014) developed a unified theory of the functioning of the capitalist economy by 
linking theories of economic growth and personal income distributions using long-run 
historical data series. He suggests that when the top incomes hold capital and its rate 
of returns keeps increasing, the rich will continue accumulating wealth, which in turn 
contributes to a widening income gap. In other words, rising wealth inequality and 
income concentration inevitably is part of the changing nature of modern capitalism. 
To tackle this increasing inequality, Piketty proposes redistribution through 
progressive taxes on wealth.  
 
1.3 Aim and Structure of the Thesis 
Many studies already have analyzed inequality in Indonesia. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the still growing body of literature by (i) focusing on empirical studies 
of inequality at the regional level in Indonesia; (ii) putting forward a a non-linear 
approach to study the relationship between inequality and economic growth; (iii) by 
introducing quality of institutions as potential driver of inequality patterns; (iv) by 
establishing a link between inequality and urban development; (v) as well as between 
inequality and accessibility to public services i.e. health and electricity, This thesis 
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consists of several chapters that aim to provide insight into the nature and 
consequences of inequality dynamics in Indonesia during the past decades. In doing 
so, the thesis examines the impact of the fundamental institutional changes in 
Indonesia on different aspects of inclusiveness. Social inclusiveness is a central notion 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), especially as regards to good health, 
well-being, affordable and clean energy and reducing inequality. The different 
chapters in this thesis focus on these different dimensions of inclusiveness in the 
contemporary Indonesia’s society. 
 The thesis essentially consists of two parts, as is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The 
first part studies various aspects of the relationship between inequality and economic 
development in Indonesia. A key question that is addressed in this part is how in 
Indonesia, as an emerging economy, the income distributions develop at various 
aggregation levels? Chapter 2 analyzes the implications of economic development of 
Indonesia on income inequality by comparing inequality in Indonesia to the rest of 
the world, looking at the within-country dynamics, and looking at the interpersonal 
dynamics. One of the particular aspects of that development is urbanization, which, 
amongst others, involves exclusion of the poor that cannot longer afford to live in 
cities. Taking an urban perspective, Chapter 3 studies the association in Indonesia 
between urbanization and income inequality, and identifies lessons that we can draw 
from the consequencs of urbanization for income inequality. Chapter 4 investigates 
whether inequality correlates with economic development by analyzing the 
relationship between changes in inequality and economic growth, and the role of 
institutional quality in shaping this relationship. 
The second part of this thesis delves deeper into the questions regarding the 
accessibility of basic public services. The emphasis is on health and electricity. Given 
that the health care reforms in Indonesia were meant to promote inclusiveness in 
health access, Chapter 5 examines whether universal health care could change the 
behavior of people towards health i.e. ex ante moral hazard. Chapter 6 studies how 
the electricity diffuses at the regional level in Indonesia, against the background of 
the specific geography of Indonesia, implying the complexity of connecting people 
that live disperse across many relatively small islands, including huge disparities in 
terms of income and landscape. This makes Indonesia an interesting case study for 




analyzing electricity diffusion; given its geography, connecting everyone is not easy 
and the social implications are profound. Our contribution is a relevant step in the 
Indonesian context because the connectivity is still less than 100 percent.  
 Chapter 7 provides the summary of this thesis, explores its further policy 
relevance, and proposes future avenues of research.  
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Chapter 2  Economic Development and Income 
Inequality in Indonesia 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we calculate and describe the income inequality dynamics in Indonesia 
over time and space, distinguishing three levels of spatial aggregation. First, we 
describe Indonesia’s income inequality dynamics from an international perspective, 
in relation to the country’s stage of development. Second, we document the income 
inequality evolution at the regional level within Indonesia, across islands and 
provinces. Third, we explore the interpersonal inequality dynamics by income class, 
based on newly constructed household expenditure data. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of income 
inequality dynamics in Indonesia since 1960, with a focus on the period 1987–2015. 
We combine the evolution of inequality over time with a spatial perspective, which 
allows us to assess the inequality dynamics in Indonesia in comparison with other 
countries and across islands and provinces as well as among individuals in relation to 
individuals on other islands and in other provinces. We assess inequality by exploring 
changes in various indicators of inequality, including the Gini index, the Theil index 
and the P90/P10 ratio. Besides providing descriptive statistics, we present the results 
of - and -convergence analyses of the variations in per capita income and key 
relevant indicators. Our analyses are based on consumption data provided by BPS 
Indonesia. As such, this chapter sets the stage for the rest of this thesis.  
Over the last four decades, Indonesia has experienced, on average, high 
economic growth, which was triggered especially by the pro-growth policy in 
President Suharto’s era. At the same time, however, income inequality at the national 
level started to rise in the early 1980s, when Indonesia started to liberalize its 
economy, including a turn to freer markets, deregulation and a larger role for the 
private sector in the economy (Booth 1992). As pointed out by many scholars, while 
economic growth in developing countries may reduce poverty (Dollar and Kraay 
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2002), its impact on income inequality is uncertain: higher economic growth may be 
accompanied by both lower and higher income inequality (Kanbur 2000; Banerjee 
and Duflo 2003). Boediono (1990) argued that the high economic growth in the 1980s 
in Indonesia was associated with a declining Gini during the 1980s. Yusuf et al. 
(2014), however, asserted that the rapid economic growth in Indonesia during the 
1980s and 1990s was accompanied by a large reduction in poverty incidence, whereas 
its impact on inequality remains rather unclear. In this chapter, we document the 
relationship between economic growth and inequality in Indonesia, paying special 
attention to the spatial dimension of this relationship.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly review the 
rapidly expanding literature on inequality in Indonesia, especially the different spatial 
levels at which income inequality has been studied so far. Section 2.3 presents the 
methods to measure inequality, and section 2.4 discusses the data sources and the 
construction of our own dataset. Section 2.5 discusses Indonesia’s inequality from the 
international perspective, while section 2.6 focuses on the regional dimension of 
inequality in Indonesia. We then present the interpersonal inequality dynamics by 
income class in section 2.7. Section 2.8 presents the conclusions and options for future 
research.  
 
2.2 Review of the Literature on Inequality in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s development and inequality patterns have been studied extensively by 
many researchers. For example, Yusuf et al. (2014) documented an increase in 
inequality in Indonesia based on estimates of expenditure inequality for 1993–2013, 
using several measures that draw on household expenditure data from the National 
Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas). In doing so, they noted that the rise in inequality 
reported since 2009 actually has a longer history, which used to be obscured by the 
fact that the Indonesian central statistics agency, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), used 
grouped data for its estimates of inequality until 2009. They also argued that the rise 
in inequality in Indonesia was largest in provinces or districts with low initial levels 
of inequality, implying a certain degree of convergence in spatial inequality patterns. 




Yusuf et al. (2014) classified the potential drivers of inequality in Indonesia into two 
groups, which they labelled as exogenous and endogenous drivers. Exogenous drivers 
consist of shifting global trade and financial patterns and technical change, while 
endogenous drivers comprise macroeconomic policies, labour market policies, wealth 
inequality, fiscal policy (taxation and transfers) and government spending on public 
goods. For instance, the commodity boom in the 2000s could be perceived as a source 
of increasing inequality in Indonesia (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012; Yusuf et al. 
2014). These commodities are grown and located outside Java, so increasing 
commodity prices contribute to a widening gap between Java and the rest of 
Indonesia. During a boom, the financial sector often grows much faster than the real 
sector, so the impact on income distribution can be predicted – the rich earn far more 
than the poor, and urban households’ income grows faster than rural households’ 
income, both exacerbating income inequality (Aziz 2015). 
Yusuf et al. (2014) argued that changes in the formal labour market as an 
endogenous factor have increased inequality. The growth of formal employment has 
been rather stagnant in the last decade. Before the 1997–1998 crisis, the 
manufacturing sector and its employment grew at 11.2 per cent and 6.0 per cent, 
respectively. However, almost a decade after the crisis, the growth of the 
manufacturing sector was 4.7 per cent and its employment grew at only 0.9 per cent. 
This situation led to an excess of skilled labour in rural areas, which lowered the rural 
real wage, as revealed in the BPS data, which shows that the real wage in the 
agricultural sector has been declining over the last few years (Manning and Pratomo 
2013). Thus, increasing inequality in rural areas is a logical consequence. 
The Indonesian Government spends up to 25 per cent of the national budget 
on rice and fuel subsidies (Howes and Davies 2014). In response to an increase of 20 
per cent in the rice price in the 2000s and an upsurge in international oil prices, the 
government increased the fuel retail prices in 2005 and distributed conditional cash 
transfers to the poor and near poor to compensate for the impact of inflation. This 
policy resulted in a slight decline of the Gini coefficient in 2006 (Yusuf and 
Resosudarmo 2008). However, since the international oil prices kept rising and the 
fuel subsidy was still high, this policy was not sufficient to maintain the lower Gini, 
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which kept increasing. Agustina et al. (2012) also found that this fuel subsidy 
benefited the rich disproportionally more than the poor.  
As regards the pattern of inequality across provinces and islands, Akita and 
Lukman (1995), applying the Williamson index, suggested a large decrease in 
inequality in the per capita GRP among provinces in Indonesia during the period 
1975–1992. However, inequality in the non-mining per capita GRP remained stagnant 
during that period except in the mid-1980s, when an export-oriented policy was 
introduced. Across islands, it was shown by applying the same method that inequality 
tended to decline in Sumatera island while it tended to increase in other islands from 
the early 1980s until the early 1990s. Moreover, Akita et al. (2011) showed that the 
differences in inequality in terms of per capita GRP among Indonesia’s largest regions 
(Java-Bali, Sumatra-Kalimantan-Papua and other regions in the eastern area) were 
small compared with the levels of inequality within those regions and that the levels 
of cross-regional inequality remained relatively constant over the years (1983–2004). 
They also found that an increasing level of inequality occurred not only within regions 
but also among districts within the provinces in those regions. Other studies 
(Tadjoeddin et al. 2001; Akita and Alisyahbana 2002; Hill et al. 2008) confirmed that 
regional inequality was relatively stable or increased slightly at the district level 
during the period 1993–1998. In a recent study, Vidyattama (2013) found that the 
inequality of the GRP per capita increased slightly at both the province and the district 
level in the period 1999–2009, especially as a result of the growth of Jakarta during 
the period 2002–2008. 
Other studies have shown a widening gap between urban and rural areas and 
between Java and outer Java in terms of the income share after the Asian Financial 
Crisis and indicated that the income share of the rich is increasing while that of the 
poor is decreasing (Sakamoto 2007; Yusuf and Resosudarmo 2008; Mishra 2009; 
Chongvilaivan 2013; Miranti et al. 2013; Tadjoeddin 2013). Meanwhile, using a 
longer period of observation, Mishra (2009) found that the income distribution was 
relatively constant during the period 1963–2005, with low fluctuations between 1.9 
and 2.5. Nonetheless, Yusuf et al. (2014) concluded that the gap among income groups 
in Java and urban areas measured by the decile dispersion ratio is worse than that 
measured by the Gini index, especially for urban areas and Java island. Their study, 




in line with Akita (2003), also demonstrated that inter-district inequality is higher than 
inter-province inequality, while there is no tendency for inter-regional disparity to 
increase in Indonesia. Furthermore, the Gini index in urban areas is much higher than 
that in rural areas, and, as most of the urban areas are located on Java island, this could 
affect the variation across islands (Sakamoto 2007; Mishra 2009; Chongvilaivan 
2013; Tadjoeddin 2013).  
As regards the dynamics of interpersonal inequality, Dick et al. (2002) asserted 
that the widening of the economic disparities perceived by many people in the 1980s 
was mainly due to excessive self-enrichment by Suharto’s cronies. In line with Leigh 
and van der Eng (2009) and Milanovic (2016), we suggest that the top income shares 
in Indonesia were relatively high over the course of the twentieth century. This finding 
may surprise some readers as it contradicts the common “growth with equity” 
understanding of Indonesia’s growth experience since the 1960s. Nevertheless, our 
results are bolstered by evidence from other sources. For example, the top wealth 
shares appear to be larger in Indonesia than in many other countries, whether one uses 
data from wealth surveys (Davies et al. 2009) or the Forbes rich lists. Piketty (2014) 
argued that inequality of asset and wealth ownership has driven increasing within-
country income and expenditure inequality around the world. This could also have 
occurred in Indonesia. However, only a few studies have discussed this wealth 
inequality in Indonesia (Davies et al. 2009; Leigh and Van der Eng 2009, pp. 209–
212). 
 
2.3 Method of Inequality Measurement 
A number of indices of inequality have been proposed to measure aspects of income 
distributions. A particularly convenient method of constructing such indices of 
inequality is to measure the extent to which an equal distribution of income deviates 
from the case in which all incomes are equal. Below is a list of methods and measures 
used for describing inequality in this chapter.  
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Decile Dispersion Ratio 
The basic idea of this method is to measure the extent to which the top incomes differ 
from the bottom incomes. This presents the ratio of the average consumption (or 
income) of the richest 10 per cent of the population to the average consumption (or 
income) of the poorest 10 per cent. The interpretation is easy and simple, expressing 
the income of the top 10 per cent (the “rich”) as a multiple of that of those in the 
poorest decile (the “poor”). For general public interests, this ratio shows how big the 
difference is in the standard of living between the richest and the poorest members of 
a society.  
Despite its simplicity and easiness, this method ignores information about 
incomes in the middle of the income distribution and does not even use information 
about the distribution of income within the top and bottom deciles. For further 
analysis, we can compare the earnings of the lowest and highest deciles relative to the 




where D is the dispersion of earnings, P10 is the lowest percentile of earnings, P50 is 
the median earnings, P90 is the highest percentile of earnings and R is the ratio of the 
richest to the poorest relative to the ratio of the richest to the median. If R is larger 
than 1, the gap is likely to be led by an increase in the income of the richest rather 
than a decrease in the income of the poorest. 
 
Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient is probably the best-known indicator of income inequality. It 
compares every individual with every other and does not square the difference, 
especially for the middle class. This coefficient is basically equivalent to the size of 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line of equality divided by the total 
area under the 45-degree line of equality. The further the Lorenz curve deviates from 
the line of equality, the higher will be the resulting value of the Gini coefficient. Apart 




from its geometric counterpart in the Lorenz curve, it can also be calculated by using 
the following formula:  
 
where yi and yj are the incomes of individual i and individual j with a mean of income 
 and where n is the total number of observations (Haughton and Khandker 2009). 
This coefficient ranges from zero to one, where zero shows perfect equality when all 
the income is shared equally and one is complete inequality when all the income is 
earned by only one individual.  
The Gini coefficient has several attractive features: if all incomes are doubled, 
the population changes or two people swap incomes, then the coefficient does not 
change; a transfer from the rich to the poor will reduce inequality and lower the Gini 
coefficient. However, the main weakness of the Gini coefficient is its incapability of 
decomposing inequality by population group or income source because the total Gini 
coefficient of a society is not equal to the sum of the Gini coefficients of its groups. It 
is sensitive to the middle part of the income spectrum and not “neutral” or value free.  
 
Theil Index 
This index is part of the larger family of measures referred to as the general entropy 
(GE) class. It can be used to capture the variation in sub-groups of the population and 
regions by income source because this can be additive across different sub-groups or 
regions in the country. However, the Theil index does not have a straightforward 
representation and lacks the appealing interpretation of the Gini coefficient, which is 
why it is less commonly used than the Gini coefficient. The formula is as follows:  
 
where yi is the income per capita of individual i and  is the average income per capita. 
The lower the index is, the lower the inequality.  
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Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
The coefficient of variation is useful for analysing inequality as a comparison between 
datasets with different units because this coefficient is independent of the 
measurement unit. The formula of CV is simply the square root of the variance, that 
is, the standard deviation divided by the average income level:  
 
         
 
where yi is the income per capita of individual i and  is the average income per capita.  
Since the standard deviation of data must always be understood in the context 
of the mean of the data, the actual value of the CV is a dimensionless number. 
However, some disadvantages of the CV are as follows: the CV is not an ideal index 
of the certainty of a measurement when the number of replicates varies across 
samples; when the mean value is close to zero, the coefficient of variation will 
approach infinity and is therefore sensitive to small changes in the mean. Unlike the 
standard deviation, it cannot be used directly to construct confidence intervals for the 
mean. 
In this chapter, we use aggregate data at the country level for the period 1961–
2013, at the province level for the period 1961–2015 and at the district level for the 
period 1999–2014, while individual data for our consumption analysis are derived 
from Susenas covering the period 1987–2015. 
 
2.4 Data Sources 
We use several data sources to calculate the Gini index across countries, specifically 
the national bureaus of statistics of the respective countries, the inequality dataset 
constructed by Atkinson, the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS) and the 
Deininger and Squire dataset. To explain the relationship between the Gini index and 
the per capita GDP, we also use the World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
classify countries into four groups as follows: ASEAN countries (Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand), emerging countries (Brazil, India, China and South Korea), 
African countries (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) and rich countries (Australia, the 
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euro area, Japan, Singapore and the United States). However, not all countries have 
data for the entire period. For most countries, the earliest available data are for 1960, 
except for China (1969), South Africa (1964) and Singapore (1966). Furthermore, in 
performing panel regressions, we define country groups based on the World Bank 
definition and data availability as follows: (1) Latin America (18 countries): 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela; (2) the Middle East (5 countries): Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan and Tunisia; and (3) East Asia (9 countries): China, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
At the regional level, we use the per capita gross regional product (GRP) and 
household expenditures from the microdata consumption module of the Social and 
Economic Survey (Susenas) provided by the central statistics agency, Badan Pusat 
Statistik (BPS). Susenas’s datasets are collected every three years, and since 2011 they 
have been collected every single year. Our datasets are available from 1987 onwards. 
As a consequence of decentralization, 8 new provinces have been established since 
2001, and, as of 2015, the total number of new and old provinces is 34. For consistency 
purposes, we keep 26 provinces as our base by regrouping new provinces with their 
parent provinces, namely Riau Island with Riau, Bangka Belitung with South 
Sumatera, Banten with West Java, North Kalimantan with East Kalimantan, 
Gorontalo with North Sulawesi, West Sulawesi with South Sulawesi, North Maluku 
with Maluku and West Papua with Papua. We also recode these provinces to construct 
a new panel province dataset.  
In addition, we reclassify new districts into their parent districts to perform 
panel regressions. Our complete dataset at the district level is from 1999 onwards. 
Special attention is necessary when the parent districts belong to a new province and 
have a different name, and then all the district codes should be recoded under the new 
coding system provided by BPS. A detail explanation of the construction of the panel 
district dataset can be found in Appendix A2.1. 
In calculating the inequality indicators (i.e. Gini, Theil, Ratio P90/P10 and 
Decile Dispersion Ratio), we use extensively household expenditure data from 
Susenas, the only one nationally representative data set on socio-economic conditions 
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in Indonesia. In this thesis, we use Susenas 1987 as the earliest available data source 
that involved 65,200 households. Since 1993, its sample size has grown to 
approximately 200,000 households, and since 2011 onwards its sample covers around 
300,000 households and 1.1 million household members. The expenditure variable in 
Susenas consists of detailed food and non-food items where those items have been 
expanded since 1993, i.e. 203 food items, 28 items on housing and utilities, 37 on 
goods and services, 15 on clothing, 13 on durables and 5 on ceremonies and festivities. 
In addition, Susenas can be linked to Potensi Desa (PODES) at the district (kabupaten) 
level which I exploit in Chapter 4.  
Despite its national representativeness, Susenas has some limitations. First, 
Susenas tends to exclude the very wealthy since they are hard for the enumerators to 
reach; if they are included, they are often considered as outliers (Mishra 2009). 
Edward and Sumner (2015) suggested that Susenas may be weak in capturing top 
incomes as only approximately 10 per cent of Indonesians consumed more than $10 
per day in 2012 (in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars). The World Bank 
also mentioned this selection bias problem in Susenas whereby enumerators 
categorize the rejection or the unwillingness of the very wealthy as selective non-
response. As a result, the Gini index based on household expenditure is likely to be a 
lower-bound estimate for inequality (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Lahoti et al. 
2014; Yusuf et al. 2014).  
Second, the expenditure variable measures total consumption, financed by 
out-of-pocket money and/or by subsidies. Since total expenditure is used as a proxy 
of income, expenditure from out-of-pocket money in Susenas is likely to overestimate 
the purchasing power of the households, especially the purchasing power of low-
income households who are likely to receive various kinds of economic assistance. 
Hence, households may appear to have high income while some parts of this income 
may actually be derived from subsidies (Johar et al. 2018). In addition, the variable 
income in Susenas is often unreliable because it is self-reported income that tends to 
be underreported. 
Third, there may be recall bias due to the reference period. According to 
Susenas Guidelines, the interviewer asks the respondent (the household 
representative) “How much did the household spend on [item] in the past [reference 
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period]?” The reference period for food items is the past seven days or one month ago, 
while several reference periods are applied for non-food items depending on the type 
of non-food expenditures i.e. a month, the past three months or six months, or one 
year ago. These reference periods might suffer from underreporting actual expenditure 
by the household especially for non-food items. For instance, the respondent may not 
remember the exact amount spent for hospital, clinic, medicine, etc. by each 
household member for the last three months. Consequently, health expenditure 
reported in Susenas tends to be lower than the actual spending. Furthermore, health 
cost is financed by out-of-pocket and or health subsidy especially for the poor where 
they likely receive health services free of charge. As a result, health expenditure as 
out-of-pocket is likely underestimated (Johar et al. 2018). Further discussion 
concerning data limitations on health variable in Susenas can be found in Appendix 
A5.A1. Bearing these limitations in mind, Susenas data are still the best source 
available, but have to be analysed and interpreted with care. 
2.5 The International Perspective 
To understand Indonesia’s position in relation to other countries, we compare the per 
capita GDP in 2005 USD prices and the Gini index from 15 countries over time. The 
trend of both the per capita GDP and the Gini coefficient of Indonesia has increased 
over time, but its position is relatively low compared with that of other countries. The 
per capita GDP of Indonesia has increased for the last three decades, and its figures 
are higher than those for India, Kenya, the Philippines and Nigeria but lower than 
those for Thailand, Malaysia, Brazil, South Korea, China and South Africa (2013). It 
appears that Indonesia is catching up with the richer countries among ASEAN and 
emerging countries. However, in terms of inequality measured by the Gini index, 
Indonesia’s figure is higher than that of Thailand, India, South Korea, Australia, Japan 
and the USA (Figure 2.1). The same pattern emerges if we use the per capita GDP 
with PPP constant 2011 USD, as reported in Appendix A2.2.  
In terms of the absolute value of the Gini index, Indonesia’s figure is much 
lower and fairly stable compared with ASEAN countries, emerging countries and 
African countries, as shown in Figure 2.1 and Appendix A2.2. It has fluctuated 
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between 33 and 38 for the past 20 years. The only Gini index pattern similar to 
Indonesia’s is that of India. If we compare it with the ASEAN countries, where the 
Gini index ranged from 40 to 50, or with African countries with a range of 40 to 70 
or even with Brazil with an index above 50 in the same period, Indonesia’s figure 
seems unusual. In response to these findings, Booth and Sundrum (1981); Booth 
(1992) and Sundrum (1992) suggested that the low income inequality in Indonesia for 
a long time was due to the government policies, such as subsidies in the agriculture, 
infrastructure, education and health sectors in the early 1970s. 
Figure 2.1 Relationship between the Gini Index and the per Capita GDP 
(Constant 2005 USD): Indonesia and Selected Countries 1960 and 2013 
Source: WDI, CBS of the respective countries and various inequality datasets constructed by Atkinson, 
LIS, and Deininger and Squire. 
In addition, the Gini index in Indonesia is calculated based on household expenditure, 
leading to a lower value than the index based on income.2 Frankema and Marks (2009, 
2 BPS has conducted a three-year National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) since 1979 by 
distributing a consumption questionnaire of food and non-food items. Although BPS collects 
household income data, the result is inaccurate due to respondents’ unwillingness to reveal 
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2010) proposed alternative measures for income inequality in Indonesia, specifically 
the ratio of unskilled wages to GDP per worker, the Theil coefficient of the inter-
industry wage distribution in the manufacturing sector and the development of the 
relative size of the urban informal sector. Their results suggest that the major 
determinants of income inequality in Indonesia, that is, the wage inequality and the 
share of self-employed in the labour force, are similar to the findings for Brazil and 
Mexico, which are both known for recording among the highest levels of income 
inequality in the world. Moreover, adjusting the estimate of inequality using the 
taxation data of top incomes shows that the share of income of the richest is generally 
much larger in Indonesia than in other countries (see Leigh and Van der Eng 2009) 
and challenges the perception that Indonesia is relatively egalitarian. Thus, the claim 
of low income inequality in Indonesia by international standards is not based on 
entirely convincing evidence (Van Zanden and Mark 2012). Despite the weaknesses 
of Susenas in capturing the top income earners in Indonesia, the rise of inequality at 
all income levels occurred throughout Indonesia. We will discuss this further in 
section 2.5. 
Deininger and Squire (1998) pointed out that many countries that started with 
low levels of per capita income grew rapidly without an increase in inequality. On the 
other hand, other countries that failed to grow were not immune to possibly 
considerable swings in aggregate measures of inequality. In a few countries, where a 
strong relationship has emerged between growth and inequality, the Kuznets 
hypothesis is contradicted almost as often as it is confirmed. Following the debates 
about inequality and growth, two main lessons can be learned. First, Lundberg and 
Squire (2003) argued that, in searching for the causal connection between growth and 
inequality, one may not consider that both could be determined by the same set of 
factors over which national decision makers have some control. Still, their findings 
show that the determinants of growth and improved equity are not mutually exclusive 
and that both equity and growth can benefit significantly from increased government 
expenditures aimed at the redistribution of land and the provision of universal 
secondary education, for instance. Second, Ravallion and Chen (2003) suggested that, 
their true income: they tend to underreport their income in the survey. Further discussion on 
the data limitation can be found in Section 2.4. 
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when considering the effect of inequality, it is equally important to ask questions 
about the quality of growth as it is to consider the rate of growth. Thus, countries that 
have high levels of initial inequality find it exceedingly difficult to reduce the 
incidence and depth of material deprivation through economic growth if measures are 
not taken to rectify the maldistribution of economic resources and opportunities 
(World Bank 2006). 
2.5.1 Kuznets at the Country Level 
We continue by further examining the relationship between inequality and income in 
an international context, in an attempt to determine whether Indonesia is indeed 
characterized by exceptionally low income inequality given its stage of development. 
The relationship between income inequality and income per capita is assessed by 
performing an analysis regressing the Gini index on various forms of GDP per capita 
and year and dummy variables, that is, events capturing decentralization for the years 
after 2000, democratization for the years after 2003 and the commodity boom for the 
years after 2005 for country groups of Latin America, East Asia and the Middle East 
in ten-year periods starting in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. The country group 
dummy variables are used to control for time-invariant omitted-variable bias, while 
the period of the time dummy variable is included to control for global shocks that 
might have an impact on inequality in any time period but are not captured by the 
explanatory variables in the model. We also add interaction between income and event 
dummies and country and period dummies. We use data for 95 countries from several 
sources, namely the World Bank, the LIS and the Central Bureau of Statistics of the 
respective countries. The unit of observation in this model is the country level, using 
a country-level panel dataset with annual observations for the period from 1961 to 
2013.  
Ineqit = Ui + Tj + β0 + β1·Incomeit + β2·[Incomeit]2 + β3 · [Incomeit]3  
+ β4 · time + ∑ βg · d_eventh + ∑ βk · [d_eventh · Incomeit]
+ ∑ βl · d_periodp + ∑ βm·d_countryc + ∑ βq·[d_periodp·d_countryc]
+ ∑ βr · [d_eventh · d_countryc] + εit    (2.1) 
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where i represents countries and t represents time; Ineqit is inequality measured using 
the Gini coefficient; U is a country fixed effect; Tj is a year effect; time is a year trend; 
Incomeit, is the per capita GDP; d_eventh represents an event dummy where h 
represents democratization, decentralization and the commodity boom; d_periodp 
represents a ten-period dummy where p is 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010; 
d_countryc is a country dummy where c is Latin America, East Asia and the Middle 
East; and εit is the error term. 
Figure 2.2 Kuznets Estimation at the Country Level 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on WDI, LIS and CBS.
Our results show that the income per capita and its square and the interactions between 
the dummy Latin and the dummies 1970, 1980 and 2010 are statistically significant 
in affecting the Gini index (Appendix A2.3). These results suggest that the period of 
the oil bonanza in the 1970s, the oil shock in the 1980s and the global crisis in 2008 
played an important role in determining inequality patterns across countries in Latin 
America. The plot of the GDP per capita and the predicted Gini index depicts an 
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inverted U-shape (consistent with the Kuznets theory). In the beginning, income 
inequality is positively related to income per capita, while, after a certain point, the 
relationship turns negative. It appears that the relationship between the Gini index and 
the GDP per capita depends on the stage of development in each country. A similar 
pattern is presented for the country group of East Asia, while it is not very clear in the 
Latin American and Middle Eastern groups (Figure 2.2).  
2.6 Interregional Inequality Dynamics 
Indonesia’s development and inequality have been studied extensively by many 
researchers. In the last four decades, Indonesia has experienced high economic 
growth, especially triggered by the pro-growth policy in President Suharto’s era. 
However, many scholars have noted that inequality has also escalated, pointing out 
that, although it may reduce poverty (Dollar and Kraay 2000), high growth does not 
necessarily mean lowering inequality in developing countries (Kanbur 2000). Yusuf 
et al. (2014) also suggested that the rapid economic growth in Indonesia during the 
1980s and 1990s was accompanied by a large reduction in poverty incidence but that 
its impact on inequality is rather unclear. 
At the national level, an increasing trend in inequality consistent with the 
Kuznets hypothesis started in the early 1980s, when Indonesia started to liberalize its 
economy, promoting a freer market, a larger role for the private sector, deregulation 
and so on (Booth 1992). If we look at inequality figures, such as the Gini coefficient, 
the Theil index and the ratio of the top 10 per cent to the bottom 10 per cent, over the 
last 26 years, all the indicators tell the same story of an increasing trend (see Figure 
2.3). The Gini coefficient increased by 34 per cent, while the Theil index increased 
by 43.5 per cent and the Ratio P90/P10 increased by 18.3 per cent. The latter means 
that the rich spent almost five times more than the poor in 2013 as compared with 
1987.  
Economic Development and Income Inequality in Indonesia  27 
Figure 2.3 Average Inequality Indicators at the National Level, 1987–2013 
(1987=100) 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
Similar patterns are also shown for the ratio of the top 10 per cent to the bottom 10 
per cent for both per capita food and per capita non-food expenditure. On a per capita 
basis, the rich spend about 3 to 3.5 times more on food than the poor and 7 to 9 
times more on non-food goods. Unlike per capita food expenditure, the average P90/
P10 ratio per capita for non-food expenditure has fluctuated over time. The 
gap started increasing in 2003 and reached its peak in 2011. This may partly 
be due to a commodity boom resulting in increasing international prices of most 
of Indonesia’s exported goods, such as coal, nickel, copper and crude palm oil. It is 
also reflected in a larger proportion of primary products to total exports in 
Indonesia during those periods (Azis 2015). Exporters, as well as those who were 
part of the associated value chain of those commodities, benefited from this 
commodity boom, which translated into a larger gap between the rich and the poor in 
per capita non-food expenditure and gave rise to variation in inequality across 
households within Indonesia. 
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Table 2.1 Inequality within Islands: Per Capita Household Expenditure, 1987–2013 
  1987 1999 2003 2013 Changes (%) 1987–2013 2003–2013 
Gini Coefficient     
  
Sumatera   25.58    25.75    28.97    36.31  42 25 
Java-Bali   30.50    29.83    31.97    40.62  33 27 
Kalimantan   27.25    26.78    28.95    36.90  35 27 
Sulawesi   28.00    28.20    29.91    42.10  50 41 
Eastern   31.33    28.55    31.10    38.20  22 23 
Average   28.53    27.82    30.18    38.83  36 29 
       
Theil Index       
Sumatera   13.96    14.56    15.63    23.02  65 47 
Java-Bali   19.29    26.15    19.75    29.67  54 50 
Kalimantan   15.67    14.35    17.02    22.69  45 33 
Sulawesi   15.64    13.45    16.90    32.13  105 90 
Eastern   21.41    20.91   15.59    24.73  16 59 
Average   17.20    17.88    16.98    26.45  54 56 
       
Ratio P90/P10       
Sumatera     3.31      3.30      3.24      3.80  15 17 
Java-Bali     3.76      3.84      3.85      4.81  28 25 
Kalimantan     3.62      3.42      3.48      4.05  12 17 
Sulawesi     3.61      3.32      3.47      4.96  38 43 
Eastern     4.20      4.64      3.57      4.35  3 22 
Average     3.70      3.70      3.52      4.40  19 25 
       
Decile Dispersion Ratio 
Sumatera     1.69      1.70      1.70      1.74  2 2 
Java-Bali     1.72      1.73      1.72      1.84  7 7 
Kalimantan     1.74      1.76      1.73      1.84  6 6 
Sulawesi     1.77      1.66      1.76      1.85  5 5 
Eastern     1.80      1.96      1.75      1.79  –1 2 
Average     1.75      1.76      1.73      1.81  4 5 
       
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
At the regional level, we calculate four inequality indicators, viz. the Gini coefficient, 
the Theil index, the ratio of the top 10 per cent to the bottom 10 per cent and the decile 
dispersion ratio – the average ratio of the rich to the poor over the rich to the median 
based on per capita household expenditure from 1999 to 2014 (Table 2.1). In general, 
inequality within islands increased from 1987 to 2013. Eastern island was the most 
unequal island in 1987, but this position was taken over by Sulawesi island in 2013 
based on all the indicators. Sulawesi island is the most striking case, in which the rich 
spent almost five times more than the poor. Sulawesi island, a centre of commodity 
production, benefited from the commodity boom, which led to an increase in 
inequality, as we previously discussed. Moreover, if we look at the decile dispersion 




ratio, for which all the figures are always larger than one, we can conclude that the 
increasing gap between the rich and the poor is due to the rich becoming richer rather 
than the poor becoming poorer (or, in other words, the rich benefit more than the 
poor). This pattern is also consistent with per capita food and non-food expenditure, 
for which inequality in non-food expenditure fluctuates strongly between islands 
compared with its food expenditure counterpart (Appendix A2.4). 
Java island has an outstanding position, which may come from the role of 
Jakarta. Akita et al. (2011), in their study of regional income inequality, suggested 
that, since the share of mining has decreased, the spatial distribution of manufacturing 
has played a more important role in the inequality of Sumatra and Kalimantan, while 
the primacy of Jakarta, with strong urbanization economies facilitated by 
globalization and trade and financial liberalization, has determined much of the Java–
Bali region’s inequality and therefore the overall inequality in Indonesia. Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2007) suggested that the effect of globalization on inequality depends 
on a trade protection pattern prior to liberalization; the particular form of liberalization 
and sectors it affected; the flexibility of markets in particular the degree of labor and 
capital mobility; and the existence of other concurrent trends (e.g., skill-biased 
technological change). Trade liberalization and export growth are found to be 
associated with lower income inequality, while increased financial openness is 
associated with higher inequality (Jaumotte et al. 2013). 
Figure 2.4 depicts the variation in the Gini coefficient across provinces in 2014 
and its change with the Gini coefficient in 1987. A high level of inequality has been 
experienced by most of the provinces throughout Indonesia, where more dark blue is 
shown in the top picture. Only a few provinces in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi 
have experienced a substantial increase in the Gini index (bottom picture). The same 
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Figure 2.4 Gini Ratio 2014 and its Change in 1987–2014 across Provinces 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
2.6.1 Relationship between Inequality and per Capita GRDP 
To understand further the relationship between inequality and per capita GRDP across 
provinces, we plot the change in the GRP per capita against the change in inequality 
between 1987 and 2013 and arrange it into four quadrants, that is, (1) “poorer” and 
more unequal, (2) “richer” and more unequal, (3) “richer” and more equal and (4) 
“poorer” and more equal. In general, more provinces are facing increasing inequality 
as well as better economic performance, moving to the second quadrant (Figure 2.5).3 
For instance, poor provinces that are characterized as equal or unequal provinces, such 
as Maluku, East Nusatenggara, West Nusatenggara, Bengkulu and Yogyakarta, 
respectively, are moving to the second quadrant. Jakarta has skyrocketed in terms of 
per capita GRDP and inequality compared with the other provinces.  
 
3 The same patterns are also apparent in the relationship between inequality and per capita 
GRDP excluding oil and gas, per capita GRDP private non-natural resources, and per capita 
GRDP non-agriculture in 1987, 1999 and 2013. 




Figure 2.5 Inequality and Development in 1987 and 2013 
 
Source: Statistic Indonesia and authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
If we look at the economic performance and inequality of Jakarta in 1987, they show 
that its per capita GRDP and its inequality are not the highest ones, but both sharply 
increase in 2013. The role of Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia has played an 
important role in attracting the rich to accumulate their wealth in Jakarta rather than 
other provinces, especially during the commodity boom from 2004 until 2011. This 
phenomenon is evidenced by Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan, which are known as 
resource based but have different development patterns from Jakarta. We suspect that 
these resource-rich provinces create different institutions. For example, the license 
required to extract forestry or mining is different from the license required to extract 
oil and gas; thus, the typical rent seekers are also different. The latter would correlate 
with an increasing gap between the rich and the poor (Baland and Francois 2000; 
Wadho and Hussain 2020). 
 
2.6.2 Kuznets at the Province Level 
To assess further the Kuznets pattern at the province level, as we did at the country 
level, we perform a regression of the Gini index as a proxy for income inequality with 
the various forms of per capita GRP as a proxy for income per capita, the time trend, 
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a dummy for islands (Sumatera, Java–Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Eastern), a 
dummy for fundamental policies or events such as the banking reform (1983–1984 
and 1994–1995), economic reform (1986–1987), the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–
1998), decentralization (2000–2001), democratization (2004–2005) and the 
commodity boom (2006–2011) and interaction dummies with per capita GRP and 
islands. We use data of 33 provinces from BPS. The unit of observation in this model 
is the province, and we use a province-level panel dataset with annual observations 
for the period from 1977 to 2013.  
 
Ineqit = Ui + Tj + β0 + β1 · Incomeit + β2 · [Incomeit]2 + β3 · [Incomeit]3  
+ β4 · time + ∑ βg · d_eventh + ∑ βk ·[d_eventh · Incomeit]  
+ ∑ βl · d_islandp + ∑βq · [d_eventh·d_islandp] + εit         (2.2) 
 
where i represents provinces and t represents time; Ineqit is inequality measured using 
the Gini coefficient; U is a province effect; Tj is a year effect; t is a time trend; Incomeit 
is the income per capita in terms of the GRDP per capita; d_eventh represents an event 
dummy, where h is the oil bonanza, bank reform, economic reform, Asian Financial 
Crisis, decentralization, democratization and commodity boom; d_islandp represents 
an island dummy, where p is Sumatera, Java-Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Eastern 
islands; and εit is the error term.  
At the province level, our results show that income per capita in all forms, 
bank reform, democratization and their interactions are statistically significant in 
affecting the Gini index. However, those events have different effects on islands. For 
instance, the bank reform had a greater impact on Java-Bali while democratization 
affected Sumatera by increasing inequality. Our results also show that the commodity 
boom period is statistically significant in decreasing inequality in Sumatera, Java-Bali 
and Kalimantan. This indicates that the commodity boom benefited not only the elites 
in Jakarta but also the people from those islands. Moreover, other events, such as 
decentralization, economic reform and the second bank reform, tend to increase 
inequality in Java-Bali, Sumatera and Sulawesi. A summary of the regression output 
can be found in Appendix A2.6.    




From the regression results, at the province level, we identify Indonesia’s pattern as a 
typical power-three function following a fraction of the Kuznets curve, and, at the 
district level, we find a typical Kuznets inverted U-shape.4 A similar pattern is 
displayed at the island level with some variations (Appendix A2.7 and A2.8). It seems 
that each province has a different initial stage of development, which affects the 
Kuznets pattern. However, some researchers have argued that Indonesia did not 
follow Kuznets’s prediction in its early stage of development. For three decades 
before the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), Indonesia experienced sustained high growth 
while maintaining a stable Gini coefficient (around 0.32 to 0.36). However, the story 
changed after recovering from the AFC. Even though the economy was able to recover 
fairly quickly from the AFC and was quite robust in the face of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), the Gini coefficient increased rapidly, reaching its highest 
ever peak of 0.41 in 2011 (Tadjoeddin 2013). 
 
2.7 Interpersonal Inequality Dynamics 
In this section we discuss interpersonal inequality dynamics from various aspects 
namely region, income class and polarization.  
 
2.7.1 Interpersonal Inequality Dynamics by Regions 
To describe the dynamics in inequality across islands and provinces, we calculate the 
coefficient of variation for each inequality indicator and each type of household 
expenditure, as presented in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, respectively. This coefficient 
illustrates how one island varies from the other islands. If one island moves 
differently, it means that not all the provinces of that island are moving in the same 
direction, and then the coefficient fluctuates. Both tables describe the variation of the 
Gini index and Theil index as decreasing This means that income inequality tends to 
converge across islands and provinces based on the Theil index and the Gini index. 
 
4 Our regression results across districts do not show that independent variables are 
individually significant, as the country and province levels do, but the overall F-test of the 
district level shows that the variables are jointly significant. 
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However, if we observe the period of the commodity boom starting in late 2003 until 
2013, the variation of all the inequality indicators decreases, implying that the income 
convergence between provinces was supported by a long period of relatively high 
commodity prices, which benefited commodity-exporting provinces.  
Moreover, if we look at the pattern of non-food expenditure, the variation in 
the ratio of the top 10 per cent to the bottom 10 per cent tends to diverge across islands 
while converging across provinces. This pattern indicates that the non-food 
consumption inequality across provinces and within islands varies and that the gap 
between the poor and the rich becomes larger since the non-food expenditure of the 
rich is a larger proportion. As the variance fluctuates in 1999, around the Asian crisis, 
this suggests that the crisis associated with an increasing gap between the rich and the 
poor. 
 
Table 2.2 Variance of Inequality per Capita Household Expenditure, per Capita 
Non-food Expenditure and per Capita Food Expenditure between Islands,        
1987–2013 
Coefficient of Variation 1987 1999 2003 2013 Changes (%) 1987–2013 2003–2013 
       
Total Expenditure       
Gini Index 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 –23 44 
Theil Index 0.18 0.31 0.10 0.16 –10 61 
Ratio P90/P10 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.11 27 78 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 17 97 
       
Non-food Expenditure       
Theil Index 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.12 –12 3 
Ratio P90/P10 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.12 19 58 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 28 26 
       
Food Expenditure       
Theil Index 0.15 0.26 0.16 0.12 –18 –26 
Ratio P90/P10 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.07 –21 –5 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.02 –41 –42 
       
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
  




Table 2.3 Variance of Inequality per Capita Household Expenditure, per Capita 
Non-food Expenditure and per Capita Food Expenditure between Provinces,    
1987–2013 
Coefficient of Variation 1987 1999 2003 2013 Changes (%) 1987–2013 2003–2013 
Total Expenditure       
Gini Index 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 –30 –15 
Theil Index 0.23 0.57 0.26 0.19 –19 –28 
Ratio P90/P10 0.15 0.29 0.20 0.15 –2 –24 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.05 –11 –16 
       
Non-food Expenditure       
Theil Index 0.18 0.36 0.21 0.16 –12 –28 
Ratio P90/P10 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.18 –12 –18 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 10 17 
       
Food Expenditure       
Theil Index 0.22 0.34 0.43 0.18 –18 –58 
Ratio P90/P10 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.11 –16 –36 
Decile Dispersion Ratio 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.04 –24 –43 
     
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
Regarding the variation in the decile dispersion ratio, it tends to decrease for per capita 
food expenditure and is likely to increase for non-food expenditure but fluctuates over 
time. This confirms that the gap in per capita non-food expenditure is much larger 
than that in per capita food expenditure. Moreover, those figures seem to be relatively 
stable over years and the variance correlates with inequality across provinces being 
likely to diverge. It appears that the gap between the rich and the average of the 
population has existed for a long time, and this supports the argument of the rise of 
new elites. 
 Figure 2.6 summarizes the variation in per capita GRDP and per capita 
household expenditure across islands and provinces. In terms of economic 
development, there is wide disparity across provinces but relative stability across 
islands. However, in terms of per capita household expenditure, the variation 
fluctuates more, with a tendency to increase for non-food expenditure and decrease 
for food expenditure as well as for total expenditure. The figure reveals a larger gap 
in non-food expenditure across provinces and islands than in food or total expenditure. 
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Figure 2.6 Variance per Capita Gross Regional Product and Household 
Expenditure across Provinces and Islands, 1987–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
2.7.2 Interpersonal Inequality Dynamics by Income Class 
We explore further the dynamics in interpersonal inequality by income class through 
calculations using the income class based on the total household expenditure and then 
aggregating at the province level. First, we plot the average annual growth per capita 
expenditure and the average initial expenditure in 1987 (in log form) for all provinces, 
as shown in Figure 2.7. This figure suggests that β-convergence existed at the province 
level during the period from 1987 to 2015. The correlation between the growth in real 
per capita household expenditure (henceforth simply “expenditure”) over time and its 
initial level is negative, so there is β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; 
Mankiw et al. 1992). If we compare this with the second period, 1999 to 2015, the 
catching-up process in this period was slower than that in the first period, 1987 to 




2015, as presented by the flatter slope (Appendix A2.8). This might be due to the 
Asian crisis that occurred in 1998, which affected all of Indonesia.  
 
Figure 2.7 Beta Convergence in Household Expenditure                                           
at the Province Level in 1987–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
Note: ACH: Aceh; NSA: North Sumatera; WSA: West Sumatera; RIU: Riau; JBI: Jambi; SSA: South 
Sumatera; BKL: Bengkulu; LMP: Lampung; BBL: Bangka Belitung; RIS: Riau Islands; JKT: Jakarta; 
WJA: West Java; CJA: Central Java; YOG: Yogyakarta; EJA: East Java; BTN: Banten; BLI: Bali; 
WNT: West Nusa Tenggara; ENT: East Nusa Tenggara; WKL: West Kalimantan; CKL: Central 
Kalimantan; SKL: South Kalimantan; EKL: East Kalimantan; NSI: North Sulawesi; CSI: Central 
Sulawesi; SSI: South Sulawesi; TSI: Southeast Sulawesi; GOR: Gorontalo; WSI: West Sulawesi; MAL: 
Maluku; NML: North Maluku; WPA: West Papua; PAP: Papua. 
 
Second, we plot the growth of household expenditure by income class for several 
periods. The higher income class grew faster than the lower income group during the 
periods 1987–2015 and 2000–2015, but the poor grew faster than the rich from 1987 
to 2000 (Figure 2.8). It seems that the time break occurred in 2000. If we look further, 
the growth of non-food expenditure per income class is higher than its counterpart of 
total expenditure. This implies that the rich, instead of the middle class, gained most 
from the globalization in Indonesia, while Milanovic (2016), regarding global income 
inequality, claimed that the winners of globalization are the middle class from 
emerging countries, including Indonesia, and the global top 1 per cent. Our data, using 
household expenditures from Susenas, show that the expenditure of the Indonesian 
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middle class grew faster than that of the other income groups only during the period 
from 2005 to 2015.5  
 
Figure 2.8 Growth Incidence Curve for Indonesia, 1987–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
In line with Milanovic, Leigh and Van der Eng (2009) found that the top income 
shares in Indonesia were relatively large over the course of the twentieth century. This 
finding may surprise some readers as it contradicts the common “growth with equity” 
understanding of Indonesia’s growth experience since the 1960s. Nevertheless, our 
results are bolstered by evidence from other sources. For example, the top wealth 
shares appear to be larger in Indonesia than in many other countries, whether one uses 
data from wealth surveys (Davies et al. 2009) or the Forbes rich lists. Piketty (2014) 
argued that the inequality of assets and wealth ownership has driven increasing 
 
5 Unlike the household expenditure surveyed by Susenas, the information on wealth, tax 
payments and income at the individual level in Indonesia is very limited. As a consequence, 
inequality in wealth could not be calculated and analysed, especially at the province or district 
level. 




within-country income and expenditure inequality around the world. This could have 
occurred in Indonesia. However, only a few studies have discussed this wealth 
inequality in Indonesia (Davies et al. 2009; Leigh and Van der Eng 2009).  
 
Figure 2.9 Interpersonal Inequality Dynamics at the Island Level by Income Class 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
If we look at interpersonal inequality at the island level, not all member provinces 
grew at the same rate within islands. Similar to the province pattern, the low income 
class grew more slowly than the higher income group (Figure 2.9). The initial level 
of per capita expenditure of the lowest income class in Sumatera is equal to the initial 
level of the fourth income class on Eastern island in the full period from 1987 to 2015. 
Sulawesi is an interesting island, which started in 1987 with a low level of expenditure 
and has grown very fast during the past decades, converging with the rich islands. The 
second period of 1999 to 2015 or post crisis era shows that all the islands moved in 
the same direction at a lower growth, with the better-off classes growing faster than 
any other income classes, as depicted by their steeper slopes.  
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Figure 2.10 Interpersonal Inequality Dynamics in Four Provinces  
by Income Class, 1987–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
 
To understand further the dynamics of changing inequality at the province level, we 
observe how the income classes differ in each province. For each income class, we 
plot the annual growth of per capita household expenditure and the initial level of per 
capita consumption. The striking figure shows that the initial level of expenditure of 
the lowest income class in the richest province is much higher than the initial level of 
expenditure of the highest income class in the poorest province or the middle class in 
the particular provinces. For instance, the initial level of expenditure of the lowest 
income class in Jakarta, as the richest province, is more or less the same as the initial 
level of expenditure of the second-highest income class in East Nusatenggara, as the 
poorest province, or almost equal to the initial level of the middle class in Aceh 
(Figure 2.10). Provinces with low initial expenditure grew faster than those with a 
high initial level of expenditure, catching up the rich provinces; this is typical β-
convergence. These patterns clearly show that people’s individual experiences of 
growth and convergence differ vastly depending on their position on the income 
ladder. For each income class, the initial level of per capita household expenditure in 
Jakarta is the highest, and this is nominated as the richest province. Maluku province 
is known as a relatively poor province. However, all of its income classes grew faster 




than any income class in Jakarta. This triggered the question of which factors drive 
income class growth in particular provinces. It might be the quality of human capital, 
quality institutions or development advancement. We will discuss this topic further in 
Chapter 4. 
Figure 2.11 also shows that the initial expenditure of the highest income class 
is higher than that of the other income classes and that it grew much faster. It implies 
that the higher initial household expenditure led to the higher income class growing 
faster and thus the gap between the low and the high income class becoming wider in 
each province. On the other hand, the lowest initial level of per capita expenditure of 
the highest income class is found in South Sulawesi (light green circle, SSI), which is 
equal to the initial level of per capita expenditure of the middle class in Jakarta (Panel 
A). A different pattern is shown in Papua (cranberry circle, PAP), where the income 
classes all grew at almost the same rate. The lowest growth of the highest income 
class in Papua is equal to the growth of the middle class in South Sumatera. People 
from the low income class in Papua seem unlikely to catch up the higher income class 
as the gap between the rich and the poor remains wide. Papua is known as a resource-
based province dominated by mining, but its stage of development is indeed lagging 
behind the other provinces. On the other hand, the lowest initial level of per capita 
expenditure of the highest income class in 1987 is found in South Sulawesi; it is equal 
to the initial level of per capita expenditure of the middle class in Jakarta. A similar 
pattern is displayed for the second period of 1999 to 2015 but with lower growth of 
per capita household expenditure for all income classes in all provinces due to the 
economic crisis. This suggests that the income classes in each province kept growing 
during the crisis (Panel B). 
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Figure 2.11 Inequality Dynamics at the Province Level by Income Class 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS.  
Note: ACH: Aceh; NSA: North Sumatera; WSA: West Sumatera; RIU: Riau; JBI: Jambi; SSA: South 
Sumatera; BKL: Bengkulu; LMP: Lampung; BBL: Bangka Belitung; RIS: Riau Islands; JKT: Jakarta; 
WJA: West Java; CJA: Central Java; YOG: Yogyakarta; EJA: East Java; BTN: Banten; BLI: Bali; 
WNT: West Nusa Tenggara; ENT: East Nusa Tenggara; WKL: West Kalimantan; CKL: Central 
Kalimantan; SKL: South Kalimantan; EKL: East Kalimantan; NSI: North Sulawesi; CSI: Central 
Sulawesi; SSI: South Sulawesi; TSI: Southeast Sulawesi; GOR: Gorontalo; WSI: West Sulawesi; 
MAL: Maluku; NML: North Maluku; WPA: West Papua; PAP: Papua. 




In a recent study on interprovincial income inequality, Kataoka (2018) suggested 
that overall technical inefficiency largely contributed to the reduction in income 
inequality. He also found that the convergence of inequality in resource utilization 
inefficiency had a greater impact on inequality convergence in overall technical 
inefficiency than in resource allocation inefficiency. For instance, in 2010, pure 
labour productivity became a substantial new factor in determining income 
inequality. Since Kataoka used this measurement, which is affected by per capita 
physical and human capital and technology, the spatial allocation imbalance of these 
factors has become a new concern in Indonesia. 
 
2.7.3 Income Polarization 
To extend our discussion on the dynamics of interpersonal inequality in Indonesia, we 
observe how income polarized across islands as well as provinces by classifying 
income into ten deciles; specifically, D1 is the poorest and D10 is the richest. A greater 
degree of heterogeneity at the very top and bottom of the income distribution could 
explain the disparities within countries (Palma 2011). We calculate the ratio of the 
richest (D10) to various income shares to understand the disparity within Indonesia, 
that is, the share of the richest to the poorest (D10/D1), the share of income of the top 
10 per cent to the share of income of the bottom 40 per cent (D10/(D4–D1)) to show 
heterogeneity in the tails, the share of the top 10 per cent to the middle (D10/(D9–D5)) 
and upper middle (D10/(D9–D7)) to show the homogeneity in the middle and various 
ratios of the share of the top 10 per cent to other income shares.    
  
Table 2.4 Island Mean Values for Different Income Ratios, 1987–2015 
Island D10/D1 D10/D2 D9/D2 D10/(D4–D1) 1987 2015 1987 2015 1987 2015 1987 2015 
         
Sumatera 6.34 9.83 4.76 7.22 2.87 3.39 1.11 1.66 
Kalimantan 7.05 8.58 5.39 6.33 3.12 3.28 1.26 1.45 
Sulawesi 7.34 12.05 5.47 8.54 3.20 4.08 1.27 1.95 
Java-Bali 8.95 13.36 6.65 9.96 3.44 4.26 1.55 2.27 
Eastern 9.54 12.29 7.32 8.04 3.62 4.01 1.69 1.86 
         
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
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Java-Bali is the island with the highest levels of inequality and polarization, but it 
moves rapidly closer to the middle of the distribution compared with other islands 
(Table 2.4). The greater inequality in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Papua decreases 
rapidly, and it moves closer to the middle of the distribution. For instance, Jakarta’s 
multiples of “D10/D1”, “D10/D2”, “D9/D2” and “D10/(D4–D1)” in 2015 are about twice 
those of the other provinces (Appendix A2.10).  
Of all the statistics in Table 2.5, the coefficient of variation best shows the 
distributional contrast between the homogeneous middles and the heterogeneous tails 
– the figures of the ratio of the richest to the poorest (D10/D1) is the highest while the 
ratio of the richest to the middle (D10/(D9–D5)) and to the upper class (D10/(D9–D7)) 
is around 0.1. This table also indicates that greater inequality rapidly decreases close 
to the middle of the distribution across provinces in Indonesia. 
 
Table 2.5 Measures of Spread for Income Groups (26 Provinces), 2015 
Income Ratio Median Mean Standard  Deviation 
Coefficient  
of Variation 
D10/D1 9.44 10.23 2.09 0.20 
D10/(D4–D1) 1.67 1.75 0.30 0.17 
D10/(D9–D5) 0.62 0.62 0.06 0.10 
D10/(D9–D7) 0.88 0.88 0.08 0.09 
D10/D9 2.10 2.09 0.15 0.07 
D10/D2 7.25 7.65 1.42 0.19 
D9/D2 3.46 3.65 0.58 0.16 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
   
If we look at the income ratios across provinces, as presented in Appendix A2.11, 
Jakarta is in the top three of all the income ratios. This suggests that Jakarta has the 
highest inequality measured by any ratio. The second province that lies in the top three 
income ratios is West Java, the province with the second-highest inequality in 
Indonesia. Other provinces, such as Yogyakarta, Papua, South Sulawesi and 
Lampung, are also members of the top three in inequality for particular income ratios. 
For instance, Yogyakarta has a high ratio of the rich to the poor, suggesting that the 
inequality in Yogyakarta is led by the growing number of the poor rather than the rich.  
The most interesting pattern is displayed by Lampung and South Sulawesi. 
Lampung occupies the third position of the high income ratio measured by the ratio 
of the richest to the second-highest income (D10/D9). This ratio suggests that the 




cumulative wealth is concentrated in the highest income class and thus inequality is 
worse in Lampung together with Jakarta and West Java. On the other hand, South 
Sulawesi lies in the third position of the middle and upper-middle income ratios. South 
Sulawesi, with Makassar port as a hub for eastern Indonesia and the main port for 
export-import activities, benefited from the commodity boom era, when many 
commodity-exporting provinces were located on Sulawesi island. This increase in the 
middle and upper-middle classes led to higher inequality, as measured by D10/(D9–
D5) and D10/(D9–D7). These ratios also exhibit the most homogeneous provinces, 
namely Jambi, Central Kalimantan and West Sumatera. These three provinces are 
known as agricultural and non-resource-based regions. 
Moreover, Figure 2.12 shows the uniqueness of the income polarization in 
Indonesia. The top three provinces in 1987 (Papua, East Nusatenggara and South East 
Sulawesi) are from different islands, while their counterparts in 2015 are from Java 
island (West Java, Yogyakarta and Jakarta). This indicates that inequality across 
provinces varies by islands. The ranges for the rankings are also different. For 
instance, D10/D2 ranges from 5.8 to 10.6 while D9/D2 only ranges from 3.1 to 4.5 in 
2015.  
 
Figure 2.12 Inequality Ranking in 26 Provinces, 1987 and 2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
Note: We use the Ratio D10/D2 as a base to rank provinces in 1987 and 2015. 
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These patterns show that Indonesia is following the global trend of rising inequality 
in which the highest and lowest income classes are the most volatile while the middle 
income class is homogeneous, as explained by Palma (2011). He introduced two terms 
regarding this global phenomenon: “centrifugal” forces, which increase the diversity 
in the shares of the top 10 and the bottom 40 per cent, and “centripetal” forces, which 
lead to growing uniformity in the income share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. The 
greatest volatility in the income distribution lies at the extreme ends (rich and poor), 
with markedly higher stability in the middle and upper-middle classes. This pattern is 
known as the homogeneous middle, as shown in Appendix A2.12. A similar pattern 
is also apparent in per capita non-food expenditure. Thus, the within-Indonesia 
disparity of inequality basically relates to the distributional fact of the income share 
of the rich. Palma (2011) suggested that political institutional factors and the nature 
of the political settlements in the real world are likely to have a far greater influence 
on the determination of income distribution than purely economic factors. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter studied the income inequality dynamics in Indonesia since 1960, with a 
focus on the period 1987–2015. It used different levels of spatial aggregation: (i) the 
national level (from an international perspective); (ii) the regional level (islands and 
provinces); and (iii) the individual level (income classes). Our analysis at the cross-
country level and at the province level covered the period 1961–2015, while our 
analysis for income classes was based on micro data (from Susenas) for the period 
1987–2015. This approach allowed us to present new insights into the inequality 
dynamics in Indonesia.  
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. Indonesia shows a rising trend 
in inequality measured by the Gini index since 2001 but at a much lower level than 
other countries for many years prior to 2001 and still much lower than leading 
countries in the ASEAN and emerging and African countries. However, this finding 
should be interpreted with care because comparisons across countries face 
measurement problems due to data availability, such as income versus expenditure as 
discussed by Leigh and Van der Eng (2009) and Van Zanden and Marks (2012). 




Instead, our analysis at the regional and individual level mainly used expenditure data 
from the Susenas household survey. We found increasing inequality at all the 
aggregated levels, that is, national, island and province, suggesting the existence of 
increasing spatial disparities along a geographical dimension. Our findings confirm 
the results of Akita and Lukman (1995) and Yusuf et al. (2014). In contrast, the 
variation in inequality across islands and provinces has decreased persistently over 
time, suggesting that the differences in inequality between islands as well as between 
provinces are becoming smaller.  
From the individual perspective, we found that the rapidly increasing 
interpersonal inequality in Indonesia has mainly been driven by strong income growth 
at the top of the income distribution – and this is true for all the provinces and islands 
during the observed period from 1987 to 2015. We also discovered that the highest 
income classes in the relatively poor provinces experienced substantially higher 
income growth than the lowest income classes in the relatively rich provinces. This 
finding is in line with the study conducted by Yusuf et al. (2014), which covered a 
shorter period, 1993 to 2013, and regional dimensions including urban–rural areas and 
Java–non Java regions. Our findings have two implications. First, we can confirm that 
interpersonal inequality kept increasing regardless of the data and methodology 
chosen, as shown by our calculation based on expenditure from the household 
consumption dataset versus top income from the taxation dataset as calculated by 
Davies et al. (2009) and Leigh and Van der Eng (2009). Agustina et al. (2012) also 
found that fuel subsidies benefit the rich disproportionally more than the poor. 
Second, the middle class is not the winner, as concluded by Milanovic (2016), who 
argued that especially the middle class has benefited from globalization. Our 
calculation shows that the middle class grew only relatively fast during the period 
2005–2015. The rich grew quickly over the entire period, while the poor were 
persistently left behind in terms of income growth. Hence, our results are consistent 
with Leigh and Van der Eng (2009), who also concluded that the top income shares 
in Indonesia have been relatively high for a long time, and Van der Weide and 
Milanovic (2014) who concluded that inequality is bad for growth of the poor but not 
for that of the rich.  
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Together, these trends lead to the conclusion that on average the relatively 
poor provinces are catching up with the relatively rich provinces while at the same 
time interpersonal inequality in Indonesia is rising at all levels of spatial aggregation 
– with individual income growth being strongly positively correlated with the 
individual income level. 
Income polarization exists uniquely in Indonesia. We found that the top three 
inequality rankings in 1987 are for Papua, East Nusatenggara and South East 
Sulawesi, and those provinces are from different islands. Meanwhile, the top three 
inequality rankings in 2015 are all from Java islands (West Java, Yogyakarta and 
Jakarta). This indicates that inequality across provinces varies by island as income is 
highly polarized within islands. 
These findings suggest that the increase in inequality may come at the expense 
of the accessibility of certain public services, which we will discuss in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. Those chapters will delve deeper into the accessibility of public services. 
After this descriptive study on inequality dynamics, in the next two chapters, we will 
examine the urban and governance drivers of inequality dynamics. 
  






Appendix A2.1 Constructing True Panel Districts 
We make intensive use of the dataset from BPS, that is, Podes, the Susenas 
consumption module and the Susenas core module. The first two datasets are collected 
every three years, while the latter is collected on a yearly basis. Since 2011, the 
Susenas consumption module has also been collected every year. Our complete 
datasets are available from 1999 onwards. Hence, in total, we have six Podes datasets 
(1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014); eight Susenas consumption module 
datasets (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014); and sixteen Susenas 
core module datasets from 1999 to 2014. 
As a consequence of decentralization, since 2001, many new districts and 
provinces have been established. As of 2014, the total number of new and old districts 
is 511. If we only count the number of old districts by recoding new districts back to 
their parents in 2000, the total number of districts becomes 341. However, not all 
districts are surveyed in Podes, the Susenas consumption module and the Susenas core 
module. Thus, we should select districts that are consistently recorded in those 3 main 
datasets to construct a true panel, and the total number of selected districts is 242. In 
terms of the size of the population, these 242 districts cover about 80 per cent of the 
total population in Indonesia.  
Our main challenge in constructing the true district panel is the coding system 
provided by BPS, that is, not only creating an old code for old districts and a new code 
for new districts but also applying the old code to new districts and the new code to 
old districts. Therefore, to obtain the panel of 242 districts, we undertake the following 
procedures. First, we recode new districts back to their parent districts using the 
identification code base year of 2000 issued by BPS, so the recoding process starts in 
2001. New districts that were established prior to 2000 are considered as parent 
districts. We find some inconsistencies in the coding system. Each dataset has its own 
code reference. For instance, Podes 1999 has two IDs, namely ID 1998 and ID 1999; 
Susenas Core 2000 refers to ID 1999 but Susenas Consumption 2000 refers to ID 
1998; and Podes 2000 uses the ID reference of 1998, while Podes 2005 refers to IDs 
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2002 and 2003. Moreover, the names of districts are not written in the same style. If 
this becomes too confusing, we check the official name written on the decree of 
district establishment at the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
Second, we carefully check the new codes due to the splitting up of issues. 
BPS has changed provinces’ ID, especially Papua, several times. Papua’s original 
province name was Irian Jaya, and its ID was 82 from 1993 until 1998. Irian Jaya 
province then split into two provinces: Papua and West Papua. The ID for both new 
provinces varies according to the year’s reference (Table A2.1.1). Facing these typical 
inconsistencies, we have to recode districts manually by matching the names of 
districts as well as the reference ID. Below is a summary of the process of changing 
IDs for new and parent provinces.   
 
Table A2.1.1 New Code and Its Parent Provinces 
Name of Provinces Province Code Year of Reference 
Riau Islands 14 1993–2001 
20 2002–2005 
21 2006–2014 
Bangka Belitung 16 1993–1998 
19 1999–2014 
Banten 32 1993–1998 
36 1999–2014 
East Kalimantan 64 1993–2009 
65 2010–2014 
Gorontalo 71 1993–1998 
75 1999–2014 
Maluku 81 1993–2014 
81 1993–1998 
North Maluku 82 1999–2014 
Irian Jaya 82 1993–1998 








Note: * Podes, ** Susenas 
 
Third, we recode districts from step 1 to match the ID in each dataset. Podes and 
Susenas have different ID references for particular years. For instance, Podes 2011 
refers to IDs 2008 and 2009 while Susenas 2011 refers to ID 2009. After finishing 
this step, we have a number of districts that were always surveyed in each dataset, 




specifically 293 districts in Podes, 268 districts in the Susenas consumption module 
and 253 districts in the Susenas core module.     
Last, we select districts that are consistently available in all 3 datasets. Some 
provinces, like Aceh, Papua and Maluku, are excluded from Susenas 2000, 2001, 2002 
and 2005 due to conflict areas and tsunami. Hence, we finally have 242 districts as 
the full panel from 1999 to 2014 (Table A2.1.2). Moreover, there are 165 districts that 
have not been split up since 1993, but our data are only available from 1999 onwards. 
We perform this recoding process for all the datasets.  
 
Table A2.1.2 List of 242 Panel Districts  
Name of Districts District Code  
 
Name of Districts District Code 
Kab. Tapanuli Selatan 1203   Kab. Lampung Barat 1801 
Kab. Tapanuli Tengah 1204   Kab. Lampung Selatan 1803 
Kab. Tapanuli Utara 1205   Kab. Lampung Tengah 1805 
Kab. Labuhan Batu 1207   Kab. Lampung Utara 1806 
Kab. Asahan 1208   Kota Bandar Lampung 1871 
Kab. Simalungun 1209   Kab. Bangka 1901 
Kab. Dairi 1210   Kab. Belitung 1902 
Kab. Karo 1211   Kota Pangkal Pinang 1971 
Kab. Deli Serdang 1212   Kota Jakarta Selatan 3171 
Kab. Langkat 1213   Kota Jakarta Timur 3172 
Kota Sibolga 1271   Kota Jakarta Pusat 3173 
Kota Tanjung Balai 1272   Kota Jakarta Barat 3174 
Kota Pematang Siantar 1273   Kota Jakarta Utara 3175 
Kota Tebing Tinggi 1274   Kab. Bogor 3201 
Kota Medan 1275   Kab. Sukabumi 3202 
Kota Binjai 1276   Kab. Cianjur 3203 
Kab. Sawahlunto/Sijunjung 1304   Kab. Bandung 3204 
Kab. Padang Pariaman 1306   Kab. Garut 3205 
Kota Padang 1371   Kab. Tasikmalaya 3206 
Kota Padang Panjang 1374   Kab. Ciamis 3207 
Kota Bukittinggi 1375   Kab. Kuningan 3208 
Kota Payakumbuh 1376   Kab. Cirebon 3209 
Kab. Indragiri Hulu 1402   Kab. Majalengka 3210 
Kab. Indragiri Hilir 1403   Kab. Sumedang 3211 
Kab. Kampar 1406   Kab. Indramayu 3212 
Kab. Bengkalis 1408   Kab. Subang 3213 
Kab. Kepulauan Riau 1410   Kab. Purwakarta 3214 
Kota Pekan Baru 1471   Kab. Karawang 3215 
Kota Batam 1472   Kota Bogor 3271 
Kab. Kerinci 1501   Kota Sukabumi 3272 
Kab. Sarolangun 1503   Kota Bandung 3273 
Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat 1507   Kota Cirebon 3274 
Kab. Tebo 1508   Kota Bekasi 3275 
Kota Jambi 1571   Kab. Cilacap 3301 
Kab. Ogan Komering Ulu 1601   Kab. Banyumas 3302 
Kab. Ogan Komering Ilir 1602   Kab. Purbalingga 3303 
      




      
Kab. Muara Enim 1603   Kab. Banjarnegara 3304 
Kab. Lahat 1604   Kab. Kebumen 3305 
Kab. Musi Rawas 1605   Kab. Purworejo 3306 
Kab. Musi Banyuasin 1606   Kab. Wonosobo 3307 
Kota Palembang 1671   Kab. Magelang 3308 
Kab. Bengkulu Selatan 1701   Kab. Boyolali 3309 
Kab. Rejang Lebong 1702   Kab. Klaten 3310 
Kab. Bengkulu Utara 1703   Kab. Jombang 3517 
Kota Bengkulu 1771   Kab. Nganjuk 3518 
Kab. Sukoharjo 3311   Kab. Madiun 3519 
Kab. Wonogiri 3312   Kab. Magetan 3520 
Kab. Karanganyar 3313   Kab. Ngawi 3521 
Kab. Sragen 3314   Kab. Bojonegoro 3522 
Kab. Grobogan 3315   Kab. Sampang 3527 
Kab. Blora 3316   Kab. Pamekasan 3528 
Kab. Rembang 3317   Kab. Sumenep 3529 
Kab. Pati 3318   Kota Kediri 3571 
Kab. Kudus 3319   Kota Blitar 3572 
Kab. Jepara 3320   Kota Malang 3573 
Kab. Demak 3321   Kota Probolinggo 3574 
Kab. Semarang 3322   Kota Pasuruan 3575 
Kab. Temanggung 3323   Kota Mojokerto 3576 
Kab. Kendal 3324   Kota Madiun 3577 
Kab. Batang 3325   Kota Surabaya 3578 
Kab. Pekalongan 3326   Kab. Pandeglang 3601 
Kab. Pemalang 3327   Kab. Lebak 3602 
Kab. Tegal 3328   Kota Tangerang 3671 
Kab. Brebes 3329   Kab. Jembrana 5101 
Kota Magelang 3371   Kab. Tabanan 5102 
Kota Surakarta 3372   Kab. Badung 5103 
Kota Salatiga 3373   Kab. Gianyar 5104 
Kota Semarang 3374   Kab. Klungkung 5105 
Kota Pekalongan 3375   Kab. Bangli 5106 
Kota Tegal 3376   Kab. Karang Asem 5107 
Kab. Kulon Progo 3401   Kab. Buleleng 5108 
Kab. Gunung Kidul 3403   Kota Denpasar 5171 
Kab. Sleman 3404   Kab. Lombok Barat 5201 
Kota Yogyakarta 3471   Kab. Lombok Tengah 5202 
Kab. Pacitan 3501   Kab. Lombok Timur 5203 
Kab. Ponorogo 3502   Kab. Sumbawa 5204 
Kab. Trenggalek 3503   Kab. Dompu 5205 
Kab. Lumajang 3508   Kab. Bima 5206 
Kab. Jember 3509   Kota Mataram 5271 
Kab. Banyuwangi 3510   Kab. Sumba Barat 5301 
Kab. Bondowoso 3511   Kab. Sumba Timur 5302 
Kab. Situbondo 3512   Kab. Kupang 5303 
Kab. Probolinggo 3513   Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan 5304 
Kab. Pasuruan 3514   Kab. Timor Tengah Utara 5305 
Kab. Sidoarjo 3515   Kab. Belu 5306 
Kab. Mojokerto 3516   Kab. Alor 5307 
Source: BPS, authors’ code. 
 
 




Appendix A2.2 Gini Index and per Capita GDP (PPP Constant 2011 USD): 
Indonesia and Selected Countries, 1990–2013 
Country 
























ASEAN                
Indonesia 
   
4,295  
   
32.0  
   
5,552  
   
32.9  
   
8,027  
   
38.0  
   
9,254  
   
41.3  115 29 
Malaysia 
   
10,155  
   
44.6  
   
15,688  
   
44.9  
   
20,390  
   
43.8  
   
22,556  
   
42.8  122 –4 
Philippines 
   
4,010  
   
42.8  
   
4,243  
   
46.1  
   
5,614  
   
42.6  
   
6,325  
   
41.6  58 –3 
Thailand 
   
6,369  
   
45.2  
   
8,939  
   
43.2  
   
12,822  
   
39.4  
   
13,932  
   
37.5  119 –17 
           
           
EMERGING               
Brazil 
   
9,997  
   
60.4  
   
11,015  
   
58.6  
   
14,043  
   
53.1  
   
14,555  
   
51.3  46 –15 
China 
   
1,554  
   
34.6  
   
3,609  
   
45.8  
   
9,230  
   
48.1  
   
11,525  
   
47.3  642 37 
India 
   
1,812  
   
29.7  
   
2,600  
   
32.7  
   
4,638  
   
33.9  
   
5,238  
   
34.5  189 16 
South Korea 
   
12,087  
   
29.5  
   
20,757  
   
31.7  
   
30,440  
   
31.0  
   
32,708  
   
30.5  171 3 
           
           
AFRICAN               
Kenya 
   
2,009  
   
57.5*  
   
1,812  
   
49.0  
   
2,080  
   
45.1  
   
2,193  
   
47.7  9 –17 
Nigeria 
   
3,050  
   
42.9  
   
2,855  
   
49.6  
   
5,148  
   
48.8  
   
5,676  
   
51.9  86 21 
South Africa 
   
9,935  
   
67.0  
   
9,519  
   
68.0  
   
11,651  
   
69.5  
   
12,106  
   
68.2  22 2 
           
           
RICH               
Australia 
   
28,546  
   
27.9  
   
35,247  
   
31.3  
   
41,328  
   
31.0  
   
42,810  
   
31.5  50 13 
Japan 
   
29,550  
   
23.9  
   
32,186  
   
24.6  
   
34,571  
   
25.5  
   
35,481  
   
25.6  20 7 
Singapore 
   
34,202  
   
43.6  
   
51,491  
   
41.4  
   
71,816  
   
42.7  
   
76,237  
   
41.2  123 –6 
USA 
   
36,982  
   
34.9  
   
45,956  
   
35.6  
   
49,307  
   
38.0  
   
51,451  
   
39.2  39 12 
Note: * The GINI index for Kenya pertains to 1992. 
Source: WDI, UNDP, OECD, CBS from respective countries.  
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Appendix A2.3 Regression Results for Kuznets Countries 
log income  31.66***  
(10.69) 
log income2 –3.056**  
(1.37) 
log income3 0.0899  
(0.06) 
year 0.222  
(1.41) 
decentralization –2.886  
(4.77) 
democratization –1.289  
(4.02) 
commodity boom –4.051  
(6.26) 
period 1970s –8.190  
(26.85) 
period 1980s –2.893  
(14.15) 
period 1990s 0.164  
(14.14) 
period 2000s –0.258  
(1.63) 
period 2010s –0.0255  
(4.92) 
Interaction Income and Event Dummies 
 
      income and decentralization 0.281  
(0.23) 
      income and democratization 0.0917  
(0.31) 
     income and commodity boom 0.281  
(0.28) 
Interaction Event Dummies and Country Dummies 
 
Latin  
      decentralization and Latin 0.519  
(1.39) 
      democratization and Latin –1.335  
(1.15) 
     commodity boom and Latin –0.404  
(1.12) 
East Asia  
      decentralization and East Asia –0.753  
(1.76) 
      democratization and East Asia 0.378  
(1.43) 
      commodity boom and East Asia 0.696  
(1.36) 
Middle East  
      decentralization and Middle East  1.463  
(3.24) 
      democratization and Middle East  –1.510  
(2.28) 
     commodity boom and Middle East  0.867  
(2.18) 
  





Interaction Period Dummies and Country Dummies  
Latin  
     period 1970s and Latin 3.114***  
(1.05) 
     period 1980s and Latin 2.813***  
(0.91) 
     period 1990s and Latin –0.785  
(0.78) 
     period 2000s and Latin 1.203  
(1.28) 
     period 2010s and Latin –3.576**  
(1.46) 
East Asia  
     period 1970s and East Asia 1.206  
(0.94) 
     period 1980s and East Asia –1.076  
(0.82) 
     period 1990s and East Asia –0.927  
(0.77) 
     period 2000s and East Asia –0.0160  
(1.60) 
     period 2010s and East Asia –1.558  
(1.16) 
Middle East  
     period 1970s and Middle East  3.325  
(2.18) 
     period 1980s and Middle East  –2.050  
(1.99) 
      period 1990s and Middle East  –0.135  
(1.65) 
     period 2000s and Middle East  –1.404  
(2.66) 
     period 2010s and Middle East  –0.356  
(2.13)   
Constant –495.5  
(2,766)   
Number of Observations 2,084 
R-squared 0.163 
Number of countries 95 
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Appendix A2.4 Inequality within Islands:  
Per Capita Food and Non-food Expenditure, 1987–2013 
 1987 1999 2003 2013 Changes (%) 
1987–2013 2003–2013 
Per Capita Food Expenditure 
Theil Index       
Sumatera       9.82      10.46      11.55      10.48  6.7 –9.3 
Java-Bali     11.08      12.24      16.46      12.62  13.9 –23.3 
Kalimantan     11.23      10.97      12.84      11.62  3.4 –9.5 
Sulawesi     11.17         9.81      11.01      14.33  28.2 30.2 
Eastern     14.47      17.56      13.83      13.56  –6.3 –2.0 
Average     11.55      12.21      13.14      12.52  8.4 –4.7 
       
Ratio P90/P10       
Sumatera        2.84         2.92         2.91         2.98  4.8 2.3 
Java-Bali        3.03         3.13         3.25         3.32  9.7 2.2 
Kalimantan        3.11         3.00         3.14         3.13  0.7 –0.3 
Sulawesi        3.10         2.88         3.01         3.53  13.7 17.0 
Eastern        3.56         4.41         3.48         3.38  –5.0 –2.8 
Average        3.13         3.27         3.16         3.27  4.4 3.4 
       
Decile Dispersion Ratio       
Sumatera        1.61         1.63         1.66         1.62  0.3 –2.3 
Java-Bali        1.63         1.65         1.67         1.66  1.8 –0.8 
Kalimantan        1.67         1.69         1.72         1.66  –0.5 –3.1 
Sulawesi        1.71         1.60         1.71         1.68  –1.9 –1.9 
Eastern        1.74         2.01         1.80         1.70  –2.2 –5.3 
Average        1.67         1.72         1.71         1.66  –0.5 –2.7 
              
Per Capita Non-food Expenditure 
Theil Index       
Sumatera     37.52      40.92      38.19      52.66  40.3 37.9 
Java-Bali     40.39      56.43      36.59      58.01  43.6 58.5 
Kalimantan     39.94      39.51      40.37      47.77  19.6 18.3 
Sulawesi     36.97      37.45      43.53      64.47  74.4 48.1 
Eastern     50.31      41.90      32.08      52.45  4.3 63.5 
Average     41.03      43.24      38.15      55.07  34.2 44.3 
       
Ratio P90/P10       
Sumatera        6.65         6.79         5.96         6.92  4.1 16.1 
Java-Bali        6.47         7.39         6.57         8.50  31.4 29.2 
Kalimantan        7.73         7.57         6.48         7.34  –5.0 13.4 
Sulawesi        7.37         7.28         6.97         9.32  26.5 33.6 
Eastern        8.21         7.26         5.80         8.43  2.7 45.3 
Average        7.28         7.26         6.36         8.10  11.2 27.4 




      Continued 
Decile Dispersion Ratio       
Sumatera        2.27         2.34         2.19         2.22  –2.5 1.3 
Java-Bali        2.17         2.29         2.19         2.29  5.3 4.7 
Kalimantan        2.41         2.52         2.28         2.53  5.0 11.3 
Sulawesi        2.39         2.30         2.38         2.46  3.0 3.1 
Eastern        2.36         2.33         2.14         2.35  –0.4 9.7 
Average        2.32         2.36         2.24         2.37  2.1 6.0 
              
Source: Susenas, authors’ calculation. 
 
  
Appendix A2.5 Gini Ratio 2014 and Its Change 1999–2014 across Districts  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
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Appendix A2.6 Regression Results for Kuznets Provinces 
log income  97.40**  
(42.06) 
log income2 –9.106**  
(3.92) 
log income3 0.287**  
(0.12) 
year 0.222  
(0.59) 
bank reform1 –24.94***  
(7.54) 
economic reform –0.823  
(7.59) 
bank reform2 –7.521  
(6.64) 
Asian crisis 5.218  
(7.56) 
decentralization 10.58  
(7.52) 
democratization 26.53***  
(7.81) 
commodity boom –11.08  
(8.12) 
InteractionIncome and Event Dummies 
 
     income and bank reform1 1.791***  
(0.55) 
     income and economic reform –0.376  
(0.54) 
     income and bank reform2 0.439  
(0.61) 
     income and asian crisis –0.796  
(0.70) 
     income and decemtralization –0.947  
(0.69) 
     income and democratization –2.244***  
(0.73) 
     income and commodity boom 1.622**  
(0.64) 




      bank reform1 and Sumatera –0.963  
(1.21) 
      economic reform and Sumatera 3.951***  
(1.13) 
      bank reform2 and Sumatera 1.390 
(1.03) 
      asian crisis and Sumatera 0.571  
(1.26) 
      decentralization and Sumatera 1.476  
(1.27) 
      democratization and Sumatera 2.503*  
(1.37) 




     bank reform1 and Java-Bali 2.214*  
(1.22) 






      economic reform and Java-Bali 3.436***  
(1.17) 
      bank reform2 and Java-Bali 0.342  
(1.09) 
      Asian crisis and Java-Bali –1.080  
(1.34) 
      decentralization and Java-Bali 2.611*  
(1.33) 
      democratization and Java-Bali 1.046  
(1.43) 




     bank reform1 and Kalimantan 2.236  
(1.43) 
     economic reform and Kalimantan 1.792  
(1.34) 
     bank reform2 and Kalimantan 1.040  
(1.25) 
     Asian crisis and Kalimantan 0.450  
(1.56) 
    decentralization and Kalimantan 2.270  
(1.55) 
    democratization and Kalimantan 0.383  
(1.65) 




      bank reform1 and Sulawesi 0.106  
(1.24) 
      economic reform and Sulawesi –1.713  
(1.17) 
     bank reform2 and Sulawesi 2.772**  
(1.14) 
     Asian crisis and Sulawesi –2.006  
(1.39) 
     decentralization and Sulawesi 1.201  
(1.35) 
     democratization and Sulawesi 1.932  
(1.42) 
     commodity boom and Sulawesi –1.072  
(1.22)   
Constant –756.2  
(1,186)   
Number of Observations 984 
R-squared 0.698 
Number of provinces 33 
  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
60 Chapter 2 
 
 
Appendix A2.7 Kuznets Estimation at the Province Level 
 
Source: Authors’ estimate.  
Note: Java-Bali islands (Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta, Bali); 
Sumatera (Aceh, North Sumatera, South Sumatera, West Sumatera, Riau, Riau islands, Bangka 
Belitung, Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung); Kalimantan (West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, South Kalimantan); Sulawesi (North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, South East Sulawesi, 
West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Gorontalo), Eastern Islands (East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa 








Appendix A2.8 Kuznets Estimation at the District Level 
 
Source: Authors’ estimate. 
Note: list of districts per island can be found in Appendix A2.1. 
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Appendix A2.9 Beta Convergence of Household Expenditure at Province Level 
1999–2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Susenas, BPS.  
Note: ACH: Aceh; NSA: North Sumatera; WSA: West Sumatera; RIU: Riau; JBI: Jambi; SSA: South 
Sumatera; BKL: Bengkulu; LMP: Lampung; BBL: Bangka Belitung; RIS: Riau Islands; JKT: Jakarta; 
WJA: West Java; CJA: Central Java; YOG: Yogyakarta; EJA: East Java; BTN: Banten; BLI: Bali; 
WNT: West Nusa Tenggara; ENT: East Nusa Tenggara; WKL: West Kalimantan; CKL: Central 
Kalimantan; SKL: South Kalimantan; EKL: East Kalimantan; NSI: North Sulawesi; CSI: Central 
Sulawesi; SSI: South Sulawesi; TSI: Southeast Sulawesi; GOR: Gorontalo; WSI: West Sulawesi; MAL: 
Maluku; NML: North Maluku; WPA: West Papua; PAP: Papua. 
 
  




Appendix A2.10 Province Mean Values for Different Income Ratio, 1987–2015 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
Note: ACH: Aceh; NSA: North Sumatera; WSA: West Sumatera; RIU: Riau; JBI: Jambi; SSA: South 
Sumatera; BKL: Bengkulu; LMP: Lampung; BBL: Bangka Belitung; RIS: Riau Islands; JKT: Jakarta; 
WJA: West Java; CJA: Central Java; YOG: Yogyakarta; EJA: East Java; BTN: Banten; BLI: Bali; 
WNT: West Nusa Tenggara; ENT: East Nusa Tenggara; WKL: West Kalimantan; CKL: Central 
Kalimantan; SKL: South Kalimantan; EKL: East Kalimantan; NSI: North Sulawesi; CSI: Central 
Sulawesi; SSI: South Sulawesi; TSI: Southeast Sulawesi; GOR: Gorontalo; WSI: West Sulawesi; 




D10/D1 D10/D2 D9/D2 D10/(D4–D1) 
1987 2015 1987 2015 1987 2015 1987 2015 
         
ACH 6.01 8.66 4.74 6.52 2.85 3.11 1.09 1.53 
NSA 6.75 8.72 4.88 6.57 2.93 3.13 1.15 1.51 
WSA 5.89 8.79 4.51 6.79 2.84 3.18 1.06 1.59 
RIU 5.67 9.37 4.41 7.21 2.67 3.35 1.04 1.65 
JBI 4.75 8.95 3.87 6.82 2.48 3.03 0.91 1.57 
SSA 6.23 8.57 4.42 6.47 2.67 3.36 1.05 1.49 
BKL 5.30 9.67 4.26 7.37 2.61 3.54 1.01 1.71 
LMP 6.34 9.42 4.96 7.33 2.82 3.22 1.16 1.71 
JKT 6.55 14.11 5.13 10.63 2.88 4.48 1.22 2.33 
WJA 6.36 13.15 5.08 9.83 2.96 4.25 1.19 2.22 
CJA 6.27 11.06 4.82 8.30 2.75 3.67 1.13 1.92 
YOG 6.67 14.23 5.25 10.41 3.05 4.93 1.23 2.35 
EJA 7.81 12.27 5.92 9.27 2.99 4.10 1.39 2.14 
BLI 7.59 10.23 5.65 7.62 3.12 3.92 1.33 1.72 
WNT 7.03 9.69 5.43 7.29 2.88 3.50 1.26 1.69 
ENT 8.38 8.70 6.55 6.72 3.26 3.21 1.53 1.56 
WKL 5.70 7.92 4.44 5.95 2.71 3.20 1.05 1.38 
CKL 5.88 8.60 4.63 6.27 2.86 3.21 1.08 1.42 
SKL 6.07 8.74 4.80 6.64 3.00 3.35 1.12 1.52 
EKL 7.75 7.97 5.69 5.81 3.19 3.14 1.33 1.34 
NSI 7.31 9.46 5.32 7.00 3.10 3.63 1.25 1.59 
CSI 6.46 9.71 4.88 7.36 3.14 3.42 1.12 1.71 
SSI 6.44 13.09 4.90 9.53 2.87 4.18 1.15 2.18 
TSI 8.18 11.93 6.26 8.61 3.58 4.17 1.42 1.95 
MAL 7.68 8.52 6.02 6.74 3.41 3.50 1.39 1.56 
PAP 12.74 14.59 8.76 9.77 5.03 5.19 1.96 2.10 
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Appendix A2.11 Different Income Ratios by Province, 2015 
PROV D10/D1 D10/D2 D9/D2 D10/(D4–D1)) D10/(D9–D5) D10/(D9–D7) D10/D9 
        
ACH 8.66 6.52 3.11 1.53 0.61 0.87 2.10 
NSA 8.72 6.57 3.13 1.51 0.59 0.85 2.10 
WSA 8.79 6.79 3.18 1.59 0.62 0.89 2.14 
RIU 9.37 7.21 3.35 1.65 0.63 0.90 2.15 
JBI 8.95 6.82 3.03 1.57 0.63 0.91 2.25 
SSA 8.57 6.47 3.36 1.49 0.56 0.80 1.93 
BKL 9.67 7.37 3.54 1.71 0.63 0.89 2.08 
LMP 9.42 7.33 3.22 1.71 0.68 0.96 2.28 
JKT 14.11 10.63 4.49 2.33 0.74 1.02 2.37 
WJA 13.15 9.83 4.25 2.22 0.73 1.01 2.31 
CJA 11.06 8.30 3.67 1.92 0.69 0.96 2.26 
YOG 14.23 10.41 4.93 2.35 0.69 0.93 2.11 
EJA 12.27 9.27 4.10 2.14 0.69 0.96 2.26 
BLI 10.23 7.62 3.92 1.72 0.58 0.81 1.95 
WNT 9.69 7.29 3.50 1.69 0.62 0.87 2.08 
ENT 8.70 6.72 3.21 1.56 0.61 0.87 2.10 
WKL 7.92 5.96 3.20 1.38 0.54 0.77 1.86 
CKL 8.60 6.27 3.21 1.42 0.54 0.79 1.96 
SKL 8.74 6.64 3.35 1.52 0.57 0.82 1.98 
EKL 7.97 5.81 3.14 1.34 0.52 0.75 1.85 
NSI 9.46 7.00 3.63 1.59 0.56 0.79 1.93 
CSI 9.71 7.37 3.42 1.71 0.64 0.91 2.16 
SSI 13.09 9.53 4.18 2.18 0.71 0.98 2.28 
TSI 11.93 8.61 4.17 1.95 0.65 0.91 2.07 
MAL 8.52 6.74 3.50 1.56 0.57 0.80 1.93 
PAP 14.59 9.77 5.19 2.10 0.60 0.82 1.88 
        
Source: Authors’ calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
Note: ACH: Aceh; NSA: North Sumatera; WSA: West Sumatera; RIU: Riau; JBI: Jambi; SSA: South 
Sumatera; BKL: Bengkulu; LMP: Lampung; BBL: Bangka Belitung; RIS: Riau Islands; JKT: Jakarta; 
WJA: West Java; CJA: Central Java; YOG: Yogyakarta; EJA: East Java; BTN: Banten; BLI: Bali; 
WNT: West Nusa Tenggara; ENT: East Nusa Tenggara; WKL: West Kalimantan; CKL: Central 
Kalimantan; SKL: South Kalimantan; EKL: East Kalimantan; NSI: North Sulawesi; CSI: Central 
Sulawesi; SSI: South Sulawesi; TSI: Southeast Sulawesi; GOR: Gorontalo; WSI: West Sulawesi; MAL: 
Maluku; NML: North Maluku; WPA: West Papua; PAP: Papua. 
 
  




Appendix A2.12 Variance per Capita Household Expenditure and per Capita Non-
food Expenditure across Provinces and Islands by Income Class, 1987–2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Susenas, BPS. 
  
 








Chapter 3 City Size Distribution and Regional 
Income Inequality Dynamics in Indonesia 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we explore the relationship between income inequality and 
urbanization in Indonesia. In the previous chapter, we found that, over the last 
decades, the relatively strong economic growth in Indonesia has been associated with 
rapidly increasing income inequality. We also found evidence for regional 
convergence of inequality across islands and provinces, driven by the fact that the 
incomes of the rich in poor regions grew faster than those of the poor in rich regions. 
The middle class and especially the top incomes seem to benefit most from the 
economic growth dynamics. All of these findings may well relate to the fact that the 
relatively high GDP growth in Indonesia – around 5.5 per cent since the end of the 
recovery – is associated with rapid urbanization and the geographical concentration 
of economic activities in places like Jakarta. The urbanization rate in Indonesia rose 
continually from 42.0% in 2000 to 49.9% in 2010 and 55.3% in 2018 (United Nations 
2018) due to either an increase in the number of cities or an increase in the size of the 
existing cities. Does urbanization in Indonesia associate with an increased inequality?  
The urbanization rate in Indonesia has been faster than the average 
urbanization rate in Asia since 1993, when Indonesian’s rate was 33.8 per cent and 
reached 50.0 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 3.1). Nearly all countries became at least 
50.0 per cent urbanized before reaching middle-income status, and all high-income 
countries are 70–80 per cent urbanized. The high urbanization rate in Indonesia is 
associated with the implementation of an industrialization policy characterized by a 
transition from import substitution to export promotion, combined with liberalization 
and a banking reform in the mid-1990s. UN (2018) predicted more than 70 per cent 
of the world’s population will live in cities in 2044. It seems that Indonesia needed 
only three decades to accomplish what today’s industrialized countries took a century 
or more to achieve. Moreover, the number of urban agglomerations with at least 300 
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thousand inhabitants is expected to be 10 times higher than the number of urban 
agglomerations in 1950, and the number of cities with between 1 and 5 million 
inhabitants is expected to increase from 1 in 1950 to 9 in 2000 and 18 in 2035 (UN 
2018). 
 
 Figure 3.1 Urbanization Rate in Indonesia and the Region, 1950–2050 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from United Nations (2018).   
 
Against this background, this chapter aims to explore whether and to what extent the 
number, size and distribution of cities might explain the evolution of inequality in 
Indonesia. Understanding the relationshiop between the size and distribution of cities 
and income inequality is important for policy makers in dealing with urban life and 
sustainable inclusive development. The impact of agglomeration on inequality relates 
to two main literatures, namely development economics and urban economics. A key 
question in this literature is what the relationship between inequality and development 
(including urbanization) looks like, inspired by the Kuznets hypothesis, which 
suggests a hump-shaped relationship. The Kuznets curve hypothesis has a spatial 
equivalent: the income gap between urban and rural areas first widens and then 
narrows. Important empirical contributions to the literature on inequality and 
economic development are the studies by Knight and Sabot (1983), Anand and 
Kanbur (1993) and Deininger and Squire (1997, 1998). Specific attention has also 




been paid to cities, but the size and income distribution of cities has not been studied 
much. Exceptions are the studies by Nord (1980), who focused on income inequality 
and city size; Sagala et al. (2014), who analysed the relationship between inequality 
and the process of urbanization; Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013), who studied wage 
inequality in larger cities; and Akita and Miyata (2008), who conducted an inequality 
decomposition analysis for urban and rural areas. 
From the urban economics perspectives, the earlier literature suggested that 
the relationship between city size and inequality is negative, but recent studies have 
proposed that this relationship is positive. Due to a lack of data, most empirical studies 
are carried out at the country level, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between 
inequality and urbanization (Angeles 2010) or between inequality and city size 
(Castells-Quintana 2018). In urban development, agglomeration economies become 
more important over time, resulting in peripheral regions becoming urbanized 
(Henderson 2003) and cities that already exist becoming even bigger because of the 
important human capital accumulation and externalities (Henderson 2007). 
Furthermore, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) claimed that skill groups and industries 
that are disproportionately located in larger cities experience larger increases in their 
wage dispersion than those in smaller cities. Thus, these factors generate the city size-
specific component of inequality growth. Ferré et al. (2012) found that inequality 
within large cities is not driven by a severe dichotomy between slum dwellers and 
others. However, very little evidence has confirmed that inequality in metropolitan 
areas is greater than inequality in smaller cities. In the case of Indonesia, Sagala et al. 
(2014) argued that the relationship between inequality and urbanization is an inverted 
U-shape and that it attains a peak if the urbanization rate is around 46–50 per cent. 
They claimed that inequality can be expected to decrease in Indonesia because it 
reached its peak at with an urbanization rate of around 50 per cent in 2010.  
In this chapter, we focus specifically on exploring the relationship between 
average city size and inequality, which is a somewhat underexplored topic in the 
literature, as described above. More specifically, in this chapter, we investigate 
whether the average city size – which is in itself a product of agglomeration 
economies associated with economic growth – is correlated with the inequality levels 
across provinces in Indonesia. Recently, Castells-Quintana (2018) tested the 
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relationship between inequality and city size across countries. He found a U-shaped 
relationship between average city size and income inequality: inequality first falls and 
then increases with average city size. However, we would like to argue that this kind 
of analysis is more interesting at the level of provinces rather than countries since each 
country has different regulations regarding urbanization. In addition, the mobility of 
people and goods across provinces within one country is in general easier and thus 
more intense than their mobility across countries. For example, people from rural 
regions tend to migrate to the cities within the same country rather than migrating to 
a different country. Therefore, in this chapter, we address this gap by empirically 
examining the question of whether the average size of a province’s cities can explain 
inequality. Following Castells-Quintana (2018), we define the average agglomeration 
size for cities above 300 thousand inhabitants and employ this as an explanatory 
variable in the panel data regression analysis in 32 provinces over the period between 
1990 and 2014.6 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 
describe, respectively, the dynamic of urbanization in Indonesia and methodology that 
we use in this chapter. Section 3.4 then presents and discusses the key results of our 
analyses as well as several robustness checks. Finally, section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 City Size Dynamics 
We are interested in the relationship between the size and distribution of cities and 
income inequality at the provincial level. This is a somewhat underexplored topic, 
also because defining a city is not straightforward. For that reason, we intend to work 
with a range of definitions, one that we will use to examine metropolitan regions and 
one that we will use to make a distinction between several cities that constitute 
metropolitan areas. We will use different samples later.  
In this chapter, due to data availability, we calculate the average agglomeration 
size in each province from 1990 to 2014. The average city size across provinces is 
615,000 inhabitants. Jakarta as one city accounts for the highest number with 
 
6 We use the term average agglomeration size interchangeably with average medium-sized 
city because those terms refer to the same definition. 




8,884,000, followed by West Java with 912,000 and Banten with 793,000. However, 
if we unbundle Jakarta into five cities, the national average city size drops to 393,000 
inhabitants and Jakarta’s average size becomes 1,777,000. We also rank the average 
city size at the province level, and these figures seem to be consistent with Zipf’s law, 
which states that the second-largest average city size of 912,000 (West Java) is about 
half of the largest average city size of Jakarta (1,777,000), and the third-largest 
average city size is 793,000 (Banten). Jakarta, as the capital city of Indonesia, outstrips 
the others’ average agglomeration size, and its dominance has been increasing since 
1980. A detailed size of the various cities that constitute integrated Jakarta is presented 
in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Metropolitan Region of Jakarta, 1980–2015 
Area 
Population (in millions)  Changes (%) 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2015   2000–2010 2010–2015 2000–2015 
          
Core 6.5 8.26 8.39 9.6 10.17  14.4 5.9 21.2 
   Jakarta* 6.5 8.26 8.39 9.6 10.17  14.4 5.9 21.2 
          
Inner peripheries n.a n.a 4.93 7.22 8.36  46.5 15.8 69.6 
City of Tangerang n.a n.a 1.33 1.8 2.04  35.3 13.3 53.4 
City of S. 
Tangerang n.a n.a 0.8 1.29 1.53  61.3 18.6 91.3 
City of Depok n.a n.a 1.14 1.75 2.09  53.5 19.4 83.3 
City of Bekasi n.a n.a 1.66 2.38 2.7  43.4 13.4 62.7 
          
Outer peripheries 5.41 8.88 7.31 11.2 13.09  53.2 16.9 79.1 
City of Bogor 0.25 0.27 0.75 0.95 1.04  26.7 9.5 38.7 
Tangerang 
Regency 1.53 2.77 2.02 2.84 3.36  40.6 18.3 66.3 
Bekasi Regency 1.14 2.1 1.62 2.63 3.23  62.3 22.8 99.4 
Bogor Regency 2.49 3.74 2.92 4.78 5.46  63.7 14.2 87.0 
Metropolitan Region  
of Jakarta 11.91 17.14 20.63 28.02 31.62  35.8 12.8 53.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Rukmana (2018). 
* excluding district of Kepulauan Seribu from Jakarta’s administration. 
 
As a metropolitan region or Jabotadebek,7 the outer peripheries grow faster than the 
inner peripheries as well as the core city of Jakarta, with corresponding figures of 21.2 
 
7 The peripheries of Jakarta consist of two jurisdictions of provinces, namely the City of 
Depok, City of Bogor, Regency of Bogor, City of Bekasi and Regency of Bekasi, which are 
within West Java province, and the City of Tangerang, Regency of Tangerang and City of 
South Tangerang, which constitute Banten province. 
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per cent and 53.3 per cent for the metropolitan region of Jakarta from 2000 to 2015. 
This high growth is partly the result of national policies to build large-scale industries 
in the peripheries of Greater Jakarta, which shifted manufacturing from the central 
city to the periphery, while Jakarta, as a core city, has disproportionately attracted 
investments in the service industry, such as finance and business, trade, and hotels 
and restaurants (Rukmana et al. 2018). A large migration flow from the urban core to 
the outskirts is an important factor explaining population growth in big cities in 
Indonesia. For instance, the share of the Jabotadebek population in Indonesia’s 
population increased from 8.1 per cent in 1980 to 9.6 per cent in 1990 and 10.0 per 
cent in 2000 (Rukmana 2015) and its population density increased substantially from 
25.5 persons per square hectare in 1990 to 37.6 in 2000 and 44.6 in 2010 (Firman 
2014). Similar tendencies can be found in the second- and third-largest metropolitan 
areas, namely Surabaya as the capital city of East Java province, known as 
Gerbangkertosusila, and Bandung as the capital city of West Java province, called 
Bandung Raya. Industrial estates and most foreign investors are also located in the 
peripheries of those metropolitan regions. The peripheries’ population is growing 
faster than the core’s population, and the proportion of the core population in the total 
metropolitan areas is tending to decrease (Appendix A3.1). As a consequence, the 
concentration of skilled labour and entrepreneurs in the metropolitan regions will 
shape the socio-economic disparities. 
If we look at the trend, the average agglomeration size across provinces is 
rising over time and the percentage of the population living in cities with at least 1 
million inhabitants tends to increase during the period from 1990 to 2014 (Appendix 
A3.2). These trends translate into more and more people living in large cities.  
 
  




Table 3.2 Urbanization Dynamics across Provinces, 1990–2014  
Province 
Average City Size 300k      
 (in millions) 
 % Change in Ave. City Size 300k 





Aceh n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
North Sumatera 1.74 1.91 2.19  9.7 14.7 25.8 
West Sumatera 0.63 0.71 0.89  12.5 24.1 39.7 
Riau 0.40 0.59 1.00  45.1 71.3 148.6 
Jambi 0.34 0.42 0.57  22.1 35.5 65.5 
South Sumatera 1.15 1.22 1.55  5.9 27.3 34.8 
Bengkulu n.a. n.a. 0.34  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lampung 0.64 0.74 0.95  15.4 28.5 48.3 
Bangka Belitung n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Riau Islands 0.34 0.46 1.13  36.1 146.7 235.9 
Jakarta 8.54 8.61 10.02  0.8 16.4 17.3 
Jakarta Metropolitan 17.4 20.63 28.46  20.4 37.9 66.0 
West Java  1.21 1.18 1.20  –2.8 2.3 –0.6 
Central Java 0.88 0.89 1.09  1.8 21.4 23.6 
Yogyakarta 0.41 0.40 0.41  –3.6 2.2 –1.5 
East Java  1.59 1.68 1.84  6.0 9.2 15.7 
Banten 1.00 0.81 1.12  –18.6 38.2 12.5 
Bali 0.40 0.52 0.86  31.2 64.8 116.3 
West Nusa Tenggara n.a. 0.32 0.44  n.a. 37.6 n.a. 
East Nusa Tenggara n.a. n.a. 0.37  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
West Kalimantan 0.40 0.47 0.59  18.3 25.8 48.8 
Central Kalimantan n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
South Kalimantan 0.48 0.53 0.66  9.3 25.7 37.4 
East Kalimantan 0.38 0.46 0.71  22.9 53.4 88.5 
North Sulawesi 0.32 0.41 0.42  26.3 3.6 30.9 
Central Sulawesi n.a. n.a. 0.36  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
South Sulawesi 0.95 1.10 1.42  16.0 29.3 50.0 
South East Sulawesi n.a. n.a. 0.33  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Gorontalo n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Maluku n.a. n.a. 0.39  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
North Maluku n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
West Papua n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Papua n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
        
Average 1.15 1.17 1.23  2.1 5.4 7.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations from various editions of BPS and MOHA.   
 
At the province level, Table 3.2 presents the average agglomeration size for cities with 
over 300 thousand residents across provinces and its change from 1990 to 2014. On 
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average, the percentage of change in the agglomerated city size is 7.5 per cent for the 
last 24 years, but some provinces show an increasing city size which more than 
doubled, such as Bali, the Riau islands and Riau.8 On the other hand, there are 6 
provinces that do not have medium-sized cities of at least 300 thousand inhabitants 
(Bangka Belitung, Central Kalimantan, Gorontalo, North Maluku, Papua and West 
Papua). This table also indicates that urban inequality is greater if the urban population 
is concentrated in a few of the province’s largest cities and much lower if the 
population is evenly distributed across large and small cities. 
 
3.3 Methodology and Data 
To seek the relationship between city size and income inequality, we take Kuznets’s 
standard and perform fixed-effect panel data regressions to consider the variation 
within provinces over time based on a provincial panel dataset over the period from 
1990 to 2014 with a total of 768 observations from 32 provinces. Due to missing data, 
510 observations are used. In this chapter, we classify a city based on the 
administrative definition issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs9 except for Jakarta. 
We treat Jakarta as one agglomerated city, not as five administrative cities, as in the 
Ministry’s classification. Jakarta will be treated as five cities in our robustness check.  
In our basic model, we restrict our sample to cities with at least 300 thousand 
inhabitants as this conforms to Duranton and Puga (2013). Following Castells-
Quintana (2018), we use this average city size (above 300k) as the key explanatory 
variable because (i) this large city size sufficiently exposes agglomeration economies 
and congestion costs, (ii) according to Zipf’s law, information on cities above 300k 
inhabitants should be enough to delineate the size of all cities. For province i in year 
t, we calculate the total number of people living in cities with at least 300 thousand 
 
8 After decentralization, some cities and regencies in Riau province formed a new province, 
Riau Island, in 2002, and all the cities in both provinces grew substantially afterwards.  
9 According to Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Administration, there are four levels 
of administrative divisions and each of them is led by a head of administration: (i) a province 
(propinsi) is headed by a governor, (ii) a regency or municipality (kabupaten) is headed by a 
bupati and a city (kota) is headed by a mayor, (iii) a sub-district (kecamatan) is headed by a 
camat or head of sub-district and (iv) a village (desa) is led by a head of village (kepala desa) 
or a lurah if the village is located in an urban area or a kelurahan. We use this city 
administration headed by a mayor in our sample.   




inhabitants divided by the total number of cities to obtain the average medium city 
size10 or city300 as our operational variable. We expect inequality to have a U-shaped 
relationship with the average city size and an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
income. In addition, we hypothesize that a larger city size with inequality is less 
harmful if income increases; therefore, we interact city size and income. Our basic 
model is written as follows:  
 
Ineqit = β0 +  β1·Citysizeit + β2·[Citysizeit]2 + β3·Incomeit + β4·[Incomeit]2       
                  + β5·[Citysizeit·Incomeit] +  β6·Xit + εit , 3.1 
 
where Ineq(it) as the dependent variable denotes inequality expenditure as measured 
by the Gini coefficient in province i in year t. This coefficient is calculated based on 
household expenditure from various Susenas consumption modules (BPS). Our 
variables of interest are city size (Citysizeit), that is, the average agglomeration size in 
province i in year t and its square [Citysizeit]2, income (Incomeit), as measured by the 
logarithm of the per capita GRDP in province i in year t and its square [Incomeit]2, 
and the interaction of city size and income (Citysizeit·Incomeit). Hence, based on the 
proposition above, we expect that β1 is negative, β2 is positive, β3 is positive, β4 is 
negative and β5 is negative.  
As a robustness check, we exclude Jakarta because it is a capital and the most 
agglomerated city in Indonesia, with more than 8 million people, which is a much 
higher number than the median of the medium city size of 678 thousand; we also 
unbundle Jakarta into 5 cities to normalize the average city size and include all cities. 
For each province i in year t, we calculate the total number of people living in all cities 
divided by the number of all cities. We use allcity as our operational variable.  
Further, we add primacyit and its square [primacyit]2, where primacyit is 
defined as the percentage of the urban population living in the largest city in each 
province i in year t. We hypothesize that primacy will correlate positively with 
inequality as higher returns to high skills in the largest city then correlate negatively 
 
10 Jakarta province consists of five cities; however, since Jakarta is the most agglomerated 
city, we merge all five cities into one city. Thus, in our sample, Jakarta province now has only 
one city and its size is huge. As a robustness check, we separate Jakarta’s city size into five 
cities.  
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due to oversupplied highly skilled workers tending to reduce the wage premium and 
thus lower inequality (Chiswick 1968; Knight and Sabot 1983). Last, we replace the 
per capita GRDP with the initial GRDP in the year 1990 and its square to see how the 
stage of development relates with inequality. In our data, the GRDP for 1990 is the 
earliest one, so we use this variable to reduce the problems of reverse causality.   
We apply the same control variables, that is, economic growth (ecogorwthit), 
the share of investment (kiit), the share of government consumption in the total GDP 
based on expenditure (kgit), the net enrolment ratio in elementary school (ner_esit), 
the firm density (firmdensit), which we define as the number of manufacturing firms 
divided by the total population, the share of agricultural employment in the total 
employment (shragremplit) and the share of the provincial minimum wage in the 
national minimum wage (shrwageit), in our basic model and robustness check 
regressions. Following Castells-Quintana (2018), all the right-hand-side variables are 
also presented in lag form to reduce endogeneity problems. We use Statistics 
Manufacture Industry to calculate the firm density and Provinces in Figures to obtain 
the key variables. Both datasets are provided by BPS. 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The distribution of the city data is right skewed, as revealed by the big difference 
between the median and the mean. For instance, the average population of all cities is 
1397.4 thousand while the median is around one-third or 538.7 thousand. Other city 
variables show similar distribution as presented in Table 3.3 and Kernel distribution 
in Appendix A3.3.  
The average city size is around 318 thousand and 678 thousand for small and 
medium cities, respectively, while the average size of the largest city in each province 
is about 432 thousand. If we look further at the distribution of the population in big 
cities in each province, 83 per cent of the urban population is living in the largest city 
and 24 per cent of the population is living in the cities with more than 1 million 
inhabitants. The number of cities in each province ranges from 1 to 9, and most of the 
provinces have only 2 small cities and 1 medium city.  
 
  




Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Key Variables 
Variable Obs. Median Mean Std Dev. Skew-ness Min. Max. 
Inequality Expenditure 997 30.00 30.79 4.73 0.14 8.03 46.00 
Average City Population (in 
thousands) 768 538.74 1397.41 2110.52 2.58 113.60 10020.02 
Average Medium City Size in 
Each Province (in thousands) 510 677.91 1188.79 1774.99 3.85 300.35 9947.24 
Average City Size in Each 
Province (in thousands) 768 318.04 614.83 1500.39 5.28 110.23 9947.24 
Size of the Largest City in Each 
Province (in thousands) 768 432.24 951.63 1569.90 4.11 113.60 9947.24 
% Pop. Living in Cities of >1 
Million in Each Province 245 24.00 30.69 24.82 1.91 8.00 100.00 
% Urban Pop. Living in the 
Largest City in Each Province 768 83.07 80.83 20.49 –0.79 25.22 100.00 
Number of All Cities in Each 
Province 768 2.00 2.70 2.35 1.51 1.00 9.00 
Number of Medium Cities in 
Each Province 510 1.00 1.47 1.22 3.45 1.00 8.00 
Per Capita GRDP (in million 
Rupiah) 1199 35.27 56.67 67.18 2.80 0.86 455.91 
Economic Growth (%) 1093 4.37 5.21 9.25 4.50 –26.36 123.14 
Av. Share of Government Cons. 
in Total GRDP over 5 Years 579 12.48 13.46 6.92 0.73 2.07 36.63 
Average Share of Investment in 
Total GRDP over 5 Years 579 21.65 22.75 9.31 1.13 3.08 78.29 
Net Enrolment Ratio for 
Elementary School 635 92.57 91.90 3.52 –2.45 70.13 98.72 
Share of Agriculture in Total 
Employment  514 47.64 45.66 16.80 –0.62 0.24 78.04 
Share of Manufacturing in 
Total Employment  514 6.60 8.58 6.13 1.63 0.71 46.31 
Share of Provincial Minimum 
Wage in National Minimum 
Wage 
632 0.97 1.00 0.19 0.70 0.51 1.74 
Share of Underemployment in 
Total Labour Force 528 31.43 30.76 9.13 –0.20 1.86 62.63 
Share of Unemployment in 
Total Labour Force 528 6.56 7.33 3.28 0.91 1.83 19.16 
Firm Density  1142 0.04 0.06 0.05 1.92 0.00 0.32 
Source: BPS various editions, calculated by the author. 
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On average, the inequality across provinces is 30 while the highest and the lowest 
inequality are experienced by Gorontalo province in 2011 and in 200011.  Per capita 
GDP is around 35 million rupiah and its average annual growth is 4.5 per cent. 
Education seems to be left behind with a minimum net enrolment ratio for elementary 
school of only 70 per cent. This in line with the employment structure, in which almost 
half of the labour force works in the agricultural sector and less than 10 per cent works 
in the manufacturing sector. The firm density as a proxy for wage differentiation is 
very low – less than one – implying that the wage difference between manufacturing 
workers and other workers is very small (Table 3.3). 
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the results of the relationship between inequality 
and average agglomeration size and the relationship with income. We also discuss the 
results of the above models used as robustness checks, that is, excluding Jakarta, 
adding primacy, replacing income with the initial income in 1990 and unbundling 
Jakarta into five cities.  
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the regression results of the basic model and 
the robustness checks. The first three columns of the basic model describe the 
relationship between the average medium city size (at least 300 thousand inhabitants) 
and inequality: column 1 includes agglomerated Jakarta, column 2 excludes Jakarta 
and column 3 includes unbundled Jakarta. The last two columns exhibit the 
relationship between all city sizes, including small cities, and inequality by including 
unbundled Jakarta and adding primacy, as shown in column 4 and column 5, 
respectively. Since our results confirm a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped, we are also 
interested in determining the bottom or the top of each model and calculating the 
percentage of observations left of the minimum or maximum value. The full 
regression results are reported in the Appendices. 
 
11 Province Gorontalo was one of the kabupaten in North Sulawesi province prior to 2000, 
when Susenas 2000 was carried out in 1999. This changing administrative status of Gorontalo 
may affect the Gini calculation in 2000.  




The relationship between average agglomeration size and inequality across 
provinces in Indonesia has a U-shape, as discussed by Castells-Quintana (2018), only 
when we include Jakarta as one agglomerated city. Our results reveal that, when the 
average agglomeration size grows larger, inequality tends to decline until it reaches 
the bottom and then it increases as the average medium city size grows if we include 
Jakarta as an agglomerated city or as one bundled city (column 1). Bundled Jakarta 
has around 8 million inhabitants, making it an outlier compared with the median of 
the average agglomeration size across provinces of 678 thousand inhabitants. So, we 
downplay specification 2 without Jakarta and specification 3 with unbundled Jakarta. 
When we exclude Jakarta from our sample (column 2) or when we unbundle Jakarta 
into five cities (column 3), inequality first increases and then decreases with the 
average agglomeration size. In other words, inequality follows the Kuznets inverted 
U-curve with respect to the average agglomeration size, contradicting with Castell-
Quintana (Figure 3.2 Panel A and Panel B). Without agglomerated Jakarta, an increase 
in inequality occurs with a larger urban agglomeration when the average 
agglomeration is already high. The city size with at least 300 thousand inhabitants 
may reflect agglomeration economies in which cities are more productive, benefit 
from more highly skilled workers and usually involve externalities or spillovers.  
Sagala et al. (2014) suggested that the increasing inequality across provinces 
in Indonesia could be explained in the context of the dual economy consisting of the 
rural and the urban sector shifting from low income in rural areas to high income in 
urban areas, resulted in an inverted U-curve between inequality and urbanization 
following the classical theories by Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955).12 It appears that 
the role of Jakarta as the most agglomerated city is essential in shaping the inequality 
pattern; inequality first increases with the average medium city size and income until 
the city size reaches 1383 thousand inhabitants, then it decreases while the cities keep 
growing along with the per capita GRDP (column 2). Our estimation also suggests 
that more cities are located to the left of the top point, implying that, without Jakarta, 
most of the provinces with an average medium city size are at the same stage of 
 
12 This inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and urbanization does not exist in 
cross-country analysis (Angeles 2010). 
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development and follow the Kuznets path, whereby inequality increases with per 
capita GRDP increases.  
 
Table 3.4 Summary of Regression Results: 
Relationship between Inequality and Average City Size 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: ineqit 










      
lag_city300 2.392 11.03*** 3.862***   
 (1.89) (3.26) (1.15)   
lag_city3002 0.523*** –3.987*** –0.250***   
 (0.16) (1.39) (0.08)   
lag_allcity    –12.20*** –4.262 
    (4.46) (5.171) 
lag_allcity2    10.53*** 9.446*** 
    (3.44) (3.556) 
lag_lgrdpc 24.92*** 20.48***  20.51*** 18.48*** 
 (3.24) (4.45)  (2.97) (3.012) 
lag_lgrdpc2 –3.683*** –2.964***  –2.604*** –2.448*** 
 (0.41) (0.62)  (0.37) (0.371) 
lag_primacy     0.412*** 
     (0.126) 
lag_primacy2     –0.003*** 
     (0.0008) 
Constant –15.65** –10.22 26.23*** –7.153 –18.26** 
 (7.26) (8.41) (1.25) (5.99) (7.567) 
      
Shape Size~ 
     
      
Turning Point 2288.12 1383.23 7724.06 579.46 72.89 
% of Obs. Left of the   
Min. or Max. Value 95.29 86.83 98.24 88.41 91.28 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 373 352 397 550 550 
R-squared 0.807 0.815 0.725 0.734 0.742 
F-test YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Provinces 24 23 24 32 32 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ~ refers to the extreme values 
defined as β1/2β2. 
 
In addition, when we replace per capita GRDP with the initial GRDP in 1990 in our 
regression without Jakarta, we find a hump-shaped relationship, confirming the 
previous result. The full regression results can be found in Appendix A3.4.B3. This 
inverted U-shape is also apparent when we unbundle Jakarta into five cities (Figure 




3.2 Panel B). Inequality keeps rising as the average agglomeration size enlarges until 
it passes 7,724 thousand inhabitants, after which it declines (column 3). In our data, 
the typical agglomeration size in Indonesia is a medium city with on average 318 
thousand inhabitants, which tends to grow into a larger city and thus inequality is 
expected to increase. 
 
Figure 3.2 Kuznets Agglomeration Size and Robustness Check  
Panel A: The Relationship between Inequality and 
Average Medium City Size (excluding 
Agglomerated Jakarta) 
 
Panel B: The Relationship between Inequality 
and Average Medium City Size (including 
Unbundled Jakarta) 
 
Panel C: The Relationship between Inequality and 
Average All City Size (including Unbundled 
Jakarta) 
 
Panel D: The Relationship between Inequality 
and Primacy (including Unbundled Jakarta) 
 
With regard to urban inequality, it seems that the most agglomerated city, that is, 
Jakarta, has two extreme folds, specifically more opportunities that benefit low-
income workers more strongly (Todaro 1976; Ferré et al. 2012) and higher returns to 
high skills (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud 2014), and the 
middle class in neighbouring cities levels up with increasing inequality (U-shaped). 
As discussed in the previous section, industrial estates located in the suburbs of 
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Jakarta are increasingly becoming specialized and intensified industries. The firm 
density, share of manufacturing employment and share of the non-government sector 
(manufacturing, finance and trade and hotels) in the neighbouring provinces of West 
Java and Banten are ranked in the top three provinces across Indonesia. This suggests 
that the average agglomeration size has association with firms’ location and workers’ 
location by industry. According to Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013), skill groups and 
industry, disproportionately located in larger cities, increase the wage dispersion more 
in larger cities than in small cities. 
As a robustness check, we use all the city sizes, including small cities and 
unbundled Jakarta, and primacy to see how the urban population living in the largest 
city correlates with inequality (columns 4 and 5). Our results yield a negative for 
liniear term and positive for quadratic term suggesting that inequality first decreases 
when small cities grow and then increases when large cities grow. A decrease in 
inequality as the agglomeration size increases may be associated with the fact that 
larger cities provide more opportunities to earn more money for people with different 
abilities and skills because more high-paid as well as low-paid jobs, including jobs in 
the informal sector, are available. Therefore, a larger city is always attractive not only 
to more educated and highly skilled people who earn a high income but also to 
informal workers who earn from low-paid jobs as a result of high urbanization. 
We find this U-shaped pattern is similar to the first specification, in which we 
estimate the average medium city size and include agglomerated Jakarta as one city. 
Inequality decreases with the average city size until the size touches the minimum 
value of 579 thousand inhabitants, then inequality increases as the average city size 
grows (column 4, Figure 3.2 Panel C). This turning point is much smaller than the 
turning point obtained using the average agglomeration size for unbundled Jakarta. It 
suggests that inequality tends to lower when the average city size keeps growing into 
the larger size; in other words, the gap will be smaller when the average city size is 
large enough to provide opportunities for unskilled labour due to urbanization. 
 Since the level of per capita GRDP is positively correlated with inequality and 
statistically significant, an increase in the average city size tends to lower inequality 
if the city residents can benefit from a higher GRDP per capita. However, when we 
add primacy to our regression, its coefficient positively correlates with inequality 




while the average city size shows the opposite (column 5). Our results in specification 
5 indicate that the relationship between inequality and average city size is N-shaped; 
it is U-shaped with a small city size then inverted U-shaped with a primacy (Figure 
3.2 Panel D). This pattern is in line with our findings for income.13  The literatures 
suggest that productivity increases with the city size (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013) 
and that urban primacy is advantageous to growth in low-income countries 
(Henderson 2003) while the largest city is also considered as the most unequal 
(Behrens and Robert-Nicoud 2014). Hence, high and increasing inequality of the 
largest city may help explain why the inverted U-shaped now has an N-shaped. 
Further, the highest level of inequality could be attained when the primacy is 72.89 
per cent, and more observations are distributed to the left of the top value, implying 
that more people living in the largest city as well as higher per capita GRDP associates 
with higher inequality. 
Moreover, part of the association between average city size and inequality may 
be explained by the association between city size and economic performance. Our 
results show that the interaction between city size and income is negatively correlated 
with inequality in all specifications. It suggests that the high inequality that is 
associated with the average city size could be lowered by an increasing income. 
Our control variables have different correlations with inequality depending on 
the sample and definition of city size that we use. For instance, the share of the 
provincial minimum wage in the national minimum wage and the firm density are 
negatively associated with inequality and statistically significant when we unbundle 
Jakarta into five cities and define the city size with at least 300 thousand inhabitants 
(Appendix A3.4.C1). Intuitively, for the average medium city size, where the size is 
already agglomerated and large enough for the city to offer more opportunities, 
inequality decreases when the number of firms and the wages increase. On the other 
hand, if we use the full sample including the average small city size below 300 
thousand residents, economic growth and education have a positive correlation with 
inequality (Appendix A3.4.D1). Our results suggest that, when the average city size 
is small, the enrolment in elementary school is also low, and then the average city size 
grows with economic performance, allowing people to access higher education. These 
 
13 See Chapter 2. 
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skilled people then benefit from the larger city and hence the gap with education and 
economic growth increases in a manner similar to the process postulated by Kuznets 
(1955). Recent literature on the impact of education on inequality has found that 
education affects the two tails of the distribution of income: education reduces the 
income share of the top earners and increases the share of the bottom earners 
(Abdullah 2015).  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigated whether and to what extent the number, size and 
distribution of cities might explain the evolution of inequality across provinces in 
Indonesia. In a cross-country analysis Castells-Quintana (2018) found that beyond 
Kuznets’ hypothesis there is a U-shaped relationship between average city size and 
inequality; inequality first falls and then increases with average city size. A key result 
of our analysis across provinces within one country is that this U-shaped relationship 
was only found if we included Jakarta as one bundled city in our sample. In contrast 
to Castells-Quintana (2018) this result is not robust. The U‐shaped relationship 
between average city size and inequality did not hold when we excluded Jakarta or 
when we considered unbundled Jakarta. However, if we included small cities with 
less than 300 thousand inhabitants in our sample, and we add primacy, we found a U-
shaped with a small city but inverted U-shaped with a primacy. This N-shaped where 
inequality first decreases with small city size, then increases with larger city size, and 
finally declines again with very large city size might be associated with the fact that 
larger cities provide more job opportunities for people with different abilities and 
skills. The interaction between city size and income is negative for all the 
specifications, suggesting that part of the association between average city size and 
inequality could be explained by the association between average city size and 
economic performance: larger cities are more productive, benefit from more highly 
skilled workers and usually involve spillover, and hence income increases. Our 
findings suggest that, if the current trend of an increasing average agglomeration size 
continues, we can expect inequality to climb further. This message implies that larger 
average agglomeration size may be desirable when cities are small, however, a very 




high average agglomeration size is undesirable so the medium city size may be more 
desirable. In the next chapter, we will examine the different dimensions of whether 
the change in inequality is correlated with the economic growth rate.  
 
  





Appendix A3.1 Core and Peripheries Population in Three Largest Metropolitan 
Areas, 1980–2015 
Area 
Population (in millions)   Changes (%) 








Core          
     Jakarta 6.50 8.26 8.39 9.60 10.17  14.4 5.9 21.2 
     Surabaya 2.02 2.47 2.60 2.77 2.84  6.6 2.6 9.4 
     Bandung 1.46 2.06 2.14 2.39 2.48  12.1 3.6 16.1 
          
Peripheries          
     Jakarta 5.41 8.88 12.24 18.42 21.45  50.5 16.4 75.2 
     Surabaya 4.09 4.76 5.57 6.37 6.71  14.3 5.4 20.5 
     Bandung 2.67 3.20 4.16 5.23 5.74  25.8 9.8 38.1 
          
Metropolitan 
Region          
     Jakarta 11.91 17.14 20.63 28.02 31.62  35.8 12.8 53.3 
     Surabaya 6.11 7.23 8.17 9.14 9.55  11.9 4.5 16.9 
     Bandung 4.13 5.26 6.29 7.62 8.22  21.1 7.8 30.6 
 
         
Share Core to Metropolitan Region (%) 
     Jakarta 54.6 48.2 40.7 34.3 32.2  –15.8 –6.1 –20.9 
     Surabaya 33.0 34.2 31.8 30.3 29.8  –4.7 –1.8 –6.5 
     Bandung 35.4 39.1 33.9 31.4 30.2  –7.5 –3.9 –11.1 
          
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Rukmana (2018).  
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Appendix A3.4.A1 Full Sample Including Bundled Jakarta (Basic Model) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model_a11 Model_a12 Model_a13 Model_a14 Model_a15 
gini gini gini gini gini 
            
lag_city300 –3.108** –3.653** 2.392 7.770*** –1.525 
 (1.31) (1.81) (1.89) (2.01) (8.08) 
lag_city3002  0.0644 0.523*** 0.744*** 0.196 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.58) 
lag_lgrdpc   24.92*** 0.0626 4.231 
   (3.24) (1.16) (3.98) 
lag_lgrdpc2   –3.683***   
   (0.41)   
city300.*  grdpc    –1.614*** 0.456 
    (0.21) (1.75) 
lag_ecogrowth     0.111 
     (0.09) 
lag_ki     0.0487 
     (0.11) 
lag_kg     –0.0182 
     (0.20) 
lag_ner_es     0.319 
     (0.21) 
lag_firmdens     –18.74 
     (13.98) 
lag_shrwage     –5.234* 
     (2.99) 
lag_shragrempl     0.0600 
     (0.06) 
Constant 33.39*** 33.71*** –15.65** 24.34*** –14.57 
 (1.58) (1.74) (7.26) (4.77) (25.71) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 397 397 373 373 171 
R-squared 0.721 0.721 0.807 0.796 0.740 
F-test YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 24 24 24 24 24 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
     
 
  




Appendix A3.4.A2 Full Sample Including Bundled Jakarta  
(add Primacy as Robustness Check) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
model_a21 model_a22 model_a23 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 2.183 7.076*** 0.00590 
 (1.922) (2.056) (8.162) 
lag_city3002 0.547*** 0.764*** 0.171 
 (0.156) (0.183) (0.582) 
lag_lgrdpc 24.51*** –0.0779 5.083 
 (3.269) (1.181) (4.162) 
lag_lgrdpc2 –3.663***   
 (0.408)   
lag_primacy 0.0522 0.183 0.478 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.615) 
lag_primacy2 –0.000521 –0.00114 –0.00350 
 (0.000685) (0.000698) (0.00533) 
city300_grdpc  –1.597*** 0.311 
  (0.208) (1.764) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0838 
   (0.0911) 
lag_ki   0.0890 
   (0.116) 
lag_kg   –0.0762 
   (0.209) 
lag_ner_es   0.290 
   (0.218) 
lag_firmdens   –21.21 
   (14.17) 
lag_shrwage   –5.227* 
   (3.007) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0701 
   (0.0625) 
Constant –15.01* 18.59*** –31.78 
 (8.061) (6.517) (30.88) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Observations 373 373 171 
R-squared 0.809 0.798 0.744 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 24 24 24 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.4.A3 Full Sample Including Bundled Jakarta  
(Use Initial GRDP 1990 as Robustness Check) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model_a31 Model_a32 Model_a33 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 1.040** 4.012*** –2.949 
 (0.48) (0.82) (8.59) 
lag_city3002 –0.0561 0.294*** 0.109 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.61) 
log_grdp90 –9.464*** 0.218 –2.121 
 (3.02) (0.25) (17.20) 
sqr_log_grdp90 1.113***   
 (0.37)   
city300* grdpc  –1.136*** 0.922 
  (0.21) (1.76) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0600 
   (0.13) 
lag_ki   0.0535 
   (0.14) 
lag_kg   0.0597 
   (0.24) 
lag_ner_es   0.341 
   (0.25) 
lag_firmdens   –13.98 
   (14.84) 
lag_shrwage   –3.507 
   (3.43) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0500 
   (0.07) 
Constant 48.32*** 28.50*** 4.396 
 (5.82) (1.20) (59.29) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE NO NO NO 
Number of Observations 353 334 151 
R-squared 0.772 0.813 0.725 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 20 20 20 
    








Appendix A3.4.B1 Sample Excluding Bundled Jakarta (Basic Model) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model_b11 Model_b12 Model_b13 Model_b14 Model_b15 
gini gini gini gini gini 
            
lag_city300 –4.232*** 4.224 11.03*** 12.48*** 22.55* 
 (1.51) (3.64) (3.26) (4.15) (12.03) 
lag_city3002  –4.103** –3.987*** –4.033** –4.256 
  (1.61) (1.39) (1.81) (4.56) 
lag_lgrdpc   20.48*** 0.0379 7.313* 
   (4.45) (1.15) (4.00) 
lag_lgrdpc2   –2.964***   
   (0.62)   
city300* grdpc    –0.504 –2.659 
    (1.06) (3.09) 
lag_ecogrowth     0.113 
     (0.09) 
lag_ki     –0.00636 
     (0.11) 
lag_kg     0.0788 
     (0.19) 
lag_ner_es     0.324 
     (0.21) 
lag_firmdens     –29.85 
     (19.91) 
lag_shrwage     –4.849 
     (2.97) 
lag_shragrempl     0.0397 
     (0.06) 
Constant 32.06*** 28.83*** –10.22 23.82*** –29.92 
 (1.19) (1.74) (8.41) (4.54) (25.09) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 376 376 352 352 161 
R-squared 0.757 0.762 0.815 0.802 0.719 
F-test YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 23 23 23 23 23 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.4.B2 Sample Excluding Bundled Jakarta  
(Add Primacy as Robustness Check) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables model_b21 model_b22 model_b23 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 10.49*** 11.00** 23.38* 
 (3.316) (4.294) (12.04) 
lag_city3002 –3.802*** –4.170** –5.315 
 (1.407) (1.809) (4.625) 
lag_lgrdpc 20.30*** –0.0793 8.366** 
 (4.624) (1.177) (4.186) 
lag_lgrdpc2 –2.963***   
 (0.651)   
lag_primacy 0.0569 0.181 0.461 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.606) 
lag_primacy2 –0.0004 –0.0011 –0.0033 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0052) 
int_city300_grdpc  –0.236 –2.206 
  (1.080) (3.131) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0823 
   (0.0887) 
lag_ki   0.0303 
   (0.117) 
lag_kg   0.0276 
   (0.204) 
lag_ner_es   0.287 
   (0.216) 
lag_firmdens   –35.37* 
   (20.27) 
lag_shrwage   –4.942* 
   (2.973) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0488 
   (0.0616) 
Constant –10.92 17.56*** –47.32 
 (8.757) (6.325) (30.32) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Observations 352 352 161 
R-squared 0.816 0.803 0.725 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 23 23 23 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
    
    
 
  




Appendix A3.4.B3 Sample Excluding Bundled Jakarta  
(Use Initial GRDP 1990 as Robustness Check) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model_b31 Model_b32 Model_b33 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 11.61*** 9.436*** 17.09 
 (2.13) (3.65) (12.70) 
lag_city3002 –4.038*** –0.530 –3.644 
 (1.20) (1.72) (5.39) 
log_grdp90 18.29*** 4.669 3.637 
 (3.05) (5.28) (17.70) 
sqr_log_grdp90 –3.474***   
 (0.95)   
city300* grdpc  –2.009** –1.549 
  (0.96) (3.36) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0808 
   (0.12) 
lag_ki   –0.00124 
   (0.14) 
lag_kg   0.170 
   (0.24) 
lag_ner_es   0.336 
   (0.25) 
lag_firmdens   –20.83 
   (22.05) 
lag_shrwage   –2.498 
   (3.45) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0213 
   (0.07) 
Constant  10.06 –18.41 
  (16.06) (60.37) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE NO NO NO 
Number of Observations 332 313 141 
R-squared 0.826 0.837 0.692 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 19 19 19 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.4.C1 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and above 300k 
Inhabitants (Basic Model) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model_c11 Model_c12 Model_c13 Model_c14 Model_c15 
gini gini gini gini gini 
            
lag_city300 0.746 3.862*** –0.156 6.055*** 3.800 
 (0.46) (1.15) (1.16) (2.01) (5.45) 
lag_city3002  –0.250*** –0.00425 0.155* 0.259* 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
lag_lgrdpc   14.64*** –2.156* 8.750** 
   (2.84) (1.18) (3.84) 
lag_lgrdpc2   –2.225***   
   (0.32)   
city300* grdpc    –1.669*** –1.468 
    (0.41) (1.17) 
lag_ecogrowth     0.0814 
     (0.09) 
lag_ki     0.0992 
     (0.12) 
lag_kg     –0.195 
     (0.20) 
lag_ner_es     0.309 
     (0.21) 
lag_firmdens     –33.50*** 
     (12.46) 
lag_shrwage     –8.457*** 
     (2.73) 
lag_shragrempl     0.0919 
     (0.062) 
Constant 29.09*** 26.23*** 7.094 36.86*** –24.90 
 (0.80) (1.25) (6.62) (4.61) (25.01) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 397 397 373 373 171 
R-squared 0.718 0.725 0.787 0.768 0.738 
F-test YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 24 24 24 24 24 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  




Appendix A3.4.C2 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and above 300k 
Inhabitants (Add Primacy) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
model_c21 model_c22 model_c23 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 0.685 6.783*** 6.412 
 (1.416) (2.216) (6.069) 
lag_city3002 –0.0322 0.106 0.109 
 (0.0905) (0.0999) (0.206) 
lag_lgrdpc 14.18*** –2.107* 9.246** 
 (2.860) (1.206) (3.969) 
lag_lgrdpc2 –2.161***   
 (0.326)   
lag_primacy 0.233 0.278* 0.498 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.792) 
lag_primacy2 –0.0015 –0.002* –0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
city300_grdpc  –1.572*** –1.412 
  (0.422) (1.194) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0654 
   (0.0915) 
lag_ki   0.0766 
   (0.120) 
lag_kg   –0.142 
   (0.214) 
lag_ner_es   0.249 
   (0.223) 
lag_firmdens   –35.12*** 
   (12.61) 
lag_shrwage   –8.943*** 
   (2.777) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0956 
   (0.0622) 
Constant –1.541 25.08*** –41.97 
 (10.09) (9.388) (33.54) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 373 373 171 
R-squared 0.789 0.770 0.740 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 24 24 24 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.4.C3 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and above 300k 
Inhabitants (Use Initial GRDP 1990) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model_c31 Model_c32 Model_c33 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_city300 0.673** –2.501** 4.559 
 (0.32) (1.09) (7.81) 
lag_city3002 –0.0402 –0.0302 0.0464 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.33) 
log_grdp90 –7.062** –0.609* 2.074 
 (2.84) (0.36) (16.78) 
sqr_log_grdp90 0.875**   
 (0.34)   
city300* grdpc  0.749*** –0.867 
  (0.28) (1.23) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0410 
   (0.13) 
lag_ki   0.0517 
   (0.14) 
lag_kg   –0.0306 
   (0.25) 
lag_ner_es   0.345 
   (0.25) 
lag_firmdens   –29.33** 
   (13.96) 
lag_shrwage   –8.225*** 
   (3.19) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0629 
   (0.07) 
Constant 43.18*** 32.28*** –3.796 
 (5.52) (1.56) (57.38) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE NO NO NO 
Number of Observations 353 334 151 
R-squared 0.772 0.753 0.711 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 20 20 20 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  




Appendix A3.4.D1 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and below 300k 
Inhabitants (Basic Model) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model_d11 Model_d12 Model_d13 Model_d14 Model_d15 
gini gini gini gini gini 
            
lag_allcity –1.954 2.340 –12.20*** 10.98** –47.89*** 
 (2.71) (4.80) (4.46) (4.55) (16.21) 
lag_allcity2  –3.783 10.53*** 17.63*** –5.906 
  (3.49) (3.44) (4.28) (9.06) 
lag_lgrdpc   20.51*** 3.344*** –0.370 
   (2.97) (0.96) (2.44) 
lag_lgrdpc2   –2.604***   
   (0.37)   
allcity* grdpc    –7.276*** 12.39** 
    (1.15) (5.09) 
lag_ecogrowth     0.0747** 
     (0.03) 
lag_ki     0.0102 
     (0.08) 
lag_kg     0.145 
     (0.11) 
lag_ner_es     0.260** 
     (0.10) 
lag_firmdens     –10.71 
     (10.61) 
lag_shrwage     –2.374 
     (2.03) 
lag_shragrempl     0.00533 
     (0.04) 
Constant 30.05*** 29.34*** –7.153 19.38*** 9.318 
 (1.14) (1.32) (5.99) (3.53) (13.25) 
      
Number of Observations 588 588 550 550 254 
R-squared 0.660 0.660 0.734 0.730 0.725 
F-test YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 32 32 32 32 32 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.4.D2 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and below 300k 
Inhabitants (Add Primacy) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
model_d21 model_d22 model_d23 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_citysize –4.262 18.66*** –42.14** 
 (5.171) (4.939) (16.76) 
lag_citysize2 9.446*** 17.91*** –4.509 
 (3.556) (4.483) (9.556) 
lag_lgrdpc 18.48*** 2.404** –0.783 
 (3.012) (0.976) (2.504) 
lag_lgrdpc2 –2.448***   
 (0.371)   
lag_primacy 0.412*** 0.520*** 0.363* 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.215) 
lag_primacy2 –0.003*** –0.004*** –0.003 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
citysize_grdpc  –7.368*** 11.56** 
  (1.170) (5.280) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0709** 
   (0.0339) 
lag_ki   0.0333 
   (0.0803) 
lag_kg   0.137 
   (0.111) 
lag_ner_es   0.236** 
   (0.104) 
lag_firmdens   –9.593 
   (10.61) 
lag_shrwage   –1.801 
   (2.055) 
lag_shragrempl   0.00375 
   (0.0435) 
Constant –18.26** 2.031 0.204 
 (7.567) (5.940) (14.90) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 550 550 254 
R-squared 0.742 0.740 0.729 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 32 32 32 
        
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  




Appendix A3.4.D3 Full Sample Including Unbundled Jakarta and below 300k 
Inhabitants (Use Initial GRDP 1990) 
  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model_d31 Model_d32 Model_d33 
gini gini gini 
        
lag_allcity –2.215 6.262* –25.07 
 (3.21) (3.33) (17.30) 
lag_allcity2 1.384 14.92*** 1.916 
 (2.04) (2.55) (9.59) 
log_grdp90 –0.0287 0.651 –18.46*** 
 (13.26) (1.13) (2.93) 
sqr_log_grdp90 –0.00835   
 (1.64)   
citysize * grdpc  –5.685*** 6.795 
  (0.74) (5.35) 
lag_ecogrowth   0.0741** 
   (0.03) 
lag_ki   –0.0219 
   (0.09) 
lag_kg   0.203* 
   (0.11) 
lag_ner_es   0.248** 
   (0.11) 
lag_firmdens   –11.41 
   (11.71) 
lag_shrwage   –2.422 
   (2.29) 
lag_shragrempl   0.0109 
   (0.05) 
Constant 30.45 29.41*** 86.70*** 
 (25.79) (4.12) (15.04) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE NO NO NO 
Number of Observations 481 457 206 
R-squared 0.782 0.811 0.745 
F-test YES YES YES 
Number of provinces 24 24 24 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  









   
Chapter 4  Regional Inequality, Growth and 
Institutional Quality in Indonesia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we explore the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth in Indonesia. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 showed that, over the last 
decades, relatively high economic growth in Indonesia has been associated with 
rapidly increasing income inequality. We also found that the incomes of the rich in 
poor regions grow faster than those of the poor in rich regions. In other words, the 
middle class and especially the top incomes seem to benefit most from the economic 
growth dynamics in Indonesia. In Chapter 3, we asked the question of whether and to 
what extent the number, size and distribution of cities might explain the evolution of 
inequality across provinces in Indonesia. Our examination of the relationship between 
income inequality and average agglomeration size at the province level revealed an 
inverted U-shaped relationship, suggesting that inequality can be expected to climb 
further if the average agglomeration size continues to grow.    
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is one of 
the most fundamental questions in economics. Hence, a large empirical literature has 
been devoted to the impact of inequality on growth. As noted by Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003, p. 267): “Many have felt compelled to try to say something about this very 
important question, braving the lack of reliable data and the obvious problems with 
identification”. Indeed, it has proved to be very difficult to determine whether (rising) 
income inequality in a country is good or bad for its economic growth performance.  
There are at least three main theoretical views on this relationship, namely (i) 
a negative (linear) inequality-growth relationship, (ii) a positive (linear) inequality-
growth relationship and (iii) a non-linear relationship between inequality and growth. 
For a long time, most of the empirical research routinely imposed a linear structure 
on the data, whereby the different variants of the basic linear model (OLS, fixed effects 
and random effects) generated very different conclusions on the inequality-growth 
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relationship (see, for example, Deininger and Squire 1996; Bruno et al. 1998; Li and 
Zou 1998; Barro 2000; Benabou 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel 2000; Forbes 2000; Nel 
2008; Benjamin et al. 2011). In an important paper, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) 
developed a simple political economy model to argue that there are no a priori 
theoretical reasons to assume that the relationship between inequality and growth is 
monotonic, let alone linear, and that the omitted variable problem inherent in 
identifying a causal effect of inequality on growth can be solved by including a 
country fixed effect in a linear specification (as in Li and Zou 1998; Forbes 2000). In 
contrast, using a cross-country panel data analysis, they showed that imposing a linear 
structure on data for which there is no theoretical support can lead to serious 
misinterpretations. In particular, they found that changes in inequality (in any 
direction) are associated with lower future growth rates and that there is a non-linear 
relationship between inequality and the magnitude of changes in inequality. They also 
identified a negative relationship between growth rates and inequality lagged by one 
period. But, they cannot conclude that there is a causal relationship between inequality 
and growth in cross-country data because of identification problems. One of their key 
findings is that the non-linearity approach is sufficient to explain why previous 
estimates of the relationship between the level of inequality and growth are 
inconsistent from one to another. 
In this chapter, we apply the cross-country panel data approach developed by 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) to cross-district data within Indonesia for the period 1999–
2014 to find the correlations between inequality and the growth rates. In Chapter 2, 
we found evidence for the existence of a typical Kuznets-like inverted U-shaped 
relationship between inequality and GDP at the district level in Indonesia: as the per 
capita GDP level increases, the level of inequality first increases and then decreases 
when the per capita GDP level increases beyond a certain threshold. Often, the 
implicit policy implication taken from this inverted U-shaped pattern is that inequality 
is a necessary and temporary part of the path to a higher level of GDP: it is the price 
that a society has to pay for the desired economic growth, while the problem 
(automatically) vanishes at higher welfare levels. However, in his path-breaking book, 
Piketty (2014) cast serious doubt on this optimistic view inherent to the Kuznets 
hypothesis. Based on unique long-term historical records, Piketty (2014) argued that 




inequality will not automatically disappear or reduce when a society accumulates 
wealth. The inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and growth that has 
been observed so frequently may well be a historical exception, whereas the long-
term regularity is that wealth accumulation is accompanied by rising inequality.   
Against this background, in this chapter, we use the approach developed by 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) to perform cross-district empirical tests in Indonesia to 
determine whether changes in inequality in the past associate with economic growth 
in the future. Dominicis et al. (2008) pointed out that the analysis of the impact of 
inequality on economic growth is more useful using single-country data at the regional 
level controlling economic, social and institutional characteristics. We also test for the 
existence of a non-linear relationship between inequality and the magnitude of 
changes in inequality and a relationship between growth rates and inequality lagged 
by one period. In doing so, we control for the role of institutional quality at the district 
level in our analyses. More precisely, we investigate whether institutional quality 
together with past inequality correlates with economic growth in the next period at 
the district level in Indonesia. Recent studies at the country level have shown that high 
institution quality leads to higher economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010) 
and tends to lower inequality (Chong and Gradstein 2007).  
Evidently, increasing welfare in a society cannot be measured adequately 
using the per capita GDP alone. Many things other than income matter in improving 
people’s life, such as the quality of and access to health care and the road, water, 
sanitation and electricity infrastructure. We therefore conclude our analysis by using 
the approach developed by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) to test empirically whether 
changes in inequality in the past correlate with the evolution of various development 
indicators in the future across districts in Indonesia.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses 
the existing literature on the relationship between inequality, growth and institutional 
quality. In section 4.3, we present the econometric approach underlying our analyses. 
Section 4.4 describes the data set that we developed to test the hypotheses mentioned 
above. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 4.6 includes 
several robustness checks and sensitivity tests. Section 4.7 provides concluding 
remarks.    
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4.2 Literature Review 
The relationship between inequality and growth has been examined for decades. The 
first seminal contribution was by Kuznets (1955), who argued that inequality first 
increases and later decreases during the process of economic development (the 
inverted U-shaped relationship). Inequality may increase again beyond a certain 
threshold, producing an N-shaped relationship. Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson 
et al. (2011), in their studies of top incomes, implied that, if inequality is already high, 
the accumulation of wealth among the rich increases over time and strengthens and 
enhances inequality further. This high inequality could harm the future growth 
potential. Perotti (1996) also suggested that the relationship between income 
distribution and growth is negative because more equal societies are characterized by 
lower fertility rates and higher rates of investment in education, which are both 
reflected in higher growth rates. 
Furthermore, Galor and Moav (2004) found that inequality is positively 
correlated with growth in poorer countries as it contributes to channelling resources  
to individuals with a higher marginal propensity to save, hence stimulating 
investments. While physical capital is a prime engine for growth in early stages of 
industrialization, in later stages, human capital becomes critical for economic growth 
and the relative return to physical capital decreases. Thus, the impact of inequality on 
growth switches from positive to negative (Galor and Moav 2004). In line with these 
findings, Barro (2000) confirmed that the impact of inequality on growth might be 
dependent on the stage of development, finding that inequality is negatively correlated 
with growth in a sample of poor countries but positively correlated with growth in a 
sample of rich countries. Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) also suggested that the 
relationship between the level of income inequality and the future economic growth 
is positive in the short run and negative in the long run.  
Finding inconsistency in the results of the relationship between inequality and 
growth, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) searched for a non-linear relationship. They 
discovered that growth is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality. 
Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the 
subsequent period. This implies that an economy’s growth rate is maximized when 




there are no changes in inequality and that any deviation of inequality, in any 
direction, lowers growth.  
Most of the literature on the relationship between institutional quality and 
economic growth has pointed at a positive correlation (Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2010). However, this positive association 
is not applicable to all regions or groups. It depends on the perception of the individual 
about the institutions, social norms and community rules (Nawaz et al. 2014). The 
role of the stages of economic development also determines the quality of institutions, 
then creating a virtuous circle between growth and institutional quality (Alonso and 
Garcimartín 2013). Hence, Valeriani and Peluso (2011) and Nawaz et al. (2014) 
concluded that institutions perform better in developed countries than in developing 
ones. 
To understand the role of institutions in economic growth, rent-seeking 
(institutional mechanism) theory explores the situation in which the gap between the 
rich and the poor widens. This may result in a stronger temptation for the poor to 
engage in rent seeking or predatory activities at the expense of the rich (Benabou 
1996). Other researchers have also proposed an institutional mechanism in which a 
rich elite will suppress democracy and equal rights before the law to preserve their 
privileged position (e.g. Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). Poor-quality institutions 
may slow down economic activities by providing room for economic agents to remain 
busy in redistributive politics with lower economic returns rather than growth-
promoting economic activities (Murphy et al. 1993). Weak institutions divert 
resources from productive sectors to unproductive sectors, hence promoting rent-
seeking activities (Iqbal and Daly 2014).14 In contrast, strong institutions reduce the 
chances of rent-seeking activities and accelerate the economic growth process and 
productivity of reproducible factors.  
On the basis of a cross-country analysis, Nel (2008) suggested that a high level 
of economic inequality undermines a country’s growth potential, retards the 
development of social capital, and encourages corruption. Chong and Gradstein 
 
14 They defined a rent-seeking activity as an activity through which public power is exercised 
for private gain; this may involve misuse of public resources or, more generally, any 
attempted capture and commodification of state, social or commercial authority by politicians, 
public officials, elites and private interests. 
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(2007) studied that the double causality between institutional strength and a more 
equal distribution of income is empirically established using dynamic panel and linear 
feedback analysis. Countries with bad institutions also seem to be more likely to have 
high inequality. Hence, the economy may converge either to a steady state with high-
quality institutions and minimal inequality or to low institutional quality and high 
inequality. 
The current concern in Indonesia is much more that the increase in inequality 
is reflecting an increase in poverty. It is driven by the dynamics at the bottom of the 
distribution. From the limited studies that are available, we discuss some notable 
findings on inequality and growth in Indonesia. Timmer (2004) indicated that rapid 
pro-poor growth requires simultaneous and balanced interaction between growth and 
distribution processes. Using panel provincial data from 1993 to 2002, Resosudarmo 
and Vidyattama (2006) found that the disparity in provincial income per capita in 
Indonesia is relatively severe and that there is a conditional growth convergence in 
Indonesia. Moreover, Vidyattama (2013) showed that the inequality at the district 
level is considerably higher than that at the provincial level and that increasing 
inequality in the per capita GDP does not necessarily translate into increasing 
inequality in other development indicators. Van Leeuwen and Földvári (2016) found 
that rising inequality had a positive impact on the per capita GDP prior to the 1940s 
but that, during the period 1950–1980, when declining inequality was accompanied 
by an increased per capita GDP, poverty rates rapidly increased. 
 
4.3 Empirical Strategy  
We adopt the approach developed by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) to explain the basic 
correlation between income inequality and growth of the per capita GDP across 
districts using a non-linear function, and then we modify the model by introducing the 
quality of governance or institutions and exploiting different indicators as control 
variables (subject to data availability). To seek those relationships, we perform fixed-
effect panel data regressions to consider the variation within districts over time based 
on a district panel dataset over the period 1999–2014. 




4.3.1 Basic Model 
We briefly discuss the theoretical model based on “hold-ups”, developed by Banerjee 
and Duflo (2003), which we employ in our estimations. Suppose that there are two 
groups in society, A and B, that are competing as political groups, and assume that 
the economy is characterized by the sharing rule. In each period, this economy is 
presented with an opportunity that can lead to growth. However, the growth 
opportunity requires some policy adjustment to be implemented, which has to be 
agreed by both groups in society; that is, one group can block the realization of the 
growth opportunity and demand a “bigger share” of the growth. If one group blocks, 
then growth is reduced. Assume that group B has the chance to hold up the economy, 
whether or not it depends on how much additional “growth” it can extract for itself 
from group A. Group B will demand a transfer if the post-transfer portion of the 
growth is bigger than it would be without holding up the economy. Group A will agree 
to the transfer as long as the post-transfer share of new growth is at least as big as the 
old share. If group A disagrees with the transfer, the status quo is maintained and there 
is no growth.  
Intuitively, each group in the economy will hold up the rest of the economy 
when its share of the output is low, which is when it has the smallest stake in the 
growth of the overall economy. Hence, hold-ups only happen when there are 
redistributive transfers that result from them. Assuming that the growth will be higher 
when the planned transfer is zero, we can expect a smooth inverted U-shaped 
relationship between expected growth and actual changes in inequality. The growth 
here does not have any direct distributional effect. Thus, the basic non-linear 
relationship in a reduced form appears as follows:15 
 
 (yit+a –yit)/a = αyit + Xit β + k(git – git–a) + νi + εit  (4.1) 
 
 
15 A detailed discussion on the theoretical model can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (2003, 
pp. 269–278).  
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where yit denotes the logarithm of the per capita GRDP in district i in year t, a is the 
length of the period that we choose,16 (yit+a – yit) / a is therefore the subsequent growth 
rate, Xit is a set of control variables, git is the Gini coefficient in district i in year t and 
k(.) is a generic function. The error term is modelled as a district-specific time-
invariant effect (νi) and a time-varying error term (εit). yit is included among the 
controls to capture the convergence effects, and Xit controls for possible sources of 
spurious correlation. Equation (4.1) is estimated with flexible specifications: (i) the 
first relationship relates to the square of the change in inequality to the level of 
inequality: 
 
 (git+a – git)2 = αyit + Xitβ + h2(git–a) + νi + εit. (4.2) 
 
The second relationship is a “reduced-form relationship”, which relates the level of 
inequality (lagged by one period) to the growth rate: 
 
 (yit+a –yit)/a = αyit + Xitβ + h(git–a) + νi + εit. (4.3) 
 
Moreover, we consider occasional shocks that increase inequality: exogenous shocks 
that increase inequality and therefore reduce growth and endogenous reductions in 
inequality that are also associated with a fall in the growth rate. This means that 
measured changes in inequality in either direction will be associated with a fall in 
growth, suggesting that the equation to estimate should include both a direct effect of 
the level of inequality and an effect of changes in inequality. Hence, the final basic 
model is expressed in equation (4.4), where (git – git–a) is the change in inequality and 
h(git) is the initial level of inequality that matters for the growth rate in the short run: 
 
(yit+a –yit)/a = αyit + Xitβ + k1(git – git–a) + k2(git – git–a)2 + + h(git) + νi + εit.         (4.4) 
 
 
16 We choose three years (a = 3) as the length of the period due to data availability and to 
avoid seasonal effects. Our data period is from 1999 to 2014 for 242 districts throughout 
Indonesia. A detailed explanation of the data sources is presented in section 4.4. 




We also follow the choice of control variables based on the Perotti model as employed 
by Banerjee and Duflo. However, due to data availability at the district level, we 
simplify the control variables of Perotti by employing only two out of four variables, 
that is, the initial level of per capita GDP yt to express the convergence in the economy 
and the total education educt as in Perotti specification without gender classification 
to capture human capital. 
By replicating the above models, we estimate the growth of the per capita GDP 
(including and excluding oil) as a function of the initial level of inequality, the change 
in inequality, the square of this change to allow for non-monotonicity and a set control 
variables suggested by Perotti as shown in equation (4.4). Our basic model is now 
written in the following fashion:   
 
 git = β0 +  β1·Giniit + β2·∆Giniit + β3·[∆Giniit]2 + βi·Xit  + εit. (4.5) 
 
Our dependent variable is the growth rate (git), an annual average of the difference 
between the initial income and the three-year lagged income. Our interest variables 
are initial inequality (Giniit), the change in inequality obtained by calculating the 
difference between the initial Gini and the three-year-lagged Gini in each period 
(∆Giniit) and the square of this change (∆Giniit)2. All of these equations are estimated 
using a fixed-effect specification to control for non-observed heterogeneity across 
districts that does not vary over time. 
Furthermore, we estimate the growth of the per capita GDP (including and 
excluding oil) with the one-period-lagged inequality, the square of this lag to capture 
non-monotonicity and a lagged set of control variables suggested by Perotti, as shown 
in equation (4.3). We expect that the level of inequality (in the lagged form) is also 
negatively correlated with the growth, which implies that increasing inequality is 
associated with lower subsequent growth. Our lagged model is: 
 
 git = β0 +  β1·Giniit –a + β2·[Giniit–a]2 + β3·Xit–a  + εit. (4.6) 
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4.3.2 Modified Basic Model: Role of Institutional Quality 
As a consequence of decentralization in Indonesia since 2001, public service delivery 
is now under local government jurisdiction, that is, provinces and districts/cities. 
Local elections have been implemented since 2004. These two events make the role 
of more than 500 districts in the governance process crucial and more strategic. Thus, 
the quality of institutions, as represented by audit performance, budget efficiency and 
local governance variables at the district level, also becomes an important factor in 
analysing the relationship between inequality and growth. Moreover, we hypothesize 
that increasing inequality is less harmful if proper institutions are in place. 
We therefore introduce the quality of institutions into our basic model (4.5) as 
a variable to test whether the quality of institutions and its interactions with various 
forms of inequality correlate with the growth rate. Our modified model is shown 
below:   
 
git = β0 +  β1·Giniit + β2·∆Giniit + βi·[∆Giniit]2 + β4·Instit  
+  β5·(Giniit ·Instit)+ β6· (∆Giniit ·Instit) + β7·([∆Giniit]2·Instit)  
+ βi·Xit  + εit.               (4.7) 
 
We exploit three institutional quality variables (Instit) in this model, namely audit 
performance (audit), budget efficiency (budget) and local regulation index (locreg). 
More details regarding the institutional quality indicators will be discussed in the next 
section. We also interact the initial level of inequality, the change in inequality and 
the square of the change in inequality with each of the institutional quality variable as 
follows: (Giniit · Instit), (∆Giniit · Instit) and (∆Giniit2 · Instit). We apply the same control 
variables as in the basic model. We expect that institutional quality will have a positive 
correlation with the growth rate.  
 
4.3.3 Development Outcome  
To understand further the relationship between inequality and development outcomes, 
we test the basic and modified models with six development indicators, specifically 
access to health, asphalt roads, sanitation, clean water and electricity and poverty. We 




primarily estimate the basic model (4.5) and the model with institutional quality (4.7) 
with some modifications. In estimating the growth of development outcomes, we add 
initial development indicators as new control variables. For instance, if our dependent 
variable is the growth of access to health, then the control variables are initial health, 
initial education and initial per capita GDP (excluding oil), as displayed in Appendix 
A4.1. 
 
4.4 Data Description  
This research covers 242 districts throughout Indonesia. We exclude Aceh, Maluku 
and Papua due to a lack of data and then recode all the amalgamated districts back to 
the parent districts to obtain a more complete and consistent dataset (see Appendix 
A2.1 on constructing the true panel dataset). We utilize secondary data from various 
sources and levels, such as the Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia (BPS) for the 
household and village levels and the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Ministry of 
Finance and Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD) for the district level. In this model, 
we define income inequality in various forms and institutional quality as interest 
variables for the right-hand side and growth as the dependent variable.  
 
Per Capita GDP (Excluding Oil) 
We use the deflated per capita GDP in log form to calculate growth. The earliest year 
of per capita GDP at the district level in our dataset is 1999, so we define 1999 as the 
initial year. We also use the per capita GDP excluding oil in our model to see how 
important oil is in the Indonesian economy, particularly in the relationship with 
inequality and development indicators. The per capita GDP and per capita GDP 
excluding oil are available at the district level in figures issued by the Indonesian 
Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) from 1999 to 2014. 
 
Income Inequality 
The Gini coefficient is widely used as a proxy for income inequality – a lower Gini 
means lower inequality. We calculate this coefficient from the total monthly 
household expenditures and aggregate it to the district level. The source of the 
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expenditure data is the Susenas consumption module issued by BPS from 1999 until 
2014. Like the per capita GDP, the earliest year for which the Gini coefficient is 
available at the district level in our dataset is 1999, so we define 1999 as the initial 
year. 
 
Institutional Quality  
We measure the quality of institutions through three indicators: audit performance, 
budget efficiency and local regulation index. These indicators come from different 
sources so the area and time coverage are different from one to another. For instance, 
audit results and budget efficiency are available since 2005 and 2002, repectively, 
while local regulation index are available from 2001 until 2011. Thus, missing values 
in particular years are unavoidable. 
 
Audit Results (Audit): We use audit results as a proxy for institutional quality. The 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK–RI) performs annual assessments on 
the compliance of all the government institutions throughout Indonesia in 
administering their expenditure and programme implementation. However, the results 
for local governments at the district level have only been released since 2005. The 
audit results are categorized into four opinions as follows: unqualified opinions as the 
best result, qualified opinions, adverse opinions and disclaimers as the worst result. 
We code these results from –1 for the best to –4 for the worst audit result. A higher 
audit result means better budget administration and programme implementation and 
thus better institutions.  
 
Budget Efficiency (Budget): We measure budget efficiency from both the expenditure 
and the revenue side of the local government budget (APBD). The disbursement rate 
of the local government budget is the percentage of the total expenditure realizations 
of its plan, while the realization rate of own source revenue17 is calculated as the 
 
17 Own source revenue is the revenue generated from within the local area itself. It consists 
of local taxes, including land and property tax, permits and licenses, fees for public services, 
fines from breaking rules and revenues from local state-owned enterprises (Law No. 28, 2009 
on Local Taxes and Levies). 
 




percentage of actual own source revenue of its target. These indicators show how 
efficient the local government is in spending its budget based on its plan and in 
collecting revenue from its own sources, such as local taxes and levies. A high 
disbursement rate (and high realization rate) could be perceived as indicating a better 
capacity of local governments to spend money (and earn money) as they planned (and 
targeted), and hence these indicators represent better institutions.  
 The source of these data is the Ministry of Finance from 2002 to 2014. 
However, there are outliers in our budget data as the maximum value of the 
disbursement or absorption rate should not exceed 100 per cent while our data record 
the disbursement and/or the absorption rate as much higher than 100 per cent – the 
maximum budget efficiency is 971.7 per cent (Appendix A4.2). These outliers are due 
to the budgeting system in Indonesia, which allows the government to reset its target 
for disbursement and absorption in the second half of the fiscal year. Thus, when the 
Ministry of Finance publishes these data, the disbursement or absorption rate refers to 
the status on 31 December or at the end of the fiscal year while the plan or the target 
refers to the status on 1 January or at the beginning of the fiscal year. Without outliers, 
the average budget disbursement rate is 90.7 per cent, with a minimum of 6.4 per cent. 
 
Local Regulation Index (locreg). This index measures businesses’ perception of the 
local regulation related to business climates, such as the types of licenses and permits 
required to start a business, cost, time spent, number of required documents to obtain 
a business license and so on. A higher index means that the local government has a 
greater ability to respond to what matters to the local businesses, so it captures a better 
government institution. This index is extracted from the survey on governance and the 
investment climate conducted by Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD) from 2001 
until 2011. However, the coverage area of the survey varies in each round, so there 
are missing values in several districts.  
 
Development Outcome  
This variable consists of six indicators, namely access to health, sanitation, water, 
roads and electricity and the poverty rate. We calculate the percentage of births 
attended by certified health workers as the health indicator, the percentage of 
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households with access to sanitation, the percentage of households with access to 
clean water, the percentage of households with access to electricity and the percentage 
of villages with asphalt roads. The source of data for all the indicators is extracted 
from the Susenas core module at the household level, except the percentage of villages 
with asphalt roads, which is calculated from Potential Village (Podes)18 at the village 
level, and then all is aggregated at the district level. The poverty rate as the 
development outcome is obtained from District in Figures and is also provided by the 
Indonesian Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) from 1999 to 2014.  
Furthermore, we use initial education as a control variable. We calculate the 
percentage of the population above 30 years old with a senior high school diploma as 
a proxy for education. These data are also available in our dataset from 1999, so we 
define 1999 as the initial year for education. 
 
4.5 Results and Discussion  
This section presents and discusses the results of the relationship between inequality 
and growth and the relationship with institutional quality. We also discuss the results 
of the above models regarding development outcomes. In general, the relationship 
between change in inequality and subsequent growth across districts in Indonesia 
supports the non-linearity hypothesis in the basic and the lagged model developed by 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003).   
 
4.5.1 Basic Model 
Table 4.1 presents the estimation results of the basic model. The initial level of 
inequality has a positive coefficient, while the change in inequality has the opposite 
correlation with the growth in the subsequent period. Both are statistically significant. 
This implies that decreasing current inequality associates with higher growth in the 
next period. If we add the square of the change in inequality to allow for non-
monotonicity, the coefficient of the squared term is negative but statistically 
 
18 Since Podes is collected every three years, we interpolate the missing values of each 
variable within these three years. 




insignificant; hence, the relationship between growth and lagged inequality growth 
shows an inverted U-shaped pattern, 95% CI [–1.81, 1.27], as shown in Figure 4.1.   
 




Per Capita GDP (Excluding Oil) 
Dependent Variable: git 
1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 
            
Ginit 0.427*** 0.877*** 0.887*** 0.889*** 0.896*** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
∆Giniit  –0.503*** –0.498*** –0.441*** –0.732*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.24) 
(∆Giniit)2   –0.271 –0.469 –2.680 
   (0.78) (0.82) (1.85) 
∆Gini(it) > 0    –0.007 –0.008 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Giniit * ∆Giniit > 0     0.561 
     (0.42) 
yt –0.100*** –0.155*** –0.156*** –0.156*** –0.158*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educt –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.091*** 0.064*** 0.063** 0.067*** 0.062** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Number of Observations 1,210 968 968 968 968 
R-squared 0.126 0.269 0.269 0.270 0.272 
Number of Districts 242 242 242 242 242 
           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We are also interested in observing the difference between districts with positive and 
negative changes in inequality in relating with growth. However, when we introduce 
a dummy variable for positive change (∆Giniit>0) and its interaction with the change 
in inequality, the results are not statistically significant. These results suggest that 
inequality at the district level in Indonesia is still an increasing function although at a 
decreasing rate (Figure 4.1). A negative change in inequality or decreasing current 
inequality compared with the previous period associates with an increase subsequent 
growth of 1.12 per cent until it reaches the value of lagged change in inequality of –
0.92. After this top point, this negative change turns into a positive change in 
inequality and harms the growth. In other words, decreasing current inequality is 
positive correlated with growth up to a certain period and then this higher growth 
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tends to increase inequality, which will be translated into a positive change in 
inequality as compared with the previous period; thus, the growth becomes slower. 
Hence, a larger change in inequality is associated with a larger decline in subsequent 
growth. 
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between Income Growth and Lagged Inequality Growth  
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
As control variables, the initial per capita GDP (oil excluded) is a negative coefficient, 
suggesting a convergence story at the district level. A district with a low initial per 
capita GDP grows faster to catch up with its counterparts. We also use initial 
education as a control variable. It seems that education does not correlate with the 
subsequent growth as the coefficient is very small and not statistically significant. 
This is due to our definition of education, which only captures the share of the 
population aged over 30 that holds a high school diploma. Since our dataset covers 
only 15 years, while completing high school takes at least 12 years of schooling, in 
this case, education is not yet correlated with growth. Similar results are shown for 
the per capita GDP estimation, as presented in Appendix A4.3. 
 




4.5.2 Lagged Model  
Our estimation results for growth with one-period-lagged inequality are similar to 
those of the previous basic model of income (oil excluded) growth estimation, 
presented in Table 4.2. It implies that increasing inequality in the linear form is 
associated with high income (oil excluded) growth in the next period (the first two 
columns). These results seem to be consistent with the conclusions of Li and Zu 
(1998), Forbes (2000) and Galor and Moav (2004), suggesting that increasing 
inequality will boost economic growth without oil. In other words, their conclusions 
are still valid for the Indonesian case. If we introduce the square of lagged inequality, 
the negative coefficient exhibits an inverted U-shape, but it has a weak relationship 
with oil income growth. The relationship between lagged inequality and subsequent 
growth becomes less important if we use control variables in lagged form, as shown 
in the last two columns of the per capita GDP (excluded oil) and per capita GDP 
estimation.  
 
Table 4.2 Relationship between Lagged Inequality and Growth (Lagged Model)  
Basic Model 
Dependent Variable: git 
Per Capita GDP (Excluding Oil)  Per Capita GDP 
1a 2a 3a 4a  1b 2b 3b 4b           
Gini(t–a) 0.495*** 1.338*** 0.208** 0.488  0.324*** 0.841** 0.058 0.119 
 (0.07) (0.41) (0.08) (0.46)  (0.07) (0.38) (0.08) (0.43) 
          
Gini(t–a)2  –1.406**  –0.466   –0.863  –0.103 
  (0.67)  (0.76)   (0.63)  (0.69) 
          
Control Var. X(t) X(t) X(t–a) X(t–a)  X(t) X(t) X(t–a) X(t–a) 
          
No. of 
Observations 968 968 964 964 
 968 968 968 968 
R-squared 0.234 0.238 0.024 0.025  0.201 0.203 0.021 0.022 
Number of 
Districts 242 242 242 242 
 242 242 242 242 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Figure 4.2 presents the non-linear relationship between the lagged inequality and the 
square of change in inequality, where the lagged inequality reaches the maximum 
around 0.53. If we look at Figure 4.3, the growth could decrease if the lagged 
inequality is larger than 0.48, which is close to the value at which the lagged inequality 
reaches its maximum, as shown in Figure 4.2. These lagged results as well as the non-
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linear models convince us that the rise in inequality is associated with a slowing of 
the economic growth.  
 
Figure 4.2 Relationship between Lagged 
Gini and Square of Gini Changes 
(Equation 2) 
Figure 4.3 Reduced Form of the 
Lagged Model (Equation 3) 
Source: Authors’ estimation Source: Authors’ estimation 
 
4.5.3 Modified Model with Institutional Quality  
Our estimation results from the modified model with institutional quality show the 
relationship between change in inequality and its square, and the income (oil 
excluded) growth in the next period remains the same as in the basic model’s results. 
The positive coefficient for the initial level of inequality in all the specifications 
suggests that a high initial level of inequality benefits subsequent growth. The change 
in inequality has a negative correlation with growth, signalling that a decrease in the 
existing inequality would enhance growth.  
With regard to institutional quality, only the local regulation index (locreg) 
has a positive correlation with growth and is statistically significant while audit 
performance (audit) and budget efficiency (budget) are positive and negative 
coefficients, respectively; neither is statistically significant. These suggest that 
districts with good audit results and budget efficiency do not guarantee high economic 
growth while the local regulation index could enhance economic growth. However, 
the interaction between the initial level of inequality and the institutional quality 
shows different relationship with growth; that is, interaction with audits results in 
0.48 




decreasing growth while budget efficiency and the local regulation index support 
increasing growth (Table 4.3 column 1). Our findings indicate that a high inequality 
level alone correlates with an increasing growth but that, if the audit performance is 
poor, increasing inequality would harm growth.  
On the other hand, budget efficiency and the local regulation index are 
important to increase growth when a high initial level of inequality exists. These 
results suggest that an increase in a level of inequality has positive relationship with 
subsequent economic growth if better institutional quality is in place, and each of the 
institutional quality indicators has a different association with the behaviour of 
inequality in the relationship with economic growth at the district level. We also 
interact institutional quality with change in inequality as well as its square of change 
in inequality, but none of the coefficients are statistically significant, as shown in the 
table below. Similar results are found for the growth of the per capita GDP with 
stronger coefficient for audit (Table 4.3 column 2). 
All the specifications apply the same control variables, that is, initial per capita 
GDP and education. Similar to the previous model without institutions, a district with 
a low initial level of per capita GDP correlates with higher growth and education does 
not yet have a correlation with growth. In short, our results have interesting 
implications: (i) good institutions alone cannot boost growth; (ii) an initial level of 
inequality is still required to increase growth together with good institutions for a 
certain period; (iii) inequality and institutional quality correlate with economic growth 
depending on the type of institutional quality indicators; (iv) different districts require 
different sets of institutional quality; and (v) the role of economic development is 
important in determining growth. 
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Table 4.3 Summary Relationship between Subsequent Growth and Institutional 
Quality19 
  
Dependent Variable: [y(t+a) – y(t)] / a 
(1) 
Per Capita GDP (Excl. Oil) 
(2) 
Per Capita GDP 
audit(it) 0.002 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
budget(it) –0.0001 –3.11e–05 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
locreg(it) 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Interaction Variable      
Gini(it) * audit(it) –0.106*** –0.049* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Gini(it) * budget(it) 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Gini(it) * locreg(it) 0.129*** 0.124*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   
∆Gini(t) * audit(it) –0.0004 –0.055 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
∆Gini(t) * budget(it) –0.0009 0.0006 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
∆Gini(t) * locreg(it) –0.064 –0.082 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
   
(∆Gini(t))2* audit(it) –0.188 –0.584 
 (0.85) (0.79) 
(∆Gini(t))2 * budget(it) 0.018 –0.006 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
(∆Gini(t))2 * locreg(it) 2.067 2.206 
 (2.18) (2.15) 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Nawaz et al. (2014), in their recent study, suggested that institutions are important in 
determining economic growth but that the impact of institutions on economic growth 
depends on the level of economic development. Moreover, they claimed that 
institutions are more effective in developed countries than in developing ones; hence, 
 
19 Full regression results are available on request. 




different countries require different sets of institutions to promote economic growth. 
Their findings are relevant to our results at the district level in Indonesia. 
 
4.5.4 Development Outcomes 
Following our basic and modified models in explaining growth from the change in 
inequality and institutional quality, we also apply these models to other development 
indicators. Our results suggest that a high initial level of inequality has a positive 
correlation with the growth of roads and reducing the growth of poverty. If we look 
at the change in inequality, existing inequality associates with high growth of roads 
and low growth of poverty, suggesting that high inequality is still expected to alleviate 
poverty for certain periods. In general, our regression results show an inverted U-
shaped in the relationship with change in inequality except for poverty and electricity 
(Figure 4.4). These development indicators grow as the change in inequality increases 
but are negatively correlated after inequality reaches a certain point (the top of the 
curve). Thus, it could be expected that the relationship between existing inequality 
and the growth of these development indicators is positive at the district level. 
High initial level of inequality associates with expanding roads and supporting 
poverty alleviation. Bourguignon (2004) explained this relationship through the PGI 
triangle (poverty, growth and inequality).20 Our results also confirm the convergence 
story in which a district with a low initial level of development grows faster and the 
control variable of per capita GDP (excluding oil) plays an important role in speeding 





20 This triangle highlights the dual routes through which the development strategy can reduce 
poverty and generate “pro-poor growth”: economic growth and improvements in income 
distribution. These two processes indicate possible causal forces at work in each direction as 
follows: economic growth might affect income distribution, perhaps widening inequality in 
the way in which Kuznets (1955) hypothesized, while income distribution might affect 
economic growth in a negative direction, as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Easterly (2002) 
demonstrated, or in a positive direction, as Forbes (2000) showed. 
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Figure 4.4 Relationship between Development Growth and                              
Lagged Inequality Growth 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
Moreover, we apply the modified model to see how institutional quality affects the 
growth of development outcomes. Our results work only for the growth of roads and 
poverty alleviation (Table 4.4). Like our basic model results, institutional quality 
solely has no statistically significant correlation with the growth of roads, but, if it is 
combined with an initial level of inequality, the relationship between institutional 
quality and growth of road varies depending on which indicator we use. For instance, 
if the initial level of inequality is high, poor audit performance (audit) negatively 
correlates with the growth of roads. However, this is not the case when the budget 
efficiency (budget) is high – a rise in the initial level of inequality positively relates 
with an increase the growth of roads.  
   
 
  




Table 4.4 Summary Relationship between Subsequent Growth of Development 
Outcome and Institutional Quality21  
  Dependent Variable: [y(t+a) – y(t)]/a 
  Health Roads Sanitation Water Poverty Electricity  
       
audit(it) 0.277 –0.068 0.248 –0.157 –0.031 0.196 
 (0.18) (0.11) (0.22) (0.16) (0.04) (0.19) 
budget(it) 0.011 0.006 –0.001 –0.01 –0.004** –0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) 
locreg(it) 0.035 0.204 –0.322 –0.079 –0.464*** –0.783** 
 (0.29) (0.18) (0.36) (0.29) (0.07) (0.31) 
Interaction Variable       
       
Gini(it) * audit(it) –0.157 –2.812*** 0.272 0.196 1.694*** 3.254* 
 (1.59) (0.93) (1.96) (1.40) (0.33) (1.71) 
Gini(it) * budget(it) 0.014 0.048** –0.009 –0.015 –0.034*** –0.047 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
Gini(it) * locreg(it) 0.911 1.261 1.711 –2.692 –0.930 –1.399 
 (2.67) (1.61) (3.26) (2.65) (0.64) (2.85) 
       
∆Gini(t) * audit(it) 2.433 –0.870 4.415 1.883 1.051 –2.617 
 (3.69) (2.14) (4.48) (3.26) (0.75) (3.98) 
∆Gini(t) * budget(it) –0.121 –0.0368 0.145 –0.109 –0.0264 0.232 
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.19) (0.13) (0.03) (0.17) 
∆Gini(t) * locreg(it) –3.292 –3.023 –1.045 –1.317 –0.259 8.350 
 (7.04) (4.25) (8.78) (7.04) (1.69) (7.49) 
       
∆Gini(t)2* audit(it) 90.36** 0.097 96.56* 37.99 8.738 –68.40 
 (45.13) (26.26) (54.99) (39.72) (9.24) (48.63) 
∆Gini(t)2 * budget(it) 0.793 –0.767 1.065 –0.319 –0.253 –1.764 
 (2.06) (1.19) (2.49) (1.77) (0.42) (2.21) 
∆Gini(t)2 * locreg(it) –90.22 34.87 –83.46 –118.4 3.821 –141.2 
 (127.9) (76.96) (155.6) (127.1) (30.56) (136.0) 
              
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Unlike the relationship between quality of institutions and the growth of roads, budget 
efficiency and local governance (locreg) alone are highly correlated in reducing the 
growth of poverty. However, if we look at the interaction between audit results and 
 
21 Full regression results are available upon request from the author. 
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the initial level of inequality, its coefficient is positively associated with growth of 
poverty when a high initial level of inequality exists. It appears that audit results focus 
more on the mechanism through which a government programme’s implementation 
complies with administrative procedures and follows the rules rather than measuring 
the effectiveness of the government programme in combatting poverty. On the other 
hand, the interaction between budget efficiency and initial level of inquality shows 
negative relationship with poverty growth. It seems that districts with the capacity and 
ability to collect tax revenue and to disburse government expenditure are expected to 
benefit from increasing inequality through support from anti-poverty programmes and 
the redistributive policy.  
 
4.6 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Test 
In this section, we perform some checks to validate our empirical results. Initial 
inequality matters in our model; therefore, we include the square of initial inequality 
(Gini(it))2 in our basic model only for the per capita GDP (excluding oil) and use the 
same set of control variables.  
 
 git = β0 + β1Giniit + β2(Giniit)2 + β3∆Giniit + β4 [∆Giniit]2 + β5Xit  + εit  . (4.8) 
 
The results of the robustness check from the basic model of growth of the per capita 
GDP (excluding oil) are consistent with our basic model, shown in Table 4.1. The 
initial level of inequality and the change in inequality are positively and negatively 
correlated with the subsequent growth, respectively, and the square of this change is 
a negative coefficient and is not statistically significant (Table 4.5). It is also 
consistent for the growth of the per capita GDP (Appendix A4.3). Hence, we conclude 
that our model is robust for the initial level of inequality, the change in inequality and 
its square. 
In performing these non-linear regressions, we realize that our data on 
inequality at the district level are limited, covering only 15 years. Therefore, to test  
  




the sensitivity of our result to the change in inequality (∆Gini(it)), we use the change 
in inequality within one period instead of between periods, as we did in our original 
basic model. Our basic model is now written as follows: 
 
 git = γ0 + γ1Giniit + γ2∆Giniit + γ3 [∆Giniit]2 + γ4Xit  + εit. (4.9) 
 
As shown in Appendix A4.5, the change in inequality within one period has a positive 
relationship while in our previous basic model using a three-year lag for one period it 
has a negative coefficient. This suggests that our model is sensitive to the period of 
change in inequality. We also exclude education from our control variables in the 
basic model to see how the results are affected. Without education, our regression 
results are still consistent with the previous basic model (Appendix A4.6). We 
conclude that our model is sensitive to the change in inequality but not for education 
as a control variable. 
 
Table 4.5 Robustness Check for the Basic Model’s Relationship between Inequality, 
Change in Inequality and Growth  
  
 
  Per Capita GDP 
 
2a 3a 4a   1b 2b 3b 4b 
  
          
1.013*** 1.176** 1.156**  0.485*** 0.613* 0.862* 0.788*   
(0.38) (0.49) (0.51)  (0.05) (0.35) (0.46) (0.47)   
–0.936 –0.469 –0.429   –0.203 –0.242 –0.093   
(0.59) (0.76) (0.79)   (0.55) (0.71) (0.74)   
 –0.504*** –0.501***    –0.334*** –0.325***   
 (0.07) (0.07)    (0.07) (0.07)   
  –0.151     –0.559   
  (0.82)     (0.76)   
–0.102*** –0.156*** –0.156***  –0.149*** –0.149*** –0.155*** –0.155***   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
–0.002 –0.002 –0.002  –0.0001 –0.0002 –0.001 –0.001   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
0.004 0.019 0.022  0.150*** 0.131** 0.083 0.093   
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)   
          
1,210 968 968  1,206 1,206 968 968   
0.128 0.270 0.270  0.324 0.324 0.243 0.244   
242 242 242  242 242 242 242   
                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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4.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This chapter basically studied the relationship between growth and inequality across 
districts in Indonesia by employing Banerjee-Duflo approach of non-linearity. More 
precise, we empirically tested whether actual changes in inequality associate with 
subsequent economic growth and whether this relationship is non-linear. We also 
examine the role of institutional quality in the relationship between past inequality 
and economic growth in the next period. Similar approach is applied to test whether 
changes in inequality in the past correlates with growth of development indicators in 
the future.     
We consistently found an increase in a level of inequality has a significant and 
positive relationship with subsequent economic growth in various specifications. 
However, large changes in inequality in any direction were found to be associated 
with large decline in economic growth, as revealed by a hump-shaped relationship 
between economic growth and the actual change in inequality. These relationships 
held in all the specifications of the basic and the modified models, which included 
institutional quality. 
  Our findings are in line with our results in Chapter 2, in which a typical 
Kuznets-like inverted U-curve relationship was found at the district level in Indonesia, 
implying that inequality can be seen as a price to be paid for wealth. In this chapter, 
we indicated that high inequality in the past is associated with relatively high 
subsequent economic growth, this high growth is then associated with high inequality 
in the current period. If this current inequality is too high, then the change in inequality 
will be positive and large enough to reduce growth in the future. In other words, the 
high inequality in the past is associated with the slowing down of economic growth 
in the future and worsening the existing inequality. It seems that our results support 
Piketty’s (2014) argument that inequality keeps increasing as societies accumulate 
wealth. With regard to the institutional quality, the type of institutional quality plays 
a significant role in shaping the relationship between past inequality and economic 
growth in the next period. This role appears more important when we interact 
institutional quality with the initial inequality, suggesting that a combination of a 
certain degree of inequality and institutional quality is positively correlated with 
economic growth.  




In addition, our results show that a high initial level of inequality is highly 
associated with the growth of roads and the poverty reduction.The relationship with 
the change in inequality shows an inverted U-shaped for the growth of roads and a U-
shaped for the poverty rate, suggesting that existing inequality is positive correlated 
with growth of roads while current inequality is negative correlated with growth of 
poverty until the this current inequality passes a threshold. If current inequality keeps 
increasing, it tends to reduce the growth of roads and increase the growth of poverty 
in the future. These findings indicate that the rising inequality may go at the expense 
of the accessibility of certain basic public services that we study in Chapter 5 and 6 
of this thesis.  
  





Appendix A4.1 List of Variables in Basic Model for Development Indicators 
  
Development Outcome 
Health Road Poverty Sanitation Clean Water Electricity        
Dependent  
Variable  
git g_health g_road g_poverty g_sanitation g_water g_electricity 
       
Independent  
Variable 
Gini(t) Gini(t) Gini(t) Gini(t) Gini(t) Gini(t) Gini(t) 
∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) ∆Gini(t) 
∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2 ∆Gini(t)2        
Control  
Variable      
y(t) initial_health initial_road initial_poverty initial_sanitation initial_water initial_electricity 
educ(t) initial_educ initial_educ initial_educ initial_educ initial_educ initial_educ 
Y(t) initial_income initial_income initial_income initial_income initial_income initial_income 




Appendix A4.2 Summary of Observed Variables 
Variable Number of  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Per Capita Income 3,868 1.69 0.72 –1.02 5.00 
Per Capita Income (excl. oil) 3,872 1.68 0.70 –1.02 5.00 
Gini 3,872 0.29 0.05 0.17 0.61 
Audit 2,420 –2.11 0.74 –4.00 –1.00 
Budget 3,076 108.09 34.22 6.35 971.73 
Local Regulation 1,857 1.49 0.77 0.11 3.50 
Education 3,872 2.87 1.55 0.11 8.67 
Health 3,872 72.14 21.05 10.70 100.00 
Road 3,872 70.88 24.99 2.44 100.00 
Sanitation 3,763 49.59 24.26 0.35 99.41 
Water 3,872 63.13 21.56 0.66 100.00 
Electricity 3,872 79.21 19.97 11.49 100.00 
Poverty 3,855 15.58 8.95 0.99 91.12 
      
Source: BPS, authors’ calculation. 




Appendix A4.3 Relationship between Inequality, Change in Inequality, and Growth 
Per Capita GDP (Basic Model)  
 
VARIABLES 
Per Capita GDP 
Dependent Variable: git 
1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 
            
Gini(t) 0.485*** 0.709*** 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.733*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
∆Gini(it)  –0.334*** –0.325*** –0.336*** –0.533** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.22) 
∆Gini(it)2   –0.586 –0.545 –2.039 
   (0.73) (0.76) (1.72) 
∆Gini(it) > 0    0.001 0.001 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Gini(it)* ∆Gini(it) > 0     0.379 
     (0.39) 
y(t) –0.149*** –0.154*** –0.155*** –0.155*** –0.156*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educ(t) –0.0001 –0.0008 –0.0008 –0.0007 –0.0006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.150*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.0975*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Observations 1,210 968 968 968 968 
R-squared 0.324 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.245 
Number of Districts 242 242 242 242 242 
           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A4.4 Relationship between Inequality, Change in Inequality, and Growth 
of Development Indicators (Basic Model) 
Basic Model 
Dependent Variable: git 
Health  Road 
1c 2c 3c   1d 2d 3d         
Gini(t) 2.567 7.668 8.666  6.573*** 14.12*** 15.26*** 
 (2.83) (5.16) (5.38)  (1.85) (3.08) (3.20) 
∆Gini(it)  –3.087 –2.638   –9.191*** –8.710*** 
  (3.84) (3.90)   (2.26) (2.29) 
∆Gini(it)2   –28.21    –31.23 
   (42.02)    (24.33) 
y(t) –0.361*** –0.383*** –0.383***  –0.117*** –0.162*** –0.162*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educ(t) 0.001 0.027 0.028  0.001 0.077 0.078 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Y(t) –0.238 –0.647 –0.676  1.312*** 1.332*** 1.302*** 
 (0.39) (0.52) (0.52)  (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) 
Constant 25.65*** 26.33*** 26.15***  5.009*** 5.936*** 5.724*** 
 (1.10) (1.59) (1.62)  (0.59) (0.81) (0.83) 
        
Observations 1,210 968 968  1,210 968 968 
R-squared 0.535 0.530 0.530  0.172 0.273 0.275 
Number of Districts 242 242 242  242 242 242 
                





Dependent Variable: git 
Poverty  Sanitation 
1e 2e 3e   1f 2f 3f 
        
Gini(t) –6.053*** –7.285*** –8.284***  –0.970 0.449 2.478 
 (0.87) (1.13) (1.17)  (3.56) (6.47) (6.74) 
∆Gini(it)  5.366*** 4.969***   –0.880 –0.013 
  (0.81) (0.81)   (4.76) (4.83) 
∆Gini(it)2   26.57***    –55.37 
   (8.58)    (51.73) 
y(t) –0.262*** –0.139*** –0.140***  –0.340*** –0.376*** –0.375*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educ(t) –0.028 –0.001 –0.001  –0.016 –0.088 –0.085 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
Y(t) –1.192*** –0.407*** –0.384***  0.121 0.362 0.296 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.50) (0.66) (0.67) 
Constant 7.355*** 4.325*** 4.561***  16.98*** 18.09*** 17.67*** 
 (0.30) (0.40) (0.41)  (1.15) (1.78) (1.82) 
        
Observations 1,203 967 967  1,165 936 936 
R-squared 0.721 0.264 0.274  0.485 0.508 0.509 
Number of Districts 242 242 242  242 242 242 
                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  






Dependent Variable: git 
Clean Water  Electricity 
1g 2g 3g   1h 2h 3h 
        
Gini(t) –0.601 –1.084 –0.825  1.433 5.802 5.476 
 (2.49) (4.53) (4.71)  (3.04) (5.56) (5.79) 
∆Gini(it)  –1.474 –1.358   –6.009 –6.155 
  (3.37) (3.42)   (4.14) (4.20) 
∆Gini(it)2   –7.289    9.195 
   (36.89)    (45.24) 
y(t) –0.374*** –0.408*** –0.408***  –0.371*** –0.404*** –0.404*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educ(t) –0.098 –0.147 –0.147  –0.076 –0.091 –0.092 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Y(t) –0.281 0.059 0.051  –1.062** –1.419** –1.410** 
 (0.35) (0.45) (0.46)  (0.42) (0.56) (0.56) 
Constant 24.51*** 26.33*** 26.29***  30.91*** 32.89*** 32.95*** 
 (1.01) (1.44) (1.45)  (1.26) (1.83) (1.85) 
        
Observations 1,210 968 968  1,210 968 968 
R-squared 0.522 0.550 0.550  0.535 0.538 0.538 
Number of Districts 242 242 242  242 242 242 
                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A4.5 Sensitivity Test for Basic Model Relationship between Inequality, 
Change in Inequality and Growth: Lagged One Year of Gini 
` 
Dependent Variable: git 
Per Capita GDP (Excluding Oil)   Per Capita GDP 
1a 2a 3a   1b 2b 3b 
        
Gini(t) 0.427*** 0.806*** 0.818***  0.485*** 0.795*** 0.810*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
gini(t) – gini(t–1)  0.453*** 0.484***   0.385*** 0.432*** 
  (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.06) 
(gini(t) – gini(t–1))2   –0.733    –1.184* 
   (0.74)    (0.68) 
y(t) –0.100*** –0.132*** –0.133***  –0.149*** –0.172*** –0.173*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
educ(t) –0.002 –0.002 –0.002  –0.0001 –0.001 –0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.0906*** 0.0214 0.0201  0.150*** 0.0901*** 0.0881*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Observations 1,210 1,210 1,210  1,206 1,206 1,206 
R-squared 0.126 0.178 0.178  0.324 0.359 0.361 
Number of Districts 242 242 242  242 242 242 
                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Appendix A4.6 Sensitivity Test for Basic Model Relationship between Inequality, 
Change in Inequality and Growth: Without Education as Control Variable  
` 
Dependent Variable: git 
Per Capita GDP (Excluding Oil)   Per Capita GDP 
1a 2a 3a   1b 2b 3b 
        
Gini(t) 0.427*** 0.878*** 0.887***  0.485*** 0.709*** 0.729*** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
∆Gini(t)  –0.503*** –0.499***   –0.334*** –0.325*** 
  (0.07) (0.07)   (0.07) (0.07) 
(∆Gini(t))2   –0.276    –0.588 
   (0.78)    (0.73) 
y(t) –0.100*** –0.155*** –0.156***  –0.149*** –0.155*** –0.155*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.085*** 0.059** 0.057**  0.149*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Observations 1,210 968 968  1,206 968 968 
R-squared 0.126 0.269 0.269  0.324 0.243 0.244 
Number of Districts 242 242 242  242 242 242 
                





Chapter 5 Does Increased Access to Indonesian 




The decentralization and democratization processes in Indonesia have strongly 
impacted the entire society. In the previous chapters we analyzed how the Indonesian 
society changes in terms of the evolution of inequality in income and economic 
development across space and individuals and under influence of urbanization. In the 
remainder of this thesis, we analyze changes in the organization and accessibility of 
public services like health (this chapter) and electricity (Chapter 6). Did inequality in 
access to these services increase or decrease, and which factors drive the observed 
patterns of inequality? More specifically, in chapter 6 we analyse how spatial variation 
in population density, per capita GDP, geographical structure, industrial intensity and 
power supply have shaped access to electricity over time. In this chapter we analyze 
how changes in health insurance coverage – aimed to foster equality in acess to health 
services – have shaped individual healthcare consumption behaviour.  
In 2014, the Indonesian government established the Jaminan Kesehatan 
Nasional (JKN), a single-payer comprehensive universal health care programme 
managed by the social security agency Badan Pengelola Jaminan Sosial untuk 
Kesehatan (BPJS),. This programme was designed as pooled insurance coverage with 
the aim of providing health coverage for all Indonesians, with the Government only 
paying a modest premium. As social insurance, the main source of finance for the 
JKN is premia. The Government, through the Ministry of Health and the local budget, 
pays the premia of poor households so that they can access free health care. This group 
is also categorized as subsidized people. In non-poor households with formal 
employment status, civil servants pay 5 per cent of their salaries, but only 2 per cent 
is deducted directly from their salary payment and the rest is borne by their employers. 
Non-civil servants pay 5 per cent of their income, with 0.5 per cent paid directly by 
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the employees and the remaining 4.5 per cent paid by their employer. Those without 
employment status, that is, informal workers, pay premia based on their chosen 
inpatient ward level (Fuady 2019). As of 1 March 2019, the JKN serves 218,132,478 
people, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total population. It covers most 
treatments, ranging from simple diseases and symptoms to heart surgery, renal 
dialysis and cancer therapies, as well as maternity and child health services (BPJS 
2020). However, currently the JKN is facing financial difficulties in paying health 
bills, affecting fiscal sustainability of the programme. 
The health status of the Indonesian population is characterized by rapidly 
increasing life expectancy at birth, mainly through reductions in communicable, 
maternal, neonatal and nutritional (CMNN) diseases, but it is also facing a double 
burden of diseases whereby non-communicable diseases, such as ischemic heart 
diseases, cerebrovascular diseases and diabetes, are growing22 due to unhealthy 
lifestyles, poor diets and a lack of physical activities, while at the same time 
communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, diarrhoea and HIV/AIDS, remain the 
biggest challenges (Mboi et al. 2018).  
After the introduction of the JKN, access to health care increased significantly, 
in particular for low-income groups and in rural areas in which the population 
previously could not afford the high costs of advanced treatments to cure non-
communicable diseases. The frequency of visits to health facilities and inpatient care 
increased by 53 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, from 2015 to 2017 (BPJS 
2018). As a consequence, financing problems became unavoidable. The very low 
premia that are charged to the participants are far from sufficient to cover the existing 
curative costs. Furthermore, many participants just join the programme once they need 
further and/or high-cost treatment. Even worse, some participants stop paying their 
contribution once they have recovered from their illness. In other words, part of the 
population contributes very little but receives advanced high-cost treatment during a 
 
22 According to Global Burden of Disease Study 2016, these diseases are the first three leading 
causes of disability-adjusted life years in 2016, while diabetes ranked seventeenth, 
cerebrovascular diseases ranked eighth and ischemic heart diseases ranked fifth in 1990 
(Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network 2017). 




short period of insurance. For instance, by making a compulsory23 contribution of only 
$6 per month, a non-poor and informal participant with kidney failure could receive 
dialysis in a first-class room with average costs of around $600 per month (i.e. 100 
times more than is paid; see Agustina et al. 2019). As a consequence, the BPJS, a 
social security agency managing and administering the JKN, encountered an 
escalating deficit from approximately $422.2 million in 2015 to $720.6 million in 
2017 (an increase of 72 per cent in 2 years; BPJS 2018). To overcome this problem, 
the Ministry of Finance has bailed out the BPJS since 2015, but of course at the price 
of fiscal sustainability of the Indonesian economy, which can be harmed in the long 
run.   
Despite the fact that the use and coverage of the JKN have increased 
considerably, the Government’s allocation to health spending was consistently low, 
at around 1 per cent of the GDP, from 2007 to 2014 (World Bank 2020). To increase 
the health budget, the Ministry of Health has assigned at least 5 per cent of the national 
budget and 10 per cent of the local budgets to health spending. However, the 
percentage of government expenditure to GDP remained low, at 1.45 per cent, in 
2017. Moreover, the total health expenditure (THE) in Indonesia was only 3.0 per cent 
of the GDP in 2017, which is lower than the expenditure in Cambodia, Vietnam and 
Thailand, with corresponding figures of 5.9 per cent, 5.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent, 
respectively (World Bank 2020). This financial problem also affects payment systems 
in which capitation systems (payments of premia on a per capita basis) and claim 
payments are only based on the number of members covered and the resource 
availability and do not consider the total facility burden and performance, so this 
system is perceived to provide too low and slow a claimant process given the required 
competency and service standard (Agustina et al. 2019). As a consequence, many 
providers are no longer willing to renew their contract with the BPJS, causing a 
shortage of health facilities and poor services. 
In view of this state of affairs, we hypothesize that there might be a moral 
hazard problem for insured people in the sense that they tend not to pay their 
 
23 Compulsory means that non-poor and informal participants have to pay a monthly 
contribution to the BPJS based on their choice of inpatient ward. For non-poor people with 
formal employment status, a small part of their contribution is deducted directly from their 
salary and the rest is paid by the employee to the BPJS. 
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contribution after being treated and not to care sufficiently about their health situation 
that causes illness (ex ante moral hazard). This behaviour may be associated with 
increasing claims to the BPJS, so it is important to understand this behaviour to solve 
the BPJS’s problem.  
In this chapter, due to data availability, we only observe individual behaviour 
prior to the JKN era, when health insurance was provided by the central government 
from 1998.24 We assume that the behaviour of insured people remains the same over 
time, so we use the latest household data prior to the JKN era to inform us about the 
effects of insurance schemes. From the individual perspective, there are two 
perceptions of health: investment and consumption. Individuals perceive health as an 
investment if they increase their health consumption to improve or maintain their 
health condition (high awareness). Hence, health insurance can be perceived as a 
subsidy to cover their preventive costs. We expect that an increasing frequency of 
visits to health facilities is for counselling. On the other hand, individuals perceive 
health as consumption if they increase their health consumption to cure their health 
problems. They tend not to pay attention to their health and are in a situation of low 
awareness. Thus, there might be a moral hazard in health consumption whereby they 
perceive that they will be covered by insurance regardless of their illness. In other 
words, there is no incentive to prevent a deteriorating health situation and this could 
harm the sustainability of the health insurance system in the long run. In short, health 
insurance could determine the probability of inpatient and outpatient treatment, but 
its impact is undetermined. 
From the literature, it is apparent that health insurance coverage may affect 
consumers’ health behaviour through multiple channels, so the net impact is 
theoretically ambiguous. Our research aims to contribute to our understanding of how 
people’s behaviour towards health influences their demand for unhealthy 
consumption, which has an impact on outpatient and inpatient care and thus affects 
the sustainability and affordability of the BPJS programme. In particular, we try to 
 
24 As part of the coping strategy during the economic crisis, the central government developed 
a pro-poor policy known as the social safety net for health (JPS-BK) in 1998. This programme 
evolved and its name changed several times: the health financing scheme (JPK) in 2003, 
health security for the poor (JPK-MM) in 2005 and health insurance for the poor (Askeskin) 
and Community Health Security (Jamkesmas) since 2008 (Fuady 2019). 




identify ex ante moral hazard for insured people to help the government to formulate 
policy recommendations.   
Our main findings are as follows. Health insurance with or without subsidies 
improves accessibility to health care in terms of increasing the frequency of visits for 
outpatient care and the number of days spent receiving inpatient care. Subsidized 
people visit health facilities more frequently, but they spend fewer days in inpatient 
care. The latter might be due to a complex and bureaucratic procedure for the subsidy 
programme, lack of knowledge of the subsidized members about completing their 
paperwork and high transportation costs to reach public hospitals. To improve this 
situation, subsidized people need intermediaries or brokers in their local communities 
to help them to access free health care (Sambodho 2019). We also find that the 
probability of insured people, regardless of their type of insurance, consuming more 
excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories is significantly higher than the 
probability of their uninsured counterparts. Furthermore, subsidized people consume 
more cigarettes than non-subsidized people. The probability of the insured, including 
subsidized people, consuming excessive fat also increases when they visit more 
frequently. These findings indicate that ex ante moral hazard exists among insured 
people and even the poor. As a consequence, insured people who consume excessive 
carbohydrates spend more days in inpatient care and subsidized people who consume 
excessive fat visit health facilities more frequently. However, there is no difference in 
the demand for inpatient care for the poor if they consume unhealthy food. The role 
of education is important not only to improve the health status of the insured 
households but also to access both outpatient and inpatient care, especially for 
subsidized households. Becoming older and richer is associated with better access to 
outpatient and inpatient treatment for insured households, but this is not the case for 
subsidized people, who spend fewer days as their age increases but visit more 
frequently as their income rises. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a 
literature review on ex ante moral hazard in health care. In section 5.3, we discuss the 
empirical strategy to estimate demand functions for health care. Section 5.4 describes 
the dataset and the variables, and section 5.5 presents and interprets the estimation 
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results. Section 5.6 provides concluding remarks and discusses avenues for future 
research.    
 
5.2 Literature Review 
In the health economics literature, moral hazard has been a central concept for 
decades. There are two types of moral hazard related to health insurance: ex ante 
moral hazard, which causes insured people to invest insufficiently in self-protection 
(Ehrlich and Becker 1972), and ex post moral hazard, which results in inefficiently 
high consumption of health care (Pauly 1968; Manning et al. 1987). Bhattacharya and 
Packalen (2011) identified a second form of ex ante moral hazard, known as “other” 
ex ante moral hazard, which arises through the impact that self-protection has on the 
reward for innovation. People are not aware that their decision to adopt a low level of 
self-protection, such as a lack of physical activities, poor diet and so on, which 
increases the incidence of diseases and their medical treatment, will benefit the 
innovators as positive externalities. This mechanism of “other” ex ante moral hazard 
leads people to select inefficiently into high levels of self-protection.  
Most research on health insurance has focused on ex post moral hazard, 
whereby insured people demand unnecessary treatment that is covered by the 
insurance. It has provided fairly consistent evidence (cf. Zweifel and Manning 2000). 
This type of moral hazard could also induce moral hazard among providers, such as 
hospitals and pharmacies, to offer unnecessary treatment, examinations or medicines 
to obtain or secure their revenues in the long run. Evidence of ex post moral hazard 
that involves adverse health events is less consistent (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).  
According to Zweifel and Breyer (1997), ex ante moral hazard depends on the 
opportunity cost of preventive effort, which is likely to be proportional to the wage 
rate. However, this moral hazard effect may be neutralized by risk aversion, which 
leads to ambiguity about the relationship between health insurance coverage and sick 
leave pay. Furthermore, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) suggested that insurance coverage 
may cause ex ante moral hazard whereby patients have less incentive to reduce their 
risky health behaviour because they will pay a relatively small amount of the financial 
cost of their future illness. For example, Dave and Kaestner (2009) found that 




Medicare coverage increases the probability of daily alcohol consumption among 
men. However, health insurance does not reduce the non‐financial consequences of 
illness, such as physical pain and suffering, which could limit the extent of ex ante 
moral hazard (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). Moreover, health insurance has significant 
incentive effects on lifestyle choices, increasing the propensity for heavy smoking, 
lack of exercise and obesity and decreasing the propensity for heavy drinking 
(Stanciole 2008). Rashad and Markowitz (2009) also presented evidence that being 
insured is associated with a higher body mass, particularly for those above a certain 
poverty threshold, and an increased probability of being overweight. There is no 
evidence that having insurance affects the probability of being obese.  
Kenkel (1994) and Stanciole (2008) found that the use of preventive services 
decreases with age, which suggests adaptation to a shorter payoff period for 
investments in prevention. If insurance increases the coverage of curative treatment, 
the demand for preventive care also increases because the out-of-pocket costs are 
reduced (Courbage and de Coulon 2004; Pagán et al. 2007). This suggests that the 
two types of care are complements and may serve as substitutes for a patient’s own 
preventive effort.  
 
5.3 Empirical Strategy  
In this section, we will discuss our empirical strategy to estimate the demand for 
unhealthy consumption, that is, cigarettes, alcohol and excessive or under-
consumption of carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories, and the demand for health 
care in terms of outpatient and inpatient care. We observe the health spending 
behaviour of insured people by calculating their out-of-pocket health expenses from 
the Susenas consumption module 2014 (the most recent year prior to the JKN). Using 
this information, we estimate the demand for unhealthy consumption, number of days 
of inpatient care and frequency of visits to health facilities for outpatient care. 
For insured households, if their out-of-pocket (OOP) payment for health 
increases, we expect that they will spend more on health for the following reasons: (i) 
their health expenditures are not or are only partially covered by their insurance; and 
(ii) their insurance only covers one person in their family, that is, the head of the 
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family. From our dataset, we can see whether the frequency of visits to health facilities 
increases as the OOP increases. If this is the case, health is a complementary good and 
there is an income effect after implementing insurance. On the other hand, if people’s 
OOP decreases, we expect that they allocate more to non-health expenditures. We can 
also see whether the number of days for inpatient treatment at health facilities 
increases as the OOP decreases. 
We use a simple theoretical framework of individual preferences to understand 
individuals’ behaviour regarding their health situation. If individuals value health as 
important, they will allocate more money to preventing illness. However, their 
allocation depends on their income. Rich people have enough money to pay their 
health expenses or can access the capital market to finance their health expenses; the 
preferences of the middle class create a market for their health-related needs, such as 
medicine, vitamins and health equipment. Within the class of low-income people, 
there is a group that is sufficiently aware of the possibilities, such as teachers, who do 
have knowledge about preventing illness, so they spend very little money on health.  
Our challenging question concerns how to differentiate people who value 
health from those who do not care. Our hypothetical scenarios are as follows. First, 
people visit health facilities to cure their illnesses due to their lack of awareness about 
preventing them, so they spend more on outpatient or inpatient care, such as medicine, 
clinics and so on. Second, people do not visit health facilities because they are healthy 
due to their awareness of health. They spend more on health prevention, such as 
purchasing vitamins, attending medical check-ups and so on.  
Our next challenging question regards how to classify people who spend more 
on self-treated expenditure. There are two possible methods: (i) patients’ knowledge, 
which enables them to heal themselves, and (ii) a lack of access in terms of either the 
high OOP due to high user fees paid to clinics (affordability) or the physical access 
(i.e. the distance to the nearest hospital).  
To control for the preferences, we use the incidence of illness, frequency of 
visits, consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories, 
education, employment status, having children and living in an urban environment. 
The health preventive costs, which are calculated from the Susenas consumption 




module, consist of expenditures on pregnancy examination, immunization, birth 
control, medical check-ups and vitamins.     
There will be heterogeneity in health preferences among the poor and the near-
poor group. We classify people into four groups as follows: (i) people with high 
awareness of health and willingness to spend more on health prevention and thus 
having low expenditure for curative purposes; (ii) people who have high awareness of 
health but who are not willing to spend more on health prevention (if they also spend 
more on curative treatment, they could face catastrophic payments with their 
expenditure on health exceeding 40 per cent of their income remaining after spending 
on subsistence needs (Xu et al. 2003)); (iii) people with low awareness of health (and 
with a poor lifestyle), who spend a large amount on curative treatment (a group that 
is likely to experience catastrophic payments); and (iv) people who have low 
awareness of health but do not spend on curative treatments (the members of this 
group probably cannot access health care because they are too poor). 
 
5.3.1 Basic Model 
In our data, there are clear indications about the relevance of moral hazards. Insured 
people spend more on curative care than on preventive care in terms of the share of 
the total health expenditure and per capita. These patterns may relate to co-payment 
or additional costs for uncovered illness. For instance, diseases derived from smoking 
are associated with unhealthy behaviour that correlates with increasing curative costs. 
This unhealthy behaviour of insured people is classified as ex ante moral hazard. They 
also experience more frequent illnesses and health disruptions and thus more days of 
health disruptions. As a consequence, they visit health facilities more frequently for 
outpatient care and spend more days receiving inpatient care. Further characteristics 
of insured people will be discussed in section 5.5.   
It seems that many insured people in Indonesia insure themselves not for risk 
protection but to acquire cheap access to health services. Once they are insured, they 
tend to consume as much health care as possible without paying much attention to 
their own health status. Insurance also seems to trigger an unhealthy lifestyle 
(Stanciole 2008; Dave and Kaestner 2009; Rashad and Markowitz 2009). In other 
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words, it resembles the behaviour of “all you can eat” restaurants where people pay a 
fixed amount irrespective of how much they eat. The study conducted by Rashad and 
Markowitz (2009) described how insurance is associated with a higher body mass, 
particularly for those above the poverty threshold, and an increased probability of 
being overweight.  
In this chapter, we try to identify this ex ante moral hazard phenomenon 
through the expenditure function. However, we do not have information on the price 
of health services because Susenas only recorded the monthly average curative and 
preventive expenditure for the last three months (Appendix A5.A1). Therefore, we 
use control variables that affect the price, such as the location and quality of housing 
and its characteristics. 
 
5.3.2 Hypotheses 
Our objectives are (i) to identify ex ante moral hazard by estimating the demand for 
unhealthy consumption, that is, cigarettes, alcohol and excessive consumption of 
carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories, and (ii) to estimate the demand for health care 
under insurance programmes, that is, the frequency of visits to health facilities for 
outpatient care and the number of days spent in inpatient care.  
Thus, our hypotheses are as follows. Compared with uninsured people, insured 
people display more unhealthy consumption patterns and consume more outpatient as 
well as inpatient care. Moreover, if insured people are subsidized, they tend to pay 
less attention to their lifestyles by increasing their unhealthy consumption compared 
with their non-subsidized counterparts. In our estimations, we control for income, 
education, age, housing quality, employment status, family composition and 
characteristics of the place where people live. 
People with a poor health status, reflected by a high frequency of illness, are 
expected to spend more days on inpatient care. Curative costs, as a proxy for the price 
of health services, are expected to have a negative correlation with outpatient and 
inpatient care. Meanwhile, preventive costs as well as medical check-ups could 
improve people’s health status, resulting in them visiting health facilities less 
frequently and spending fewer days receiving inpatient care.  




People’s marital status is an important determinant of their health status 
(Rashad and Markowits 2009). Married people have a greater incentive to stay healthy 
because of the responsibilities associated with family live, which tends to result in 
selecting healthy consumption and hence reduced spending on outpatient and 
inpatient care. We expect that income, education and housing quality will correlate 
negatively with outpatient care but positively with inpatient care. The latter reflects 
that inpatient care is expensive and tends to be accessible only if people have 
sufficient income and are sufficiently knowledgeable about how to obtain it. Having 
children and living in urban areas are also important determinants of visits to health 
facilities and spending on inpatient care. Children are likely to be ill more frequently 
in urban areas, while at the same time urban areas offer more health facilities. After 
privatization in 1988, a significant number of hospitals and private clinics emerged 
throughout Indonesia, especially in urban areas and big cities (Heywood and Harahap 
2009).  
Thus, we have three main basic models explaining the variation in unhealthy 
consumption, outpatient care and inpatient care. The first basic model estimates the 
demand for unhealthy consumption of household i of consumption type j (UCij), 
where j = 1,…,6, namely cigarettes, alcohol and excessive consumption of 
carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories. Ex ante moral hazard can be identified by 
looking at whether insured people with or without subsidies increase their demand for 
unhealthy consumption compared with the uninsured group. An increasing insurance 
premium that correlates with increasing unhealthy consumption could also indicate 
that ex ante moral hazard prevails. In other words, they consume more unhealthy food 
because they think they do not need to protect their health and that, if they fall ill due 
to their unhealthy lifestyle and poor diet, the associated expenses will be covered by 
the insurance. Thus, we expect that increasing health insurance premia are positively 
correlated with unhealthy consumption: 
  
UCij = γ0 +  γ1·ln Hinsi + γ2·OPi + γ3·pct Marriedi  
 + γ4·(Marriedi ·Incomei) + γ5·d_insi  + γ6·d_subi  
 + γ7·(d_insi ·OPi) + γ8·(d_subi ·OPi)  
 + γ9·(Hinsi ·OPi) + γ10·Xsi  + εij.             (5.1) 
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Visiting health facilities gives people a chance to contact health professionals and 
obtain indirect benefits, such as counselling on healthy lifestyles (Dave and Kaestner 
2009). Therefore, we use the frequency of visits in this model: increasing visits to 
health facilities are expected to have an association with decreasing unhealthy 
consumption.  
Moreover, we add an interaction between insurance and outpatient care to see 
whether insured people change their demand for unhealthy consumption if they visit 
health facilities. We expect that this interaction has a negative impact on unhealthy 
consumption if the insured people contact health professionals and receive 
counselling on healthy food consumption during their visit.25 
As we discussed earlier, marital status and its interaction with income could 
associate with more healthy lifestyles. Hence, we expect that marital status will 
negatively relate to unhealthy consumption, while its interaction with income could 
be positive or negative, as discussed above. All the control variables are expected to 
have a negative impact on unhealthy consumption. 
We introduce an insurance dummy to determine how people’s preferences 
regarding health are affected by being insured and receiving a subsidy. Therefore, we 
generate two insurance dummies, namely insurance (d_ins) and subsidy (d_sub), in 
our model (Figure 5.1). The latter is a dummy variable among insured people 
indicating whether they pay the non-subsidy premium or receive a subsidy card that 
allows the card holders to access with free health care in the insurance system. The 
card holders’ subsidy premia are paid by the central and the local government.  
 
Figure 5.1 Possible States of Insurance 
 
25 Many insurance programmes require their members to visit health facilities at least once to 
examine their health status. 




We then interact each insurance dummy with age (d_insi · Agei and d_subi · Agei), 
education (d_insi · Educi and d_subi · Educi) and income (d_insi · Incomei and d_subi · 
Incomei) to examine whether the impact of insurance is conditional on age, education 
and income. In all three models, we routinely control for seven variables (Xi), viz. 
income, education, age, housing quality, a dummy for employment status, a dummy 
for having children and a dummy for living in urban areas. 
As discussed previously, the demand for outpatient care (OPi) and inpatient care 
(IPi) can be explained by the per capita curative cost (ln Curei), per capita preventive 
cost (ln Previ), per capita medical check-up expense (ln Mdchecki) and other variables 
as written in the first model, that is, per capita premium health insurance (ln Hinsi), 
married household (pct Marriedi) and its interaction with income, insurance dummies 
(d_insi and d_subi) and their interaction with age, education and income and a set of 
control variables (Xsi). Our second model of outpatient care (OPi) is written as 
follows:  
 
OPi = α0 + α1·lnCurei + α2·lnPrevi + α3·lnMdchecki  + α4·lnHinsi  
 + α5·pctMarriedi + α6·(Marriedi ·Incomei) + α7·d_insi  
 + α8·d_subi + α9·(d_insi ·Agei) + α10·(d_insi · Educi) 
+ α11·(d_insi· Incomei) + α12·(d_subi  ·Agei) + α13·(d_subi· Educi)  
+ α14· (d_subi· Incomei) + α15· Xsi  + εij.              (5.2) 
 
In addition, we use the frequency of illness per capita (Illness(i)) as a proxy for health 
status to explain the demand for inpatient care (IPi). Increasing frequency of illness 
shows poorer health status, which is associated with increasing inpatient care. Our 
third model of inpatient care (IPi) is expressed in the equation below:  
 
IPi = β0 +  β1· Illness(i) + β2· lnCure(i) + β3· lnPrev(i) + β4·lnMdcheck(i)  
+ β5· lnHins(i) + β6·pctMarried(i) + β7· (Married(i)·Income(i))  
+ β8·d_insi + β9·d_subi + β10·(d_insi ·Agei) + β11·(d_insi · Educi) 
+ β12·(d_insi· Incomei) + β13·(d_subi  ·Agei) + β14·(d_subi· Educi)  
+ β15· (d_subi· Incomei) + β16· Xsi  + εt.                                (5.3) 
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The interaction between marital status and income in the second and third models 
could be a positive or negative correlation with the demand for outpatient and 
inpatient care. If this interaction has a negative coefficient, decreasing outpatient or 
inpatient care is due more to people’s awareness of the need to keep healthy after 
marriage rather than to their income. However, if this is not the case, an increasing 
income after marriage could link to increasing unhealthy consumption due to being a 
poor household. A higher income after marriage indicates that the household can 
afford more consumption, including unhealthy forms, which relate to diseases that 
requires more outpatient or inpatient care.   
We also expect the coefficient of the interaction between insurance dummies 
(d_insi and d_subi) and age as well as income to be positive. The elderly are likely to 
experience numerous health complaints that need more outpatient or inpatient care, 
and richer people can easily access health facilities either for outpatient or for inpatient 
care. The interaction between insurance and education is expected to be a negative 
correlation, meaning that more educated people understand how to protect their health 
status and reduce their outpatient and inpatient care.  
Detailed explanations for each variable and the data sources used are provided 
in section 5.4. In addition, we modify the basic model of outpatient and inpatient care 
by introducing each type of unhealthy consumption as a variable of interest and then 
interact unhealthy consumption with the insurance dummies (d_insi and d_subi) to see 
how outpatient or inpatient care changes when unhealthy consumption changes under 
a particular insurance scheme.  
 
5.4 Data Description  
We conduct a cross-sectional analysis to explain the variation in the demand for health 
as a function of the insurance status of individuals. The main source of our data is 
Susenas 2014, provided by the BPS, which comprises consumption at the household 
level and a core module at the individual level. This survey covers a 0.34 per cent 
sample of the total population (around 1.1 million individuals). We exclude 
individuals from Aceh, Maluku, West Papua and Papua from our dataset because there 
are too many missing responses. Our unit of analysis is the household level. The total 




sample consists of 202,924 households. We extract expenditure information, such as 
curative costs, preventive costs, health insurance premium and household 
expenditure, from the Susenas consumption module. Exploiting Susenas, and 
especially the expenditure data, has limitations. For instance, health consumption is 
financed by out of pocket and/or by subsidies especially for the poor. The subsidy 
recipient might receive health services free of charge so health expenditure as out-of-
pocket is likely underestimated (Johar, et al. 2018). A more detailed explanation of 
data limitations in Susenas is presented in Appendix A5.A1 and Section 2.4. For 
variables with high variability and heterogeneity, we control the heteroscedasticity by 
transforming our variables into log form, including per capita curative and preventive 
costs, medical check-ups, health insurance premium, consumption on cigarettes and 
alcohol. Accordingly, we can interpret the results more easily as (semi-) elasticities. 
A detailed description of each variable that we use is presented below.    
 
Unhealthy Consumption 
Given the limitations of the consumption module in Susenas, we classify unhealthy 
consumption as follows: cigarettes, alcohol and unstandardized carbohydrate, protein, 
fat and calorie intake. The last 4 consumption types are based on the nutrient standards 
issued by the Ministry of Health of the Government of Indonesia (Peraturan Menteri 
Kesehatan No 41 Tahun 2014; Ministry of Health 2014), which state that Indonesians’ 
daily consumption, to be healthy, should be 300–500 grams/capita of carbohydrates, 
55–65 grams/capita of protein, 20–35 grams/capita of fat and 1,200–2,000 
calories/capita. Therefore, we generate four dummy variables (d_carbo, d_protein, 
d_fat and d_calorie), which are equal to 1 if the consumption is on the unhealthy side 
of the threshold and 0 otherwise. We calculate the consumption of cigarettes 
(log_cigarcap) and alcohol (log_alcoholcap) in quantities, 1 pack of cigarettes 
consisting of 10 pieces and 1 bottle of alcohol being 620 ml. Both amounts are 
transformed into logs. 
 
Inpatient and Outpatient Care  
Inpatient care per capita (IP) is calculated by adding up the number of days spent in 
all health facilities, such as hospitals, integrated health centres (Puskesmas), health 
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workers’ practices and traditional healers’ practices, in the last year and then dividing 
the total by the number of household members. Outpatient care per capita (OP) is 
calculated as the frequency of visits to health facilities during the last month, again on 
a per capita basis. Hence, we sum up the total number of visits to hospitals, clinics, 
integrated health centres and their support (Puskesmas/Pustu), health workers’ 
practices and traditional healers’ and birth attendants’ practices and divide the total 
by the number of household members.   
 
Frequency of Illness 
The frequency of illness per capita (illness_cap) shows the individual health status. 
The more frequent people’s illnesses are, the poorer their health status is. We add up 
the incidence of fever, cough, influenza, asthma, diarrhoea, headache and toothache 
reported by each household member in the last month and divide this figure by the 
number of household members.   
   
Health Expenditure 
Health expenditure is a monthly average calculated based on three months of 
expenditure taken from the Susenas consumption module. We distinguish two main 
expenditure types, namely curative and preventive costs. Curative costs (log_curecap) 
are the per capita monthly average expenditures to cure illness (i.e. fees for hospitals, 
clinics, health workers’ practices, traditional healers’ and birth attendants’ practices, 
medicines, plaster cast, wheelchairs and glasses). Preventive costs (log_prevcap) are 
the per capita monthly average expenditures for prevention (i.e. pregnancy 
examination, immunization, birth control, medical check-up, vitamin, fitness, etc.). 
We transform these expenditures into log form. 
 
Health Insurance  
We use two variables for health insurance: the insurance premium and a dummy 
capturing whether a household is insured. The insurance premium (log_premiumcap) 
is the monthly average of three months of health premium expenditure divided by the 
number of household members calculated from the consumption module of Susenas. 
To understand people’s behaviour towards health once they are insured, we classify 




our sample into three groups, viz. uninsured, insured and subsidized groups (see 
Figure 5.1). We therefore use two insurance dummies, namely d_ins, which is one if 
at least one family member is insured and zero if no member is insured, and d_sub, 
which equals one if at least one family member is insured and holds a subsidy card 
and zero otherwise.  
Using the core module of Susenas 2014,26 we classify insurance based on its 
premium, namely insurance with a subsidized premium and a non-subsidized 
premium. About 67 per cent of insured households have insurance with a subsidized 
premium paid by the central or local government, that is, health insurance for the poor 
(Jamkesmas), local health insurance (Jamkesda) and maternity insurance 
(Jampersal).27 The remaining 33 per cent of insured households are registered as non-
subsidized insurance members whose premium payment varies depending on their 
coverage, that is, insurance for civil servants or the army or retirees (Askes), insurance 
for workers (Jamsostek)28 and private insurance. We also transform this premium 
expenditure into log form.  
 
Married Household 
This variable is calculated based on the percentage of married people within a 
household (pct_married). 
 
Other Control Variables 
In this chapter, we use seven control variables for our regressions: the per capita 
income calculated from household expenditure (log_incomecap), education of the 
 
26 The data collection was carried out early in 2014, when the JKN had just been introduced, 
so the BPS did not include the JKN in the Susenas core questionnaire in 2014. 
27 Prior to 2014, members of the national insurance for the poor (Jamkesmas and Askeskin) 
held an insurance card provided by the central government through the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, giving them free access to health facilities. Since the JKN started in 2014, all the 
members of national and local insurance for the poor were transferred to the BPJS and were 
known as contribution beneficiaries – Penerima Bantuan Iuran (PBI); they received a new 
health card – the Kartu Indonesia Sehat (KIS). The BPS recorded these subsidized people 
after being validated and verified by the Ministry of Social Affairs; however, some problems 
remained to be solved, for example misclassification between poor and non-poor households 
and an outdated database (Fuady 2019). 
28 Jamsostek is the insurance programme for workers (white and blue collar), the benefit 
package of which is similar to Askes (the insurance programme for civil servants); the 
premium is deducted directly from workers’ salary. 
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household head (educ_hh), age of the household head (log_age_hh), housing quality 
(housequality), a dummy for the employment status of the household head 
(d_empl_hh), a dummy for having children (d_kids) and a dummy for urban 
(d_urban). 
Education is defined as the total years spent to obtain the highest diploma held 
by the household head. For instance, obtaining an elementary diploma takes at least 
six years, junior high school nine years, senior high school twelve years, college 
fourteen to fifteen years, university seventeen years and a master’s or doctoral degree 
at least twenty-two years. If the household head does not hold any diploma, we 
categorize the household as no school or zero years. 
We construct an index with equal weighting for housing quality based on 
housing characteristics, that is, wall, roof, floor, toilet facility and source of water for 
drinking, cooking and washing. The type of wall consists of concrete, wood or 
bamboo, of which concrete is a higher quality than wood and bamboo, respectively; 
the type of roof ranges from concrete to tile, shingled, tin, asbestos and leaves, a 
concrete roof being the highest quality; the type of floor is marble, ceramic, granite, 
wood, terrazzo, cement or soil, of which marble is the highest quality; the type of 
toilet facility is classified based on the ownership type, that is, private, shared, public 
and none, private ownership being perceived as the highest quality; and the water 
source for drinking, cooking and washing can be tap water, which is categorized as 
the highest quality, followed by artesian or protected wells, unprotected wells, rivers 
and rain, respectively. We rank each feature and set 100 as the highest quality; we 
then add up each of them and divide the total by five to obtain the average housing 
index. Thus, the higher the value of the index is, the higher the quality of the house 
is.  
We use a dummy for the employment status of the household head, in which 
one is the formal status or white collar and zero is the non-formal status or blue collar. 
The formal status includes workers, employees or staffs with employment contract, 
self-owned businesses with permanent or paid workers, and freelancers. The dummy 
for having children equals one when a household has children and zero otherwise; the 
dummy for urban is one for households living in urban areas and zero otherwise.  
 




5.5 Descriptive Statistics  
As discussed previously, we classify our Susenas 2014 into an insured and an 
uninsured group. Most of the difference in the means across the insured and uninsured 
groups is significant, with a p-value<0.01, except that the share of preventive 
expenditure in the total expenditure, the share of medical check-ups in the total health 
expenditure and the medical check-up expenditure are not significant. In general, the 
means of these household and health characteristics are higher for insured people than 
for uninsured people (Table 5.1).  
On average, the household head is almost 50 years old and spent around 7 
years on education, holding an elementary diploma. Insured people are slightly more 
educated and about 46 per cent work with a formal status as compared with uninsured 
people. More than 80 per cent of our sample is married, and the average size of the 
household is 3.95 and 3.6 for insured and uninsured households, respectively. In terms 
of housing quality, the uninsured group has better quality but its per capita household 
expenditure as a proxy for income is lower than that of the insured group. 
In terms of health status, insured people reported illness and health disruption 
of 0.34 and 0.36, respectively, while their counterparts reported 0.31 and 0.33. They 
also could not work for almost 2 days due to health disruption in the last month. They 
prefer visiting public health facilities, that is, hospitals and clinics, to private ones. On 
average, insured people visit health facilities more frequently than uninsured people. 
In our sample, about 67 per cent of insured people are subsidized by the Government 
because they are poor. According to the BPJS guidelines, patients under the subsidy 
programme require referral from public primary health care every time they need 
further examination or treatment in higher public health facilities, that is, local, 
provincial or national public hospitals. Moreover, the consultation time is limited to 
10 minutes per patient in public facilities. If patients need further examination, such 
as a blood test or chest X-ray they should obtain an additional referral. If this is the 
case, the patients need to travel back and forth at least three times not only due to the 
referral system but also due to the time limit for consultation during outpatient care. 
In addition, there is widespread anecdotal experience that patients with diabetes 
mellitus or hypertension, which require regular control at primary public health 
facilities, are advised by the local health office (Dinas Kesehatan) to meet the doctor 
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every one or two weeks, while in fact this is not necessary and it could be every four 
to eight weeks.29 As a consequence, this procedure, along with anecdotal experiences, 
contributes to the higher number of visits for insured people with subsidies.  
For inpatient care, patients with insurance prefer to choose public hospitals, 
private hospitals and primary health care facilities, respectively, and they spend a 
longer time there than uninsured patients. As our sample consists of more than half of 
insured people who are subsidized, they opt for public health facilities. In addition, 
higher income groups spend more days receiving inpatient care than lower income 
groups. 
If we break down the total household health expenditure, it shows that the 
share of curative expenditure is around double the share of preventive expenditure for 
both insured and uninsured groups. This implies that insured people still need to pay 
to cure their illnesses because the insurance package does not cover all types of illness 
or a co-payment method applies in the insurance scheme. In terms of per capita 
expenditure, the curative cost is five times higher than the preventive cost. This 
suggests that the cost of curing illnesses, such as hospital fees, health treatment or 
health examination, medicine and so on, is still expensive for both insured and 
uninsured people.  
  
 
29 This advice is mostly derived to ensure that the patients obey the routine control and take 
their medicine properly as ordered, but it places a higher burden on the doctor. 




Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Definition Insured30 Uninsured Difference 
Age Age of household head in years 49.12 48.01 −1.11*** 
Married Percentage married 81.75 80.31 −1.44*** 
Education 
Years of schooling of household 
head 7.71 7.22 −0.49*** 
Formal Employment 
Formal employment status of 
household head 46.16 39.02 −7.14*** 
Working Activity Percentage worked in the last week 49.49 51.49 2.00*** 
Household Size Number of household members 3.95 3.60 −0.35*** 
Housing Quality 
Index of housing material (the 
higher the index, the better the 
quality) 67.40 68.34 0.94*** 
Household Expenditure  
 Per capita monthly household 
expenditure (thousand rupiah)    1,629.24  1,599.17 −30.07*** 
People Reported Illness 
Number of household members 
reporting illness in the last month  0.34 0.31 −2.61*** 
People Reported Health 
Disruption 
Number of household members 
above 5 y.o. who reported health 
disruption in the last month 0.36 0.33 −2.93*** 
Days of Health 
Disruption 
Per capita (above 5 y.o.) days of 
health disruption in the last month 1.94 2.08 0.15*** 
People Taking 
Outpatient Care 
Number of household members 
visiting health facilities in the last 
month 0.33 0.30 −0.03*** 
People Taking Inpatient 
Care 
Number of household members 
taking inpatient care over the last 
12 months 0.02 0.03 −0.01*** 
Frequency of Outpatient 
Visits 
Per capita visits to health facilities 
in the last month 0.26 0.21 −0.04*** 
Days of Inpatient Care 
Per capita days spent at health 
facilities over the last 12 months 0.19 0.11 −0.08*** 
Curative Expenditure 
Per capita monthly expenditure to 
cure illness (rupiah) 34,579 28,521 −6,057.86*** 
Preventive Expenditure 
Per capita monthly expenditure to 
prevent illness (rupiah) 6,214 5,617 −597.29*** 
Medical Check-Up 
Expenditure 
Per capita monthly medical check-
up (rupiah) 18,878 16,369 −2,509.46 
Share of Curative 
Expenditure in Total 
Health Expenditure 
Percentage of curative to total 
health expenditure (%) 67.61 64.00 −3.61*** 
Share of Preventive 
Expenditure in Total 
Health Expenditure 
Percentage of preventive to total 
health expenditure (%) 32.39 36.00 3.61*** 
     
 
30 Among insured households, 71,547 and 34,981 households are registered as subsidy 
insurance and non-subsidy insurance holders, respectively. 
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    Continued 
Share of Medical 
Check-Up Expenditure 
in Total Health 
Expenditure 
Percentage of medical check-up to 
total health expenditure (%) 0.44 0.40 −0.04 
Share of Curative 
Expenditure in Total 
Expenditure 
Percentage of curative to total 
household expenditure (%) 1.38 1.21 −0.17*** 
Share of Preventive 
Expenditure in Total 
Expenditure 
Percentage of preventive to total 
household expenditure (%) 0.35 0.35 0.00 
Immunization 
Number of immunizations received 
by children under 5 y.o. 1.19 1.00 −0.19*** 
Giving birth 
Giving birth with a certified birth 
attendant 1.13 1.11 −0.02*** 
Days of Breastmilk 
Number of days consuming 
breastmilk 152.15 137.50 −14.65*** 
Cigarette Consumption 
Per capita adult weekly cigarette 
consumption (pack @ 10 pieces) 1.98 2.25 0.27*** 
Alcohol Consumption 
Per capita adult weekly alcohol 
consumption (bottle @ 620 ml) 0.86 1.21 0.35*** 
Carbohydrate 
Consumption 
Per capita daily carbohydrate 
consumption (grams) 515.67 472.55 −43.12*** 
Protein Consumption 
Per capita daily protein 
consumption (grams) 88.24 83.24 −5.00*** 
Fat Consumption 
Per capita daily fat consumption 
(grams) 62.64 61.22 −1.41*** 
Calorie Consumption 
Per capita daily calorie 
consumption (cal) 2826.61 2652.49 −174.12*** 
Number of 
Observations  106,530 96,394  
Notes: *** p<0.01. 
  
In our data, medical check-ups are part of preventive care, and the composition of 
preventive care expenditure is as follows: medical check-ups with about 38 per cent 
followed by pregnancy examination, self-preventive, immunization and birth control 
with 26 per cent, 16 per cent, 14 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. This expenditure 
rises as age, education and income increase for all households.  
Moreover, in terms of mother–child health, insured households show their 
awareness of health. For instance, children under 5 years old received more 
immunization and mothers opted to give birth with a certified birth attendant and 
breastfeed their babies for much longer than their counterparts from uninsured 
households. However, if we look at mothers’ educational background, highly 




educated mothers tend to breastfeed their babies for shorter periods than low educated 
mothers. This might be due to their limited maternity leave, requiring educated 
mothers to return to work immediately.31 On the other hand, the children of low 
educated mothers and poor families have more complete immunization than the 
children of their counterparts. This might be due to the results of the national 
immunization programme, which focuses on poor families (as well as low educated 
mothers), while fewer immunized children of highly educated mothers and richer 
families might be due to their perception of the religious belief against the 
immunization programme (Wombwell et al. 2015).   
If we look at the pattern of preventive and curative expenditure based on 
having children, age and education, the ratio of curative to preventive expenditure is 
higher for families with children, suggesting that having children is associated with 
higher curative costs than for families with no children. Nevertheless, preventive care 
decreases while curative care increases as people age, so the ratio of curative to 
preventive care for old people is more than double that for young people. We also 
consider how education plays an important role in shaping health spending. 
Preventive care expenditure increases while curative care decreases as the education 
level rises. The ratio of curative to preventive care is higher with a higher education 
level, suggesting that curing illnesses, such as selecting medical treatment or the type 
of medicine, is associated with knowledge. These patterns are also shown for all 
households. 
In addition, with regard to unhealthy consumption, the insured group 
consumes less alcohol and fewer cigarettes than the uninsured group. Indonesia is now 
facing high-risk smoking behaviour whereby almost 30 per cent of the population 
above 10 years old smokes. The prevalence of smoking in the school age group (10 
to 18 years old) increased from 7.2 per cent in 2013 to 9.1 per cent in 2018 (Dartanto 
et al. 2019). This young generation is likely to be part of the uninsured group, which 
consumes 2.25 packs per week.  
 
31 According to the Ministry of Manpower Government of Indonesia, the total maternity leave 
for a mother is three months, which could be used one month prior to the due date and two 
months afterwards.  
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Moreover, insured people consume more excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat 
and calories than their uninsured counterparts. It appears that the insured group pays 
less attention to the diet nutrients suggested by the Ministry of Health; thus, we can 
indicate that the insured group displays the ex ante moral hazard phenomenon. This 
unhealthy behaviour also leads to severe illnesses, such as diabetes, high blood 
pressure, heart attacks and so on, which might partly be covered by the insurance 
package and hence have serious implications for the financing burden as well as the 
health status 
.  
5.6 Results and Discussion 
This section presents our results from (i) the basic model of the demand for unhealthy 
consumption, outpatient care and inpatient care and (ii) the modified model for 
outpatient and inpatient care.  
 
5.6.1 Basic Model 
 
5.6.1.1 Unhealthy Consumption 
Following our hypothesis that “all-you-can-eat” behaviour exists for insured people 
in Indonesia, as discussed in the previous section, our results show different patterns 
for the consumption of cigarettes, alcohol and excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat 
and calories between (i) the uninsured and the insured group either with or without a 
premium subsidy and (ii) insured people with and without a premium subsidy. 
As we discussed in the previous section, the demand for unhealthy 
consumption is estimated to determine whether ex ante moral hazard exists for insured 
households either with or without a subsidy. We also introduce the interaction 
between insurance and frequency of visits to gauge whether visiting health facilities 
could improve the awareness of a healthy lifestyle when insurance exists. In 
estimating the demand for unhealthy consumption, we use OLS for cigarette and 




alcohol consumption and logit for dummy excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat and 
calories.32  
The results from our basic model of unhealthy consumption are summarized 
in Table 5.2, in which the last four columns denote the marginal effects. This table 
exhibits how the type of insurance is associated with the demand for unhealthy 
consumption. Compared with uninsured households, insured households have an 
increased probability of excessively consuming carbohydrates, protein and calories 
but decreased cigarette and alcohol consumption. However, when insured people 
receive a subsidy from the Government, they increase their cigarette consumption but 
decrease their probability of consuming excessive fat compared with those without a 
subsidy.  
 
Table 5.2 Relationship between Insurance and Unhealthy Consumption 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Unhealthy Consumption (UCi) 







       
d_insurance –0.0617*** –0.0047*** 0.0178***   0.0105***  0.0001 0.0158***  
 (–0.0492) (–0.0137) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
d_subsidy 0.0973*** 0.0008 –0.0026 0.0005 –0.0209*** 0.0061 
 (0.0750) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0038) 
       
Interaction       
d_insurance * visit –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0002 0.0037 0.0067***   0.0034 
 (–0.0003) (–0.0012) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0036) 
d_subsidy * visit –0.0104 –0.0020 –0.0093 0.0003 0.0089***   0.0032 
 (–0.0075) (–0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0052) 
              
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses for cigarettes and 
alcohol. Standard error in parentheses for the marginal effects of carbohydrates, protein, fat and 
calories. This table is a summary of Appendices 5.B1–5.B2. 
 
These results indicate that there is ex ante moral hazard in consuming excessive 
carbohydrates, protein and calories for insured people and consuming more cigarettes 
for subsidized people. For instance, the probability for insured people to consume 
excessive carbohydrates is 0.02 per cent higher than for those without insurance, and 
subsidized people, who are likely to be poor people, consume 0.1 per cent more 
 
32 We also use OLS to estimate demand for unhealthy consumption in continuous form, and 
the results have similar patterns.  
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cigarettes but have a lower probability of consuming excessive fat than those without 
a subsidy (Table 5.2). 
 Unhealthy consumption could also be avoided by visiting health facilities or 
having contact with professional health workers, ensuring that patients are well 
informed about the consequences of unhealthy consumption (Dave and Kaestner 
2009). Our results confirm this hypothesis as more frequent visits to health facilities 
are associated with lower levels of unhealthy consumption (Appendix A5.B1–A5B.2). 
However, when we add the interaction between insurance and frequency of visits, our 
results are no longer statistically significant in supporting this hypothesis, suggesting 
that the frequency of visits does not affect both uninsured and non-subsidized 
households in cutting unhealthy consumption. Moreover, we find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for excessive fat, suggesting that, when insured and 
subsidized households visit health facilities more frequently, their probability of 
consuming excessive fat becomes higher compared with the non-insured and non-
subsidized groups (Table 5.2). The typical favourite Indonesian meals or snacks are 
deep-fried or fat-based meals (gorengan). Intuitively, patients with insurance or 
subsidies prefer these meals to others during their visits to health care facilities, maybe 
because these meals are easy to find at an affordable price.  
We are also interested in investigating how the insurance premium and its 
interaction with the frequency of visits and marital status and its interaction with 
income correlate with unhealthy consumption (Appendix A5.B1–A5.B2). The 
insurance premium has a negative correlation with the demand for cigarettes, but it 
turns positive when we interact it with frequency of visits. Further, a higher premium 
tends to increase the probability of consuming excessive carbohydrates but decrease 
the probability of consuming excessive calories. Despite small changes, the marginal 
effect is slightly larger for subsidized households than for insured households. These 
findings suggest that there is ex ante moral hazard when insurance and subsidies exist.  
Marital status is also important in determining the demand for unhealthy 
consumption. Our results indicate that married households consume more cigarettes 
and alcohol but that their probability of consuming excessive carbohydrates, protein, 
fat and calories is lower than that of unmarried households. However, if we add the 
interaction between marital status and income, it presents the opposite correlation with 




the demand for the above types of consumption. These findings imply that an 
increasing probability of consuming unhealthy food is likely to be due to the 
affordability. It appears that income after marriage or joint income could foster a 
higher probability of consuming those foods as there is more money available to spend 
in the household. On the other hand, the lower demand for cigarettes and alcohol after 
interacting income and marital status could be interpreted as showing increasing 
awareness after marriage.  
We control our estimation with income, education, age, housing quality and 
dummy variables for employment status, children and urban area. Our results show 
that increasing income per capita and formal employment status are positively 
associated with the demand for cigarettes, alcohol and excessive fat consumption and 
negatively associated with the probability of consuming excessive carbohydrates, 
protein and calories (Appendix A5.B1–A5B.2).  
Households in which the head of the family spent more years on schooling 
have a higher probability of consuming more excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat and 
calories but consume fewer cigarettes and less alcohol. These findings imply that the 
level of education, where the average number of years of schooling is below 8 years, 
is not sufficient to enhance the awareness of healthy consumption. Age is also 
associated with an increasing probability of consuming excessive carbohydrates, 
protein and calories.  
Households that have children tend to increase their probability of consuming 
excessive protein, fat and calories but decrease their probability of consuming 
carbohydrates, cigarettes and alcohol. Our findings imply that households with 
children are lack knowledge of the recommended consumption amounts of diet 
nutrients issued by the Ministry of Health. Although protein, fat and calories are 
important nutrients for children, excessive consumption of those meals could relate 
with their health in the future. On the other hand, the decreasing cigarette and alcohol 
consumption of households with children indicates an awareness of health.   
Housing quality as a proxy for wealth and the urban dummy are strongly 
positively correlated with alcohol consumption, while the rest of the unhealthy forms 
of consumption have a negative correlation. This clearly explains that alcohol is 
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consumed by relatively rich households and that those who are living in urban areas 
consume more alcohol than their counterparts. 
 
5.6.1.2 Outpatient and Inpatient Care  
If we look at the pattern of outpatient and inpatient care after introducing insurance, 
households visit health facilities 0.03 times more and spend 0.07 more days at health 
facilities than those without insurance. Among the insured households, people with a 
subsidy visit 0.04 times more but spend 0.02 fewer days there than households with  
no subsidy (Table 5.3). These findings confirm that insurance could expand 
accessibility to health care (Agustina et al. 2019). Since subsidy insurance is part of 
the poverty alleviation programme, the more frequent visits for outpatient care but 
fewer days for inpatient care for insured people with a subsidy have two implications: 
poor people have greater awareness after visiting health facilities more frequently, so 
they experience fewer severe illnesses that need inpatient treatment, or they are too 
poor or too old to access inpatient treatment, as shown in the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the interaction with age.  
Our results also show that subsidized households increase their frequency of 
visiting health care as their income increases. It seems that visiting health care more 
frequently could be perceived as substituting inpatient treatment for poor people. The 
latter is in line with the BPJS (2018), in which the number of JKN members visiting 
hospital for outpatient care increased from 39.8 million cases in 2015 to 64.4 million 
cases in 2017 or approximately 62 per cent more in 2 years. However, the more 
frequent visits for outpatient care made by subsidized people could also reflect the 
referral system in accessing public health facilities and the consultation time limit, as 
discussed in section 5.4. 
If we look further at the interaction of this insurance with income, the 
coefficient exhibits the strongest correlation with both outpatient and inpatient care, 
as shown in its standardized beta coefficients. As income increases, insured 
households visit health facilities more frequently and spend more days receiving 
inpatient care. This pattern holds with age but not with education. They visit less 
frequently and spend fewer days as inpatients as their years of schooling increase. 
This suggests that education could improve the health status of insured people. 




On the other hand, when insured households are subsidized by the 
Government, they visit more frequently as well as spending more days receiving 
inpatient care as their level of education rises. If we add 1 more year of schooling, we 
expect subsidized households to increase their frequency of visits by 0.04 times and 
spend 0.05 days in hospital compared with their non-subsidized counterparts (Table 
5.3, standardized beta coefficient). This suggests that poor people with subsidized 
insurance could access health facilities if they are more knowledgeable, that is, able 
to understand the procedures to obtain free health care at clinics, including preparing 
the paperwork that is required to access free inpatient care at a hospital or free 
advanced examinations. 
 
Table 5.3 Relationship between Insurance and Health Care (Basic Model) 
Variable  
Frequency of Visits as  
Outpatient 
Days Spent as  
Inpatient 
   
d_insurance 0.0321*** 0.0680*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0364) 
d_subsidy 0.0386*** –0.0155* 
 (0.0360) (–0.0071) 
   
Interaction Insurance Dummy   
d_insurance * age 0.0149** 0.0736*** 
 (0.0568) (0.1523) 
d_insurance * educ –0.0010** –0.0015* 
 (–0.0109) (–0.0088) 
d_insurance * income 0.0109*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.1415) (0.2451)    
Interaction Subsidy Dummy   
d_subsidy * age –0.0028 –0.0864*** 
 (–0.0099) (–0.1533) 
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0478) 
d_subsidy * income 0.0472*** –0.0172 
 (0.5630) (–0.1008) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses. This table is a 
summary of Appendices 5.C1–5.C2. 
  
The complex and bureaucratic procedure for subsidized patients to access free health 
care might explain these findings. Sambodho (2019) described the complicated 
procedure that a subsidized (poor) patient should follow to gain a bed in a hospital. 
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The patient should bring at least three documents,33 including an identification card 
(ID and family card), subsidized insurance card and referral letter from a primary 
health care provider, every time he or she needs inpatient treatment. However, those 
documents do not guarantee that the subsidized patient can automatically obtain a bed 
in a public hospital, mostly because of the lack of bed availability. To overcome this 
situation, the subsidized patient usually seeks help from the intermediary or broker 
services in his or her local community to argue successfully with the administrative 
staff and finally gain a bed in a hospital in time (Sambodho 2019). Thus, our findings 
suggest that education plays an important role in accessing both outpatient and 
inpatient care for the poor while being older and being richer are associated with more 
access to health care for households with insurance.  
In addition, we examine the health care cost, that is, the cost of curative and 
preventive treatment and medical check-ups, insurance premium, marital status and 
its interaction with income, and unhealthy consumption in estimating the frequency 
of visits for outpatient care and days spent in inpatient care. Our results indicate that 
the curative cost and medical check-ups are positively correlated with outpatient and 
inpatient care while the preventive cost shows the opposite sign. A high insurance 
premium is associated with less frequent visits to outpatient care but more days spent 
receiving inpatient care. Marital status and its interaction with income shows a 
positive and negative correlation, respectively, with outpatient care and neither is 
statistically significant in the inpatient model. These findings suggest that the curative 
cost as the price of health care and medical check-ups arises during visits to health 
facilities. If we look at married households, it appears that they visit more frequently 
for outpatient services, but this depends on their income. A lower income for married 
households tends to reduce the frequency of visits.  
 
33 Many poor (subsidized) patients do not even have basic documents, such as ID and/or a 
family card and subsidized insurance card. When they are ill, they do not know how to obtain 
a referral from the primary health care facility. If this is the case, the patient should obtain 
additional documents from various offices, specifically a poverty reference letter from the 
village office, official proof and stamp on that letter from the sub-district office and a fee 
waiver letter from the welfare office at the district level. Obtaining letters from those different 
offices is not an easy task and is time consuming, so most subsidized people seek help from 
the local broker of their community and pay to cover at least the broker’s transportation cost 
(Sambodho 2019).   




As we expect, our control variables per capita income and age confirm a 
positive correlation while education, formal employment status and having children 
show negative correlations with both the frequency of visits for outpatient care and 
the number of days spent receiving inpatient care. Housing quality as a proxy for 
wealth and living in an urban area reveal a positive correlation with days spent on 
inpatient treatment. Our results suggest that inpatient care is more accessible for 
wealthier and elderly people and those who live in urban areas, where the number of 
health facilities is much higher than that in rural areas. Being more educated is 
important to improve people’s health status, as presented by the decreasing frequency 
of visits and number of days spent in hospital. Households that have children tend to 
follow a healthy lifestyle, reducing both the frequency of visits and the number of 
days in inpatient care. In addition, households in which the head of the family has 
formal employment status are associated with a lower demand for both outpatient and 
inpatient care. The full regression output of the basic outpatient and inpatient care 
model can be found in Appendices A5.C1–A5.C2. 
 
5.6.2 Modified Model 
We modify our basic model by introducing unhealthy consumption, specifically 
cigarettes, alcohol and excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories, to 
understand how these types of consumption affect the frequency of visits and number 
of days spent receiving inpatient care if insurance exists.  
 
5.6.2.1 Frequency of Visits for Outpatient Care  
Table 5.4 presents a summary of the modified outpatient model in which we introduce 
unhealthy consumption and its interaction with insurance. The consumption of 
cigarettes and excessive fat is associated with less frequent visits to health care 
facilities. When we interact unhealthy consumption with insurance, our results show 
there is no statistical difference in the frequency of visits between insured and 
uninsured households if they consume cigarettes, alcohol or excessive carbohydrates, 
protein and fat. This pattern is not shown for subsidized households. Compared with 
the non-subsidized group, subsidized households visit health facilities less frequently 
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when they consume cigarettes but multiply the frequency of visits if they consume 
excessive fat. The latter denotes a moral hazard phenomenon among subsidized 
households. It appears that consuming excessive fat tends to worsen the health status 
of subsidized people and is more severe than cigarette consumption, which exerts an 
effect on smokers in the long run. The role of insurance and subsidies and their 
interactions with age, education and income in outpatient care are consistent with the 
results of the basic model in the previous section. The full regression output of 




34 In addition, we use variable of unhealthy consumption in continuous form to estimate the 
frequency of visits for outpatient care and these results show a similar pattern. 




Table 5.4 Relationship between Insurance and Frequency of Visits for Outpatient 
Care with Unhealthy Consumption (Modified Model) 
Variable 












       
Unhealthy 
Consumption –0.0191*** –0.0019 0.0001 –0.0009 –0.0113*** –0.0007 
 (–0.0238) (–0.0006) (0.0001) (–0.0006) (–0.0068) (–0.0006)        
d_insurance 0.0310*** 0.0321*** 0.0321*** 0.0321*** 0.0321*** 0.0321*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) 
d_subsidy 0.0404*** 0.0386*** 0.0386*** 0.0386*** 0.0385*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0360)        
Interaction Insurance Dummy    
d_insurance * age 0.0153** 0.0149** 0.0149** 0.0148** 0.0150** 0.0148** 
 (0.0586) (0.0569) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0568) 
d_insurance *  educ –0.0010** –0.0010** –0.0010** –0.0010** –0.0010** –0.0010** 
 (–0.0113) (–0.0109) (–0.0109) (–0.0109) (–0.0110) (–0.0109) 
d_insurance * income 0.0105*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0108*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.1356) (0.1415) (0.1414) (0.0086) (0.1396) (0.1412) 
d_insurance * 
unhealthycons 0.0016 0.0030 0.0051 0.0088 –0.0025 –0.0084* 
 (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0086) (–0.0025) (–0.0081)        
Interaction Subsidy Dummy       
d_subsidy * age –0.0026 –0.0028 –0.0028 –0.0028 –0.0027 –0.0028 
 (–0.0095) (–0.0099) (–0.0049) (–0.0099) (–0.0098) (–0.0100) 
d_subsidy * educ 0.0045*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0358) (0.0355) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0358) 
d_subsidy * income 0.0514*** 0.0472*** 0.0474*** 0.0473*** 0.0472*** 0.0472*** 
 (0.6132) (0.5630) (0.5590) (0.5643) (0.5633) (0.5630) 
d_subsidy * 
unhealthycons –0.0142*** 0.0014 –0.0016 –0.0038 0.0393*** –0.0012 
 (–0.0145) (0.0004) (–0.0017) (–0.0037) (0.0380) (–0.0011) 
              
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses. This table is a 
summary of Appendices 5.D1–5.D6. 
 
5.6.2.2 Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care  
We also look at the correlation of each form of unhealthy consumption with the length 
of time spent receiving inpatient care when insurance exists by interacting these two 
variables. The consumption of excessive carbohydrates, protein and calories is 
positively correlated with inpatient care and statistically significant, while cigarette 
and alcohol consumption show the opposite. When we interact unhealthy 
consumption with insurance, our results indicate that there is ex ante moral hazard 
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where insured people, compared with the uninsured group, spend more days receiving 
inpatient care when they consume excessive carbohydrates. It seems that illnesses 
derived from excessive carbohydrate consumption require hospitalization. From the 
health literature, we find that excessive carbohydrate consumption mostly causes 
diabetes, which leads to potential complications such as heart disease, stroke and 
kidney and nerve damage. Once these conditions combine, they can lead to a life-
threatening stage that requires inpatient care. Nevertheless, people spend fewer days 
receiving inpatient treatment when they consume excessive fat and calories. It appears 
that excessive consumption of fat and calories, which likely causes hypertension and 
obesity, leads to severe complications in the long run. In addition, there is no statistical 
difference in inpatient care between subsidized and non-subsidized households if they 
consume cigarettes, alcohol or excessive carbohydrates, protein, fat and calories 
(Table 5.5). 
The role of insurance and subsidies and their interactions with age, education 
and income in inpatient care are consistent with the results of the basic model in the 
previous section. The full regression output of the modified inpatient care model can 
be found in Appendices A5.E1–A5.E6.35  
  
 
35 In addition, we use variable of unhealthy consumption in continuous form to estimate the 
number of days spent receiving inpatient care and these results show a similar pattern. 




Table 5.5 Relationship between Insurance and Days Spent in Inpatient Care 
and Unhealthy Consumption (Modified Model) 
Variable 












       
Unhealthy 
Consumption –0.0447*** –0.0204* 0.0118*** 0.0174*** –0.0084 0.0094* 
 (–0.0301) (–0.0037) 0.0063 (0.0067) (–0.0027) (0.0044)        
d_insurance 0.0655*** 0.0679*** 0.0678*** 0.0678*** 0.0680*** 0.0679*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0364) 
d_subsidy –0.0111 –0.0155* –0.0154* –0.0155* –0.0158* –0.0155* 
 (–0.0051) (–0.0071) (–0.0071) (–0.0071) (–0.0073) (–0.0071)        
Interaction Insurance 
Dummy        
d_insurance * age 0.0747*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 0.0739*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.1545) (0.1524) (0.1523) (0.1527) (0.1524) (0.1525) 
d_insurance * educ –0.0016* –0.0015* –0.0015* –0.0015* –0.0015* –0.0015* 
 (–0.0092) (–0.0087) (–0.0088) (–0.0089) (–0.0088) (–0.0088) 
d_insurance * 
income 0.0339*** 0.0350*** 0.0352*** 0.0351*** 0.0349*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.2376) (0.2453) (0.2467) (0.2458) (0.2443) (0.2462) 
d_insurance * 
unhealthycons –0.0054 0.0063 0.0184** 0.0053 
–
0.0375*** –0.0239** 
 (–0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0090) (0.0028) (–0.0201) (–0.0126)        
Interaction Subsidy 
Dummy       
d_subsidy * age –0.0860*** –0.0864*** –0.0867*** –0.0865*** –0.0859*** –0.0864*** 
 (–0.1526) (–0.1533) (–0.1538) (–0.1534) (–0.1523) (–0.1532) 
d_subsidy * educ 0.0122*** 0.0114*** 0.0115*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0478) (0.0482) (0.0479) (0.0478) (0.0478) 
d_subsidy * income –0.0084 –0.0172 –0.0156 –0.0166 –0.0169 –0.0171 
 (–0.0492) (–0.1008) (–0.0917) (–0.0975) (–0.0993) (–0.1005) 
d_subsidy * 
unhealthycons 0.0052 0.0167 –0.0134 –0.0143 0.0038 –0.0047 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (–0.0063) (–0.0068) (0.0018) (–0.0023) 
              
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses. Note: This table 
is a summary of Appendices 5.E1–5.E6. 
 
5.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Given the high disparity in access to health care, one of the goals of the Indonesian 
universal health care programme (JKN) is to ensure that all Indonesians have access 
to health care. However, our findings show that this policy regime has invoked  ex 
ante moral hazard whereby insured and subsidized households tend to adopt relatively 
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unhealthy lifestyles by increasing their unhealthy consumption when insured. The 
results in this chapter show that insured people behave differently from uninsured 
people, and within the insured groups, the subsidized people behave differently from 
the non-subsidized people. These different behaviours may also appear from the 
implementation of the JKN in 2014 onwards.  
Compared with uninsured households, the probability of consuming excessive 
carbohydrates, protein and calories is significant higher for their insured counterparts. 
Subsidized people, who are likely to be poor, even increase their cigarette 
consumption compared with unsubsidized people. Further, we found unhealthy 
consumption is positively correlated with demand for health care after introducing 
insurance. Insured people who consume excessive carbohydrates spend more days for 
inpatient care compared with their uninsured counterparts while subsidized people 
who consume excessive fat visit health facilities more frequent compared with the 
non-subsidized group. These findings suggest that ex ante moral hazard among 
insured and subsidized people exists and tends to increase demand for health care, and 
hence raises insurance claims.  
 We confirm that the insurance programme, with or without subsidies, 
improves the accessibility of health care. Compared with the uninsured group, insured 
households visit outpatient care more frequently and spend more days in inpatient 
care. This holds with age and income but not with education. More knowledgeable 
people visit less frequently and spend fewer days receiving inpatient care. Among 
insured people, subsidized people visit more frequently and spend more days there if 
they are more knowledgeable than non-subsidized members. This also holds for 
income for outpatient but not for inpatient care. It appears that the poor prefer to access 
outpatient care than inpatient care. This result has two implications: (i) poor people 
have greater awareness after visiting health facilities more frequently, so they 
experience less severe illnesses that do not require inpatient treatment, or (ii) they are 
too poor and too old to access inpatient treatment. The latter could be perceived as 
indicating that poor people tend to substitute inpatient care with visiting health care 
facilities more frequently. However, this high frequency of visits for outpatient care 
by subsidized people could also reflect the referral system in accessing public health 
facilities and the consultation time limit. 




As we expected, education turns out to play an important role in improving 
health status. Becoming older and becoming richer are associated with greater use of 
inpatient treatment for insured households but being knowledgeable is more important 
for subsidized people to understand the procedure for accessing free health care. Our 
findings suggest that giving more access to health care solely by providing universal 
health care is inadequate. People should be made aware that it is and will remain 
crucial to maintaining their health status. Therefore, the insurance programme should 
cover preventive care as well as curative care. Moreover, an incentive system is 
necessary to change the behaviour of insurance members to follow a healthy lifestyle.  
In addition, complex and bureaucratic procedures in accessing free health care 
for the poor should be eliminated. For the middle and upper income classes, the 
Government and the Parliament could amend National Social Security (SJSN) Law 
No. 40, which was passed in 2004, and BPJS Law No. 24, passed in 2011, which limit 
co-payment to obtain a higher class of inpatient care. The BPJS could determine the 
base provision and optional services such as MRIs, complete medical check-ups and 
so on depending on their willingness to pay the premium.  
Since moral hazards could exist on both sides – insured people and providers 
– the next avenue for future research is to identify incentives for both parties to control 
the moral hazard effects in the health care system. Further, the JKN has been 
implemented for at least five years, so it remains interesting to test our hypothesis 
among JKN members to determine whether they show ex ante moral hazard.  
  





Appendix A5.A1 Data Limitations 
Susenas, a socio-economic national survey, is now conducted every year throughout 
Indonesia by the Central Statistics Bureau BPS. Susenas consists of two modules, 
namely the consumption and core modules. The consumption survey records all 
expenditures, including health expenses, at the household level on a weekly and 
monthly basis for food and non-food expenditures, respectively. In this chapter, we 
therefore define health expenditure based on the types of health expenditures listed in 
the Susenas consumption questionnaire. We classify health expenditure into curative 
and preventive expenditure. Curative expenditure consists of payments for public 
hospitals, private hospitals, primary health care (puskesmas), private clinics, health 
worker practices, traditional healer practices, traditional birth attendants, prescribed 
medicine, traditional medicine and self-treatment (including purchasing non-
prescribed medicine). Preventive expenditure covers pregnancy examination, 
immunization, family planning or birth control, health prevention, medical check-ups 
and purchasing health devices such as glasses, plaster cast, wheelchairs and so on. We 
calculate these expenditures as an average for the last three months and deflate them 
into real values. To analyse health expenditure, we calculate these expenditures in 
terms of the per capita share in the total health expenditure and the total expenditure.  
The frequency of outpatient visits and the number of days spent receiving inpatient 
care are extracted from the Susenas core module. The BPS records the frequency of 
visits for outpatient care for the last month and the number of days spent in inpatient 
care for the last year in each health facility. We calculate the per capita visits for 
outpatient care and the per capita days for inpatient care.  
Despite the wide survey coverage and large sample size, Susenas, which we 
use to perform several regression analyses, has some limitations. Susenas is not a 
special survey designated for measuring detailed health expenditure and health 
services. We do not know exactly how much the households pay for each health-
related service that they receive because the relevant questions are asked in separate 
modules, as discussed above. The respondents cannot give explicit answers about the 




payment for administration or laboratory or other related health expenses paid by the 
households. These typical questions can only be answered satisfactorily by exit 
inpatients or outpatients survey who are interviewed directly on site (see Hidayat et 
al 2015). Instead, Susenas’s respondents are general households interviewed at their 
homes and answering questions on expenditures made during the last week, the last 
month and the last 3 months, the frequency of visits in the last month and the number 
of days spent as inpatients over the last 12 months. As a consequence, Susenas’s 
respondents have difficulty in answering the questions related to health expenditure 
precisely – their memory recall might be biased. This implies that the three variables 
used in this paper – (a) curative expenditure, (b) preventive expenditure and (c) other 
health expenditure – are much lower than the corresponding figures shown in other 
reports that use exit patient surveys to calculate health expenditure.36 Similar 
problems occur when calculating the frequency of visits, which refers to outpatients a 
month ago, and days spent in health facilities, which refer to inpatients a year ago.  
Further, health expenditure in Susenas could be misinterpreted. Health 
consumption is financed by out-of-pocket and/or health subsidy. However, 
calculating the size of health subsidy is difficult because health goods and services 
vary greatly in both type and intensity, and medical fees can be very expensive. 
Susenas relied on appraisal value from the respondent, but people in general do not 
know the exact price until they receive a bill. The problem occurred when the subsidy 
recipient do not receive the bill. Thus, health cost is likely to be underestimated 
especially among subsidized households with high medical needs (Johar et al. 2018). 
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Appendix A5.B1 Relationship between Insured Households and Unhealthy 
Consumption 
Variable 













       
d_insurance –0.0617*** –0.0047*** 0.0178***   0.0105***   0.0001 0.0158***   
 (–0.0492) (–0.0137) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
freq_visit –0.0547*** –0.0010 –0.002 –0.0038*   –0.0072***  –0.0081***  
 (–0.0439) (–0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0026) 
log_premiun –0.0152*** 0.0001 0.0008***   0.0000 -0.0001 –0.0007***  
 (–0.0459) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
pct_married 0.0038*** 0.0009*** –0.0137***  –0.0038***  –0.0061***  –0.0109***  
 (0.1693) (0.1533) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)        
Interaction       
d_insurance * 
visit –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0002 0.0037 0.0067***   0.0034 
 (–0.0003) (–0.0012) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0036) 
married * 
income –0.0001 –0.0001*** 0.0009***   0.0002***   0.0005***   0.0007***   
 (–0.0459) –(0.1567) (–0.0001) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
premium * 
visit 0.0029* 0.0001 0.002 –0.0001 –0.001 –0.0005 
 (0.0047) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010)        
Control        
log_income 0.2877*** 0.0048*** –0.9571***  –0.0600*   0.2212***  –0.6200***  
 (0.3165) (0.0193) (0.0445) (0.0336) (0.0227) (0.0366) 
educ_hhh –0.0168*** –0.0002** 0.0013***   0.0007***   0.0022***   0.0005**   
 (–0.1339) (–0.0065) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
log_age_hhh –0.2601*** –0.0034** 0.2054***   0.1722***  –0.0095 0.2347***   
 (–0.1192) (–0.0058) (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.0092) (0.0135) 
housequality –0.0027*** 0.0006*** –0.0033***  –0.0014***  –0.0001*   –0.0030***  
 (-0.0489) (0.0388) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
d_empl_hhh 0.0301*** 0.0031*** -0.0434***  –0.0113***  0.0015 –0.0224***  
 (0.0239) (0.0092) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0021) 
d_kids –0.0038 –0.0133*** –0.1220***  0.0039*    0.1587***   0.2052***   
 (–0.0025) (–0.0319) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
d_urban –0.0740*** 0.0058*** –0.0257***  –0.0165***  –0.0019 –0.0797***  
 (-0.0590) (0.0171) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
              
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses for Cigarette and 
Alcohol. Standard error in parentheses for marginal effect of Carbohydrate, Protein, Fat and Calorie. 
 
  




Appendix A5.B2 Relationship between Subsidized Households and Unhealthy 
Consumption 
Variable 













       
d_subsidy 0.0973*** 0.0008 –0.0026 0.0005 –0.0209***  0.0061 
 (0.0750) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0038) 
freq_visit –0.0496*** –0.0000 0.0067 0.001 –0.0062**   –0.0048 
 (–0.0410) (–0.0001) –0.0059 –0.0041 –0.003 –0.0044 
log_premiun –0.0105*** 0.0002 0.0014***   –0.0001 –0.0004 –0.0010**   
 (–0.0411) (0.0020) –0.0005 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0004 
pct_married 0.0085*** 0.0009** –0.0175***  –0.0036***  –0.0066***  –0.0112***  
 (0.3654) (0.1291) –0.001 –0.0007 –0.0005 –0.0008        
Interaction       
d_subsidy * 
visit –0.0104 –0.0020 –0.0093 0.0003 0.0089***   0.0032 
 (–0.0075) (–0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0052) 
married * 
income –0.0004*** –0.0001** 0.0012***   0.0002***   0.0005***   0.0008***   
 (–0.2495) (–0.1242) –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0000 –0.0001 
premium * 
visit 0.0021 –0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 –0.0008 0.0000 
 (0.0044) (–0.0009) –0.0015 –0.001 –0.0007 –0.0011        
Control        
log_income 0.3058*** 0.0039** –1.2224***  –0.0942**  0.0645**  –0.7711***  
 (0.3593) (0.0157) (0.0612) (0.0450) (0.0307) (0.0495) 
educ_hhh –0.0144*** –0.0001 0.0023***   0.0015***   0.0018***   0.0016***   
 (–0.1239) (–0.0038) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
log_age_hhh –0.2433*** 0.0002 0.2046***   0.1640***  –0.0013 0.2397***   
 (–0.1099) (0.0003) (0.0238) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0193) 
housequality –0.0011*** 0.0006*** –0.0033***  –0.0014***  –0.0001 –0.0028***  
 (–0.0205) (0.0399) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
d_empl_hhh 0.0290*** 0.0059*** –0.0585***  –0.0134***  0.0034*    –0.0199***  
 (0.0234) (0.0164) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0029) 
d_kids –0.0020 –0.0131*** –0.1093***  0.0133***   0.1510***   0.2063***   
 (–0.0013) (–0.0284) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0030) 
d_urban –0.0636*** 0.0073*** –0.0377***  –0.0169***  –0.0017 –0.0800***  
 (–0.0515) (0.0202) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0029) 
              
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized beta coefficients in parentheses for Cigarette and 
Alcohol. Standard error in parentheses for marginal effect of Carbohydrate, Protein, Fat and Calorie. 
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Appendix A5.C1 Basic Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log_curecap 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0548***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0041*** –0.0040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0020*** –0.0024*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married * income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0248 0.0395*** –0.1102***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041)
d_subsidy 0.0386*** 0.0492 0.0008 –0.5842***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065)
d_insurance *  age 0.0149**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0109***
(0.003)
d_subsidy * age –0.0028
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
(0.001)
d_subsidy * income 0.0472***
(0.005)
log income 0.0132*** 0.0319*** 0.0130*** 0.0134*** 0.0072** 0.0320*** 0.0330*** 0.0023
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0033*** –0.0027*** –0.0033*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0475*** 0.0500*** 0.0402*** 0.0482*** 0.0466*** 0.0518*** 0.0538*** 0.0501***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0002** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0069**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0975*** –0.1165*** –0.0974*** –0.0975*** –0.0979*** –0.1166*** –0.1173*** –0.1173***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0011 0.0053 –0.0012 –0.0012 –0.0009 0.0053 0.0047 0.0060*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2808*** –0.5206*** –0.2511*** –0.2911*** –0.1969*** –0.5282*** –0.5155*** –0.1140
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.071) (0.063) (0.076)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
` Frequency Visit Outpatient Care




Appendix A5.C2 Basic Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
illness_cap –0.0058* –0.0037 –0.0058* –0.0059* –0.0058* –0.0034 –0.0036 –0.0036
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0052*** –0.0058*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0059*** –0.0060*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0039 0.0038 0.0043 0.0039
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0024* 0.0029** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0008 0.0017 –0.0009 –0.0008 –0.0008 0.0022 0.0014 0.0019
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_insurance 0.0680*** –0.2137*** 0.0790*** –0.3879***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082)
d_subsidy –0.0155* 0.3162*** –0.1177*** 0.2108
(0.009) (0.096) (0.017) (0.143)
d_insurance *  age 0.0736***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0350***
(0.006)
d_subsidy * age –0.0864***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0114***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0172
(0.011)
log income 0.0783*** 0.0942*** 0.0775*** 0.0786*** 0.0591*** 0.0966*** 0.0970*** 0.1050***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0023*** –0.0010* –0.0000 –0.0011** –0.0025*** –0.0092*** –0.0024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0704*** 0.0795*** 0.0345*** 0.0715*** 0.0676*** 0.1354*** 0.0897*** 0.0794***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0334*** –0.0476*** –0.0320*** –0.0329*** –0.0344*** –0.0442*** –0.0425*** –0.0476***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0489*** –0.0599*** –0.0482*** –0.0488*** –0.0501*** –0.0635*** –0.0622*** –0.0596***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0207*** 0.0346*** 0.0199*** 0.0204*** 0.0210*** 0.0345*** 0.0331*** 0.0343***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3392*** –1.5239*** –1.1921*** –1.3545*** –1.0705*** –1.7642*** –1.5102*** –1.6717***
(0.089) (0.139) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101) (0.155) (0.139) (0.167)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Days Spent (Inpatient Care)Variable
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Appendix A5.D1 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: Cigarette 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0529*** 0.0547*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0547*** 0.0546*** 0.0546*** 0.0547***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0040*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0040*** –0.0041*** –0.0039*** –0.0040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0039*** 0.003 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.003 0.0031 0.0034* 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0024*** –0.0016** –0.0024*** –0.0023*** –0.0026*** –0.0024*** –0.0016** –0.0014** –0.0009 –0.0016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0024*** 0.0046*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0046*** 0.0045*** 0.0040*** 0.0048***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married * income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_cigarcap –0.0178*** –0.0195*** –0.0179*** –0.0179*** –0.0178*** –0.0187*** –0.0195*** –0.0205*** –0.0221*** –0.0100**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
d_insurance 0.0310*** –0.0277 0.0387*** –0.1054** 0.0305***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.002)
d_subsidy 0.0404*** 0.0505 -0.0003 -0.6376*** 0.0448***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.066) (0.004)
d_insurance *  age 0.0153**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0105***
(0.003)
d_insurance *  cigarette 0.0016
(0.003)
d_subsidy * age –0.0026
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0045***
-0.001
d_subsidy * income 0.0514***
(0.005)
d_subsidy *  cigarette –0.0142***
(0.005)
log income 0.0184*** 0.0380*** 0.0182*** 0.0186*** 0.0126*** 0.0184*** 0.0381*** 0.0394*** 0.0065 0.0389***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0036*** –0.0026*** –0.0036*** –0.0030*** –0.0036*** –0.0036*** –0.0026*** –0.0054*** –0.0024*** –0.0026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0430*** 0.0454*** 0.0355*** 0.0437*** 0.0421*** 0.0429*** 0.0471*** 0.0493*** 0.0449*** 0.0459***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0003*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0059*** –0.0062* –0.0057** –0.0056** –0.0063*** –0.0060*** –0.0061* –0.0041 –0.0063* –0.0063*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0975*** –0.1164*** –0.0974*** –0.0974*** –0.0979*** –0.0975*** –0.1165*** –0.1173*** –0.1173*** –0.1160***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0024 0.0041 –0.0025 –0.0026 –0.0023 –0.0024 0.0041 0.0034 0.0047 0.0041
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.3212*** –0.5755*** –0.2906*** –0.3319*** –0.2406*** –0.3206*** –0.5828*** –0.5728*** –0.1399* –0.5940***
(0.045) (0.064) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.064) (0.076) (0.064)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.175 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.175 0.175 0.176 0.175
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Frequency Visit Outpatient CareVariable




Appendix A5.D2 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: Alcohol 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 0.0549***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0041*** –0.0040*** –0.0041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037* 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0020*** –0.0024*** –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0038*** 0.0044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married  *  income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_alcoholcap –0.0006 0.0001 –0.0007 –0.0006 –0.0007 –0.0024 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 –0.0010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0248 0.0395*** –0.1102*** 0.0321***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.002)
d_subsidy 0.0386*** 0.0492 0.0008 –0.5842*** 0.0386***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065) (0.004)
d_insurance *  age 0.0149**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0109***
(0.003)
d_insurance * alcohol 0.003
(0.013)
d_subsidy * age –0.0028
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
(0.001)
d_subsidy * income 0.0472***
(0.005)
d_subsidy * alcohol 0.0014
(0.020)
log income 0.0132*** 0.0319*** 0.0130*** 0.0134*** 0.0072** 0.0132*** 0.0320*** 0.0330*** 0.0023 0.0319***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0033*** –0.0027*** –0.0033*** –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021*** –0.0024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0474*** 0.0500*** 0.0402*** 0.0482*** 0.0466*** 0.0474*** 0.0518*** 0.0538*** 0.0501*** 0.0500***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0002** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0065*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0069** –0.0067**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0975*** –0.1165*** –0.0974*** –0.0975*** –0.0979*** –0.0975*** –0.1166*** –0.1173*** –0.1173*** –0.1165***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0011 0.0053 –0.0012 –0.0012 –0.0009 –0.0011 0.0053 0.0047 0.0060* 0.0053
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2808*** –0.5206*** –0.2511*** –0.2912*** –0.1969*** –0.2808*** –0.5282*** –0.5155*** –0.1140 –0.5205***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Frequency Visit Outpatient Care
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Appendix A5.D3 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: 
Carbohydrate (Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 0.0549***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0040*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0041*** –0.0040*** –0.0041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0042*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037* 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0020*** –0.0024*** –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0039*** 0.0044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married  *  income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_carbo –0.0005 0.0006 –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0003 –0.0031 0.0006 0.0009 0.0019 0.0016
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0248 0.0395*** –0.1101*** 0.0292***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.003)
d_subsidy 0.0386*** 0.0492 0.0008 –0.5861*** 0.0394***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065) (0.005)
d_insurance *  age 0.0149**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0109***
(0.003)
d_insurance * d_carbo 0.0051
(0.004)
d_subsidy * age –0.0028
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
(0.001)
d_subsidy * income 0.0474***
(0.005)
d_subsidy * d_carbo –0.0016
(0.006)
log income 0.0132*** 0.0320*** 0.0130*** 0.0134*** 0.0072** 0.0133*** 0.0321*** 0.0330*** 0.0024 0.0320***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0033*** –0.0027*** –0.0033*** –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021*** –0.0024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0475*** 0.0500*** 0.0402*** 0.0482*** 0.0466*** 0.0475*** 0.0518*** 0.0538*** 0.0500*** 0.0500***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0002** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0064*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0068** –0.0067**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0976*** –0.1164*** –0.0975*** –0.0975*** –0.0980*** –0.0976*** –0.1165*** –0.1172*** –0.1172*** –0.1164***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0011 0.0053 –0.0012 –0.0013 –0.0010 –0.0010 0.0053 0.0048 0.0061* 0.0053
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2800*** –0.5217*** –0.2503*** –0.2904*** –0.1964*** –0.2799*** –0.5294*** –0.5173*** –0.1165 –0.5217***
(0.045) (0.064) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.064) (0.076) (0.064)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Frequency Visit Outpatient Care




Appendix A5.D4 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: Protein 
(Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0549*** 0.0549***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0040*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0040*** –0.0041*** –0.0040*** –0.0040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037* 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0020*** –0.0024*** –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0038*** 0.0044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married  *  income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_protein –0.0016 0.0029 –0.0015 –0.0015 –0.0015 –0.0060 0.0029 0.0032 0.0039 0.0054
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0247 0.0395*** –0.1101*** 0.0246***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.005)
d_subsidy 0.0386*** 0.0492 0.0007 –0.5856*** 0.0418***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065) (0.009)
d_insurance *  age 0.0148**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0109***
(0.003)
d_insurance * d_protein 0.0088
(0.006)
d_subsidy * age –0.0028
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
-0.001
d_subsidy * income 0.0473***
(0.005)
d_subsidy * d_protein –0.0038
(0.009)
log income 0.0132*** 0.0319*** 0.0130*** 0.0134*** 0.0072** 0.0132*** 0.0320*** 0.0330*** 0.0023 0.0319***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0033*** –0.0027*** –0.0033*** –0.0033*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021*** –0.0024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0475*** 0.0499*** 0.0403*** 0.0482*** 0.0466*** 0.0475*** 0.0517*** 0.0537*** 0.0499*** 0.0499***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0002** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0065*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0068** –0.0067**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0975*** –0.1165*** –0.0974*** –0.0975*** –0.0979*** –0.0976*** –0.1167*** –0.1174*** –0.1174*** –0.1165***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0011 0.0053 –0.0012 –0.0013 –0.0010 –0.0011 0.0053 0.0048 0.0061* 0.0053
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2795*** –0.5231*** –0.2498*** –0.2899*** –0.1957*** –0.2762*** –0.5308*** –0.5183*** –0.1165 –0.5239***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Frequency Visit Outpatient Care
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Appendix A5.D5 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: Fat 
(Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0530*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0530*** 0.0530*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0549*** 0.0549***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0041*** –0.0040*** –0.0041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037* 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0021*** –0.0024*** –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0022*** 0.0044*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0038*** 0.0045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married  *  income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_fat –0.0114*** –0.0016 –0.0114*** –0.0114*** –0.0112*** –0.0101** –0.0016 –0.0018 –0.0022 –0.0313***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0252 0.0396*** –0.1083*** 0.0344***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.007)
d_subsidy 0.0385*** 0.049 0.0008 –0.5846*** 0.0023
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065) (0.011)
d_insurance *  age 0.0150**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0108***
(0.003)
d_insurance * d_fat –0.0025
-0.007
d_subsidy * age –0.0027
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
(0.001)
d_subsidy * income 0.0472***
(0.005)
d_subsidy * d_fat 0.0393***
(0.012)
log income 0.0132*** 0.0319*** 0.0130*** 0.0134*** 0.0073** 0.0132*** 0.0320*** 0.0329*** 0.0023 0.0322***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0023*** –0.0032*** –0.0026*** –0.0033*** –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021*** –0.0023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0472*** 0.0500*** 0.0399*** 0.0480*** 0.0463*** 0.0472*** 0.0518*** 0.0538*** 0.0500*** 0.0505***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0002** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0002** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0065*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0069** –0.0063*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0950*** –0.1161*** –0.0949*** –0.0950*** –0.0955*** –0.0950*** –0.1163*** –0.1169*** –0.1169*** –0.1159***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0011 0.0053 –0.0012 –0.0013 –0.0010 –0.0011 0.0053 0.0047 0.0060* 0.0052
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2720*** –0.5191*** –0.2420*** –0.2824*** –0.1894*** –0.2730*** –0.5266*** –0.5138*** –0.1117 –0.4967***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.063) (0.076) (0.064)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Frequency Visit Outpatient Care




Appendix A5.D6 Modified Model Frequency of Visit for Outpatient Care: Calorie 
(Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log_curecap 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0531*** 0.0549*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 0.0549***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_prevcap –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0032*** –0.0041*** –0.0041*** –0.0040*** –0.0041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_medcheckcap 0.0042*** 0.0033* 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0037* 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log_premium –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0022*** –0.0020*** –0.0024*** –0.0022*** –0.0014** –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0038*** 0.0044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married * income –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003*** –0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_calorie –0.0014 –0.0005 –0.0013 –0.0013 –0.0012 0.0028 –0.0005 –0.0005 –0.0003 0.0002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
d_insurance 0.0321*** –0.0247 0.0395*** –0.1099*** 0.0383***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.041) (0.004)
d_subsidy 0.0386*** 0.0492 0.0008 –0.5841*** 0.0394***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.065) (0.007)
d_insurance *  age 0.0148**
(0.007)
d_insurance * educ –0.0010**
(0.000)
d_insurance *  income 0.0109***
(0.003)
d_insurance *  d_calorie –0.0084*
(0.005)
d_subsidy * age –0.0028
(0.011)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0042***
(0.001)
d_subsidy * income 0.0472***
(0.005)
d_subsidy *  d_calorie –0.0012
(0.007)
log income 0.0131*** 0.0319*** 0.0130*** 0.0133*** 0.0072** 0.0131*** 0.0320*** 0.0329*** 0.0023 0.0319***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
educ_hhh –0.0032*** –0.0024*** –0.0033*** –0.0027*** –0.0033*** –0.0033*** –0.0024*** –0.0049*** –0.0021*** –0.0024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log_age_hhh 0.0475*** 0.0501*** 0.0403*** 0.0483*** 0.0466*** 0.0474*** 0.0519*** 0.0539*** 0.0501*** 0.0500***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
housequality –0.0003** –0.0004*** –0.0003** –0.0002** –0.0003** –0.0003** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0065*** –0.0067** –0.0062*** –0.0062*** –0.0068*** –0.0065*** –0.0066** –0.0048 –0.0069** –0.0067**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d_kids –0.0972*** –0.1163*** –0.0971*** –0.0971*** –0.0976*** –0.0972*** –0.1165*** –0.1172*** –0.1173*** –0.1163***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d_urban –0.0012 0.0052 –0.0013 –0.0013 –0.0010 –0.0012 0.0052 0.0047 0.0060* 0.0052
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant –0.2792*** –0.5199*** –0.2496*** –0.2896*** –0.1957*** –0.2808*** –0.5276*** –0.5149*** –0.1137 –0.5197***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.071) (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.167 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Frequency Visit Outpatient Care
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Appendix A5.E1 Modified Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care: Cigarette 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0067** –0.0047 –0.0066** –0.0067** –0.0066** –0.0067** –0.0044 –0.0046 –0.0047 –0.0047
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0355*** 0.0423*** 0.0355*** 0.0355*** 0.0354*** 0.0355*** 0.0422*** 0.0421*** 0.0423*** 0.0423***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0051*** –0.0057*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0058*** –0.0059*** –0.0057*** –0.0057***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0032 0.0037 0.0033 0.0034
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0032*** 0.0018 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0025** 0.0032*** 0.0019 0.0025* 0.0017 0.0018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0006 0.0021 –0.0008 –0.0006 –0.0006 –0.0006 0.0026 0.0018 0.0022 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_cigarcap –0.0420*** –0.0463*** –0.0422*** –0.0421*** –0.0418*** –0.0393*** –0.0462*** –0.0489*** –0.0459*** –0.0498***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
d_insurance 0.0655*** –0.2204*** 0.0770*** –0.3764*** 0.0672***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.005)
d_subsidy –0.0111 0.3191*** –0.1202*** 0.0994 –0.0127
(0.009) (0.096) (0.017) (0.144) (0.010)
d_insurance *  age 0.0747***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0016*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0339***
(0.006)
d_insurance * cigarette –0.0054
(0.007)
d_subsidy * age –0.0860***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0122***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0084
(0.011)
d_subsidy * cigarette 0.0052
(0.011)
log income 0.0906*** 0.1085*** 0.0898*** 0.0909*** 0.0719*** 0.0906*** 0.1109*** 0.1123*** 0.1137*** 0.1082***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0016*** –0.0029*** –0.0017*** –0.0007 –0.0018*** –0.0016*** –0.0032*** –0.0104*** –0.0030*** –0.0030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0597*** 0.0685*** 0.0232** 0.0609*** 0.0571*** 0.0598*** 0.1241*** 0.0789*** 0.0686*** 0.0683***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0321*** –0.0464*** –0.0307*** –0.0316*** –0.0332*** –0.0321*** –0.0430*** –0.0408*** –0.0464*** –0.0463***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0489*** –0.0599*** –0.0483*** –0.0488*** –0.0502*** –0.0489*** –0.0634*** –0.0623*** –0.0597*** –0.0600***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0176*** 0.0317*** 0.0168*** 0.0173*** 0.0179*** 0.0176*** 0.0316*** 0.0300*** 0.0316*** 0.0317***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.4336*** –1.6534*** –1.2845*** –1.4498*** –1.1726*** –1.4357*** –1.8924*** –1.6460*** –1.7244*** –1.6466***
(0.089) (0.140) (0.094) (0.090) (0.102) (0.089) (0.156) (0.140) (0.168) (0.140)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R –squared 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Days Spent (Inpatient Care)Variable




Appendix A5.E2 Modified Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care: Alcohol 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0059* –0.0037 –0.0058* –0.0059* –0.0058* –0.0059* –0.0034 –0.0036 –0.0036 –0.0037
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0052*** –0.0058*** –0.0051*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0059*** –0.0060*** –0.0058*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0039 0.004 0.0038 0.0043 0.0039 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0024* 0.0029** 0.002 0.0023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0007 0.0017 –0.0009 –0.0008 –0.0008 –0.0007 0.0022 0.0014 0.0019 0.0017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log_alcoholcap –0.0178 –0.0167 –0.0180 –0.0177 –0.0180 –0.0215 –0.0166 –0.0165 –0.0167 –0.0297
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.038)
d_insurance 0.0679*** –0.2141*** 0.0789*** –0.3883*** 0.0680***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.004)
d_subsidy –0.0155* 0.3161*** –0.1177*** 0.2108 –0.0153*
(0.009) (0.096) (0.017) (0.143) (0.009)
d_insurance *  age 0.0737***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0350***
(0.006)
d_insurance *  alcohol 0.0063
(0.025)
d_subsidy * age –0.0864***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0114***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0172
(0.011)
d_subsidy *  alcohol 0.0167
(0.043)
log income 0.0784*** 0.0943*** 0.0776*** 0.0787*** 0.0591*** 0.0784*** 0.0966*** 0.0970*** 0.1050*** 0.0943***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0023*** –0.0010* –0.0001 –0.0011** –0.0009* –0.0025*** –0.0092*** –0.0024*** –0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0704*** 0.0795*** 0.0344*** 0.0714*** 0.0675*** 0.0704*** 0.1354*** 0.0898*** 0.0795*** 0.0795***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0004** 0.0004 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0333*** –0.0475*** –0.0319*** –0.0329*** –0.0344*** –0.0333*** –0.0441*** –0.0424*** –0.0475*** –0.0476***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0491*** –0.0602*** –0.0485*** –0.0490*** –0.0504*** –0.0491*** –0.0637*** –0.0624*** –0.0599*** –0.0602***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0208*** 0.0347*** 0.0201*** 0.0205*** 0.0211*** 0.0208*** 0.0346*** 0.0333*** 0.0344*** 0.0347***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3408*** –1.5257*** –1.1935*** –1.3560*** –1.0719*** –1.3408*** –1.7659*** –1.5120*** –1.6735*** –1.5254***
(0.089) (0.139) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101) (0.089) (0.155) (0.139) (0.167) (0.139)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R –squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Days Spent (Inpatient Care)
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Appendix A5.E3 Modified Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care: 
Carbohydrate (Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0058* –0.0036 –0.0058* –0.0059* –0.0058* –0.0058* –0.0033 –0.0035 –0.0036 –0.0037
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0051*** –0.0057*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0052*** –0.0051*** –0.0058*** –0.0059*** –0.0058*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.004 0.0038 0.0039 0.0037 0.0042 0.0038 0.0039
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0022 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0030*** 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0028** 0.002 0.0022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0006 0.002 –0.0008 –0.0007 –0.0007 –0.0006 0.0025 0.0018 0.0022 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_carbo 0.0106** 0.0206*** 0.0107** 0.0106** 0.0110** 0.0011 0.0207*** 0.0217*** 0.0202*** 0.0292***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
d_insurance 0.0678*** –0.2141*** 0.0788*** –0.3910*** 0.0576***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.006)
d_subsidy –0.0154* 0.3175*** –0.1185*** 0.1906 –0.0084
(0.009) (0.096) (0.017) (0.144) (0.012)
d_insurance *  age 0.0737***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0352***
(0.006)
d_insurance *  d_carbo 0.0184**
(0.008)
d_subsidy * age –0.0867***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0115***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0156
(0.011)
d_subsidy * d_carbo –0.0134
(0.014)
log income 0.0790*** 0.0960*** 0.0782*** 0.0793*** 0.0597*** 0.0793*** 0.0984*** 0.0989*** 0.1057*** 0.0957***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0023*** –0.0010* –0.0001 –0.0011** –0.0009* –0.0025*** –0.0093*** –0.0024*** –0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0700*** 0.0786*** 0.0340*** 0.0710*** 0.0671*** 0.0700*** 0.1347*** 0.0889*** 0.0786*** 0.0788***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0005** 0.0004 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0329*** –0.0464*** –0.0315*** –0.0324*** –0.0340*** –0.0327*** –0.0430*** –0.0412*** –0.0464*** –0.0465***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0477*** –0.0579*** –0.0470*** –0.0476*** –0.0489*** –0.0478*** –0.0614*** –0.0600*** –0.0577*** –0.0575***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0209*** 0.0354*** 0.0202*** 0.0207*** 0.0213*** 0.0210*** 0.0353*** 0.0339*** 0.0351*** 0.0352***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3571*** –1.5643*** –1.2098*** –1.3723*** –1.0872*** –1.3567*** –1.8056*** –1.5524*** –1.6979*** –1.5646***
(0.089) (0.140) (0.094) (0.090) (0.102) (0.089) (0.156) (0.139) (0.168) (0.140)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Days Spent (Inpatient Care)




Appendix A5.E4 Modified Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care: Protein 
(Discrete) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0058* –0.0036 –0.0057* –0.0058* –0.0057* –0.0058* –0.0033 –0.0035 –0.0035 –0.0036
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0051*** –0.0058*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0052*** –0.0051*** –0.0059*** –0.0060*** –0.0058*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0039 0.004 0.0038 0.0042 0.0038 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0024* 0.0029** 0.002 0.0023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0007 0.0017 –0.0009 –0.0007 –0.0007 –0.0007 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 0.0017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_protein 0.0159*** 0.0203** 0.0161*** 0.0160*** 0.0162*** 0.0133 0.0203** 0.0211** 0.0200** 0.0294*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
d_insurance 0.0678*** –0.2147*** 0.0789*** –0.3894*** 0.0633***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.011)
d_subsidy –0.0155* 0.3163*** –0.1181*** 0.2036 –0.0034
(0.009) (0.096) (0.017) (0.143) (0.019)
d_insurance *  age 0.0739***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0351***
(0.006)
d_insurance * d_protein 0.0053
(0.012)
d_subsidy * age –0.0865***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0114***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0166
(0.011)
d_subsidy *  d_protein –0.0143
(0.019)
log income 0.0783*** 0.0943*** 0.0775*** 0.0786*** 0.0590*** 0.0783*** 0.0966*** 0.0970*** 0.1047*** 0.0939***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0023*** –0.0010* –0.0000 –0.0011** –0.0009* –0.0025*** –0.0093*** –0.0024*** –0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0698*** 0.0787*** 0.0337*** 0.0709*** 0.0669*** 0.0698*** 0.1347*** 0.0890*** 0.0787*** 0.0787***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0005** 0.0004 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0332*** –0.0474*** –0.0318*** –0.0327*** –0.0343*** –0.0332*** –0.0439*** –0.0422*** –0.0473*** –0.0474***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0490*** –0.0604*** –0.0484*** –0.0490*** –0.0503*** –0.0490*** –0.0639*** –0.0626*** –0.0600*** –0.0603***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0209*** 0.0349*** 0.0202*** 0.0207*** 0.0213*** 0.0209*** 0.0349*** 0.0335*** 0.0347*** 0.0349***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3527*** –1.5418*** –1.2053*** –1.3682*** –1.0834*** –1.3507*** –1.7822*** –1.5287*** –1.6846*** –1.5447***
(0.089) (0.139) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101) (0.089) (0.155) (0.139) (0.168) (0.139)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Days Spent (Inpatient Care)
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Appendix A5.E5 Modified Model Days Spent Receiving Inpatient Care: Fat 
(Discrete)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0059* –0.0038 –0.0059* –0.0060* –0.0059* –0.0059* –0.0035 –0.0037 –0.0037 –0.0038
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0052*** –0.0058*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0059*** –0.0060*** –0.0058*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0039 0.004 0.0038 0.0043 0.0039 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0023* 0.0029** 0.002 0.0023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0008 0.0014 –0.0010 –0.0009 –0.0009 –0.0009 0.0019 0.0012 0.0016 0.0014
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married *  income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_fat –0.0087 –0.0213* –0.0088 –0.0087 –0.0080 0.01 –0.0208* –0.0218* –0.0211* –0.0241
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022)
d_insurance 0.0680*** –0.2140*** 0.0791*** –0.3865*** 0.1016***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.013)
d_subsidy –0.0158* 0.3137*** –0.1182*** 0.2071 –0.0193
(0.009) -0.096 -0.017 -0.143 -0.025
d_insurance *  age 0.0737***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0349***
(0.006)
d_insurance * d_fat –0.0375***
(0.014)
d_subsidy * age –0.0859***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0114***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0169
(0.011)
d_subsidy * d_fat 0.0038
(0.025)
log income 0.0783*** 0.0939*** 0.0775*** 0.0786*** 0.0592*** 0.0782*** 0.0963*** 0.0967*** 0.1045*** 0.0939***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0022*** –0.0009* –0.0000 –0.0011** –0.0009* –0.0024*** –0.0092*** –0.0023*** –0.0022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0702*** 0.0791*** 0.0342*** 0.0713*** 0.0674*** 0.0703*** 0.1347*** 0.0894*** 0.0791*** 0.0791***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0334*** –0.0476*** –0.0320*** –0.0329*** –0.0344*** –0.0332*** –0.0442*** –0.0425*** –0.0476*** –0.0476***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0470*** –0.0553*** –0.0463*** –0.0469*** –0.0484*** –0.0471*** –0.0589*** –0.0574*** –0.0550*** –0.0553***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0207*** 0.0346*** 0.0199*** 0.0204*** 0.0210*** 0.0207*** 0.0345*** 0.0331*** 0.0343*** 0.0346***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3325*** –1.5031*** –1.1850*** –1.3478*** –1.0651*** –1.3479*** –1.7423*** –1.4889*** –1.6490*** –1.5010***
(0.089) (0.139) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101) (0.089) (0.156) (0.139) (0.168) (0.140)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Days Spent (Inpatient Care)








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
illness_cap –0.0057* –0.0037 –0.0057* –0.0058* –0.0057* –0.0057* –0.0033 –0.0035 –0.0036 –0.0037
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log_curecap 0.0358*** 0.0427*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0427*** 0.0427***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_prevcap –0.0051*** –0.0058*** –0.0051*** –0.0051*** –0.0052*** –0.0052*** –0.0059*** –0.0060*** –0.0058*** –0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_medcheckcap 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0039 0.004 0.0038 0.0043 0.0038 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log_premium 0.0038*** 0.0023 0.0039*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0024* 0.0029** 0.002 0.0023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pct_married –0.0007 0.0017 –0.0009 –0.0007 –0.0007 –0.0007 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 0.0017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
married * income 0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_calorie 0.0079 0.0049 0.008 0.0079 0.0083* 0.0199*** 0.0048 0.005 0.0048 0.0077
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
d_insurance 0.0679*** –0.2142*** 0.0789*** –0.3901*** 0.0857***
(0.004) (0.056) (0.008) (0.082) (0.008)
d_subsidy –0.0155* 0.3160*** –0.1178*** 0.2101 –0.0121
(0.009) -0.096 -0.017 -0.143 -0.015
d_insurance *  age 0.0737***
(0.015)
d_insurance * educ –0.0015*
(0.001)
d_insurance *  income 0.0351***
(0.006)
d_insurance * d_calorie –0.0239**
(0.010)
d_subsidy * age –0.0864***
(0.025)
d_subsidy * educ 0.0114***
(0.002)
d_subsidy * income –0.0171
(0.011)
d_subsidy * d_calorie –0.0047
(0.016)
log income 0.0786*** 0.0944*** 0.0778*** 0.0789*** 0.0593*** 0.0784*** 0.0968*** 0.0972*** 0.1052*** 0.0943***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
educ_hhh –0.0009* –0.0023*** –0.0010* –0.0000 –0.0011** –0.0009* –0.0025*** –0.0092*** –0.0024*** –0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log_age_hhh 0.0699*** 0.0792*** 0.0339*** 0.0710*** 0.0670*** 0.0696*** 0.1351*** 0.0894*** 0.0792*** 0.0790***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
housequality 0.0005** 0.0004 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d_empl_hhh –0.0332*** –0.0476*** –0.0318*** –0.0328*** –0.0343*** –0.0332*** –0.0441*** –0.0424*** –0.0475*** –0.0477***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d_kids –0.0508*** –0.0612*** –0.0502*** –0.0508*** –0.0523*** –0.0509*** –0.0647*** –0.0635*** –0.0609*** –0.0611***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
d_urban 0.0213*** 0.0350*** 0.0206*** 0.0210*** 0.0217*** 0.0213*** 0.0349*** 0.0335*** 0.0347*** 0.0350***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant –1.3482*** –1.5299*** –1.2010*** –1.3636*** –1.0788*** –1.3527*** –1.7699*** –1.5163*** –1.6771*** –1.5289***
(0.089) (0.139) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101) (0.089) (0.155) (0.139) (0.168) (0.139)
Observations 190,571 99,748 190,571 190,571 190,571 190,571 99,748 99,748 99,748 99,748
R -squared 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Days Spent (Inpatient Care)








Chapter 6 What Drives Electrification Inequality 
AcrossTime and Space in Indonesia? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the spatial patterns of inequality in access to electricity and 
its supply provision in Indonesia. It is our aim to identify the determinants of spatial 
variation in the timing of electricity diffusion across Indonesian provinces. Several 
studies on technology adoption or diffusion have been carried out at the country level. 
For example, Comin et al. (2012) suggested that understanding technology diffusion 
over space is crucial to understanding the speed of technology diffusion. They found 
that countries located far away from the adoption leaders benefit less rapidly from the 
technology diffusion. Other studies have suggested that income per capita, openness, 
human capital and the type of regime across countries are associated with the speed 
of technology adoption (Comin and Hobijn 2004). Inspired by these considerations, 
in this chapter, we study the pattern of technology (electricity) diffusion within a 
country (Indonesia) at the province level.  
Evidently, Indonesia is a particularly interesting country to study the spatial 
diffusion pattern of electrification. Indonesia is an archipelagic country where people 
are unevenly distributed across five big islands and hundreds of small islands. Unlike 
the situation in non-archipelagic countries, where new connections can be provided 
by extending the existing lines, Indonesia needs huge investments to build new lines 
to bring electricity to people on the different islands, and the up-front costs are very 
high. Therefore, electrification in Indonesia is spatially heterogeneous due to the 
geographical barriers, meaning that many islands have to rely on autonomous self-
contained electricity systems.  
The electrification of Indonesia started in the early 1900s in the colonialization 
era, especially at the centre of economic activities in most provinces. Evidently, in its 
initial phase, the diffusion of electricity mainly served the economic interests of the 
colonial elite. Interestingly, the diffusion process was very slow until about the 1980s, 
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after which the electrification ratio started to grow rapidly in some provinces while 
remaining low in other provinces – thus implying an increasing spatial variation in 
access to electricity over time. For example, in 1975, the electrification ratio was 20 
per cent in Jakarta and only 3 per cent in Papua. The most recent figures show that the 
percentage of households with access to electricity in Papua has increased to 35 per 
cent while in Jakarta it equals 100 per cent. Similarly, in 1975, the total installed 
electricity generation capacity was 1,066 MW, of which 771 MW was located in Java–
Bali and only 16 MW was allocated to the Eastern islands. Since then, the national 
electricity generation capacity has increased to 57,822 MW (the 2018 figure), of 
which 65 per cent is located on the Java–Bali islands and only 3 per cent is to be found 
in Eastern Indonesia (PLN 2019). 
Of course, this high level of disparity is mainly caused by spatial variation in 
the location of households, the stage of economic development, proximity to the 
centres of economic activity, institutional quality and economic incentives (Barnes 
and Foley 2004; Mulder and Tembe 2008; Jimenez 2017). Foley (1992) showed that 
electricity is a derived demand occurring only when an area has reached a certain level 
of development. As a consequence, the timing and the level of resources that should 
be committed to it at any particular moment of time or level of economic development 
varies. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity in electrification ratios is partly driven by a 
response to political conditions, such as post-independence until the early 1950s to 
gain sovereign, the cleaning-up communism ideology in the 1960s and other internal 
conflicts in Aceh, Maluku, Papua and so on. Hence, it is obvious that connecting 
people, including those living on the small islands, is not easy and has potentially 
large social implications. Furthermore, the story of the electricity uptake provides 
lessons for regional disparities throughout Indonesia and how to accelerate the 
development aimed at closing the gap between the more and the less developed 
provinces. 
To understand the determinants of temporal and spatial variation in the speed 
of electricity diffusion, of course, we first need to describe the pattern of electricity 
diffusion across Indonesia by estimating the access to electricity at the province level 
over time. This is not an easy step to take, however, given the limitations to publicly 
available and consistent electricity access data series for a longer time period across 
What Drives Electrification Inequality Across Time and Space in Indonesia?  191 
 
 
provinces. Therefore, we built a consistent database describing the spatial and 
temporal variation of electrification in Indonesia. To achieve this aim, we make use 
of unpublished statistics kept by PLN, which, as the only company providing 
electricity throughout Indonesia, plays an important role in shaping the electricity 
diffusion pattern across Indonesia. Hence, an important contribution of this chapter is 
also to document the complexities of electricity data in Indonesia and to describe the 
methodological choices that we must make in constructing a consistent dataset. Given 
the limitations in data availability, we are able to construct consistent time series for 
the period 1975 to 2018. We complemented our dataset with information on per capita 
GDP, population density, firm density, landscape complexity (measured as the share 
of households living in flat areas) and per capita installed electricity generation 
capacity across provinces and islands. 
Using this rich dataset, we develop a non-linear least square estimation to 
estimate the speed of the diffusion process within an S-curve framework of access to 
electricity. More specifically, we first regress the electrification ratio in various 
provinces over time on a set of explanatory variables, including per capita GDP, 
population density, firm density, landscape complexity and per capita installed 
electricity generation capacity – thus exploring the spatial and time variation in our 
data. Next, we translate the non-linear least square regression outcomes into the β 
parameter that defines the speed of diffusion in the S-curve framework. By plugging 
the estimated βi into our sample, we obtain the predicted electrification ratios for each 
province in terms of an S-curve over time. Finally, we calculate for each province the 
gap between its own electrification performance and that of the leading island (Java-
Bali) and use our regression outcomes to decompose this gap into the respective 
contribution of the driving forces of electrification mentioned above, which differ 
across space.    
Our main hypothesis in this chapter is that spatial variation in the speed of 
electricity diffusion can be explained by variation in the population density, per capita 
GDP, geographical structure, industrial intensity and power supply. To test this 
hypothesis, we adopt a non-linear S-shaped diffusion curve framework and then use 
a pooled regression analysis to estimate the parameters that determine the speed of 
diffusion within such a framework. Finally, we identify those of the above-mentioned 
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factors that determine the pattern of diffusion and simulate the number of years that 
are required to electrify at least 50 per cent of households. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2, we 
discuss the construction of long-term data series of electricity access ratios in 
Indonesia. Section 6.3 provides a short overview of the history of electricity diffusion 
in Indonesia based on our newly constructed dataset as well as existing data. Section 
6.4 describes the empirical strategy that we develop to estimate the diffusion of 
electricity access based on historical data, including a description of the data 
employed. In section 6.5, we simulate electricity diffusion patterns for each province 
by integrating the results of our regression analysis into a simple theoretical S-shaped 
diffusion framework. In section 6.6, we identify for each province the key 
determinants that drive the speed of electricity diffusion, using a combination of 
model simulation and decomposition techniques. Section 6.7 provides concluding 
remarks and discusses avenues for future research.   
 
6.2 Constructing a Long-term Electricity Dataset  
In this section, we will present the unique electricity dataset that we have constructed 
for the research presented in this chapter. As noted, this dataset is constructed on the 
basis of unpublished statistics kept by PLN, Indonesia’s main electricity provider. We 
use the PLN annual electricity statistics at the region and distribution levels 
throughout Indonesia to obtain the number of customers and installed capacity as our 
main variables. We collect these statistics from various sources, specifically PLN’s 
website, PLN’s headquarters and PLN’s archives for data after 2000, during the 1990s 
and before 1990, respectively. Moreover, we directly consult a resource person from 
PLN37 to understand the technical aspects and the context behind the statistics. 
Nevertheless, most of the statistics are available in the form of hard copies that we 
had to to digitize, enter and clean. We finally manage to gather 44 years of electricity 
data covering the period from 1975 to 2018 at the province level. Some challenges 
are encountered in constructing the electricity dataset, especially regarding the 
nomenclature of business units, area coverage and tariff classification. Below we 
 
37 We are grateful to Amir Rosidin for his expert judgement in preparing the electricity dataset.  
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summarize the main features of our dataset and the methodological choices involved 
in processing the raw data. For more details we refer to the Appendix A6. in this 
chapter. 
 
6.2.1 Nomenclature of Business Units 
To serve customers throughout Indonesia, PLN established two main business units, 
Kantor Wilayah (the regional office) and Kantor Distribusi (the distribution office). 
Kantor Wilayah is responsible for managing not only the customer but also the 
production side, while Kantor Distribusi is mainly in charge of the customer side. In 
particular regions, such as Maluku and Papua, Kantor Wilayah performs three main 
functions, that is, production, transmission and distribution. Meanwhile, in Java–Bali, 
where all the systems are already interconnected, each function is carried out by an 
independent entity; that is, the production is under subsidiary companies, the 
transmission is carried out by the Transmission Load and Dispatch Centre (Pusat 
Pengatur dan Penyaluran Beban –P3B) and the distribution is performed by Kantor 
Distribusi. These task divisions are carried out for efficiency and reliability purposes. 
Due to this nature, PLN frequently changes its business units to accommodate the 
electricity development. This company’s transformation affects our data collection 
process. For instance, PLN business units in 1975 comprised 1 generating unit, 2 
Kantor Distribusi and 13 Kantor Wilayah, and since 2018 number of business units 
have become 15 Kantor Wilayah, 7 Kantor Distribusi and 10 related generating units. 
As a consequence, customer and installed capacity data are recorded and stored in 
different PLN’s business units following the new organization. Therefore, the 
consistency in the annual PLN statistics needs to be taken into consideration. 
Historical dynamics of PLN business units is presented in Appendix A6.1. 
 
6.2.2 Area Coverage 
PLN distinguishes the areas for customers and production where the boundaries differ 
from those of the BPS’s provinces. One PLN area can consist of more than one BPS 
province. To compile all the electricity data from the annual PLN statistics, we first 
match the PLN area coverage within the PLN statistics over time to obtain a coherent 
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dataset at the province level and then we reclassify the matched PLN provinces into 
the BPS’s provinces. For the period from 1990 onwards, the PLN statistics are 
available at the regional level with a provincial breakdown, so we can easily match 
them with the BPS province data. However, the name of PLN regions might not reflect 
the true coverage area, so we need to reconfirm this with PLN during this 
reclassification process.  
Some PLN regions cover several provinces. For the purpose of coding thirty-
three provinces, we recode these regions and distributions as follows. Prior to 1990, 
for some regions with more than one province, their data are recoded to the province 
where the regional office was located. This pragmatic strategy is chosen because, 
according to PLN, the location of the regional office was selected based on the number 
of PLN customers. In other words, the capital province of a region represents more 
electrified households than other provinces within the region. For example, Region 
III consists of West Sumatera, Riau and Riau Island, so data were recorded as West 
Sumatera province because the office of Region III is located in Padang, the capital 
city of West Sumatera province. Thus, seven regional provinces were considered as 
one province according to this pragmatic strategy, namely West Sumatera (Region 
III), South Sumatera (Region IV), South Kalimantan (Region VI), North Sulawesi 
(Region VII), South Sulawesi (Region VIII), Bali (Region XI) and Central Java 
(Distribution Central Java and Yogyakarta). However, it should be noted that there is 
a potential jump in the number of customers due to discontinuity in the definition of 
the regions. Detailed coverage area PLN business units and BPS can be found in Table 
A6.2. For new business units that are established to response electricity development 
in some provinces, we reclassify these new business units back to the parent regions 
or provinces to make our dataset consistent with the BPS’s classification at the 
province level. 
  
6.2.3 Installed Capacity and Power Plants 
In this chapter, we use installed capacity (megawatt) as a proxy of power supply, 
which is to be understood as the arrival of power supply in that area (island). 
According to PLN, the installed capacity is the capacity of one generating unit as 
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written on the generator’s name plate. In other words, the installed capacity is the 
maximum output of electricity that a generator can produce under ideal conditions. 
PLN records this information based on the location of the power plants, including the 
ones owned by private companies, and the interconnection system in which the 
capacity of the entire area should be managed (Appendix A6.1). As a consequence, 
the division of regions for installed capacity becomes more complicated because it 
should be managed as one system and in line with its transmission. For instance, the 
generator system of Northern Sumatera covers Aceh, North Sumatera, West 
Sumatera, Riau and Riau Island, while the generator system of Southern Sumatera 
comprises South Sumatera, Bangka Belitung, Jambi, Bengkulu and Lampung. As a 
result, electricity can be transmitted across provinces throughout Sumatera island. 
This interconnected system is also known as autonomous self-contained electricity 
system in which the capacity could be supplied, transmitted and distributed within one 
island via this system. 
Having this complexity and as suggested by PLN, we prepare the capacity 
dataset at the island level, and then we use the weighted population to obtain the 
installed capacity per province. We categorize islands into five groups as follows: (i) 
Sumatera, (ii) Java–Bali, (iii) Kalimantan, (iv) Sulawesi and (v) Eastern. Unlike the 
first three main islands, the latter consists of one big island (Papua) and many small 
islands (Maluku and Nusatenggara). The weighted population (wpopij) for each 
province is calculated as the share of the population of province i on island j (popij) in 
the total population of island j (popj), where i is an index for provinces (i = 1, …, 33) 
and j is an index for islands (j = 1, …, 5):  
 
The calculation of the installed capacity also includes the amount of installed capacity 
from the private sector or the independent power producer (IPP) as part of the power 
supply since 2014. In sum, the quite frequent changes in PLN’s organization structure 
require us not only to consult PLN directly but also to prepare our electricity dataset 
carefully, especially due to the fact that the power plants belong to different units in 
different regions.  
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6.2.4 Tariff Classification  
As discussed, PLN issued annual statistics in different formats, including a tariff 
classification. We reclassify tariffs to calculate the number of customers as follows: 
(i) prior to 1980, tariffs A, B and C are classified as residential, industry and business, 
respectively, and tariffs D, E and F and Khusus are classified as “other”; (ii) in the 
period from 1980/1981 onwards, tariff R is classified as residential, I as industry, U 
and H as “business” and S, G, J and M as “other”. We then translate customers who 
held a residential tariff as household customers. Thus, in general, we have four types 
of customers: households, industry, business and other (Table A6.3). From 1989 
onwards, PLN issued not only the number of customers based on tariffs but also the 
number of customers based on types, namely residential, industry, business, social, 
government office and public street lighting. To make our classification consistent 
with previous classifications, we categorize the last three types as “other”. In this 
chapter, we only use household customers to determine the number of connections.  
 
6.2.5 Electrification Ratio 
The main variable in this chapter is the electrification ratio, which we use as the 
dependent variable in our diffusion model. According to the Asia Development Bank 
(ADB 2016), the electrification ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of 
households with access to electricity relative to the total number of households. This 
ratio is important for measuring the extent to which people have benefited from the 
development, that is, electricity. As discussed previously, PLN only issues annual 
statistics without the total number of households. Therefore, the electrification ratio 
is calculated based on two different sources: (i) the number of households with access 
to electricity as the nominator is recorded by PLN as its customers and the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) for non-PLN customers38; and (ii) the total 
number of households as the denominator is recorded by the BPS based on the family 
card. In this chapter, we only focus on electrified households based on PLN data 
 
38 These electrified households are part of rural electrification program under Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources.  
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because the share of non-PLN electrified households is less than 5 per cent of the total 
number of electrified households.  
Electrified households are recorded by PLN based on the number of meters 
installed at the customer’s house – one meter is counted as one household customer. 
There are two potential measurement issues. First, in rural areas where several 
families live in one house, the electrification ratio measured could be lower than the 
effective ratio. For instance, the electrification ratio calculated by PLN is 56.3 per cent 
while the author’s calculation using the BPS data results in a ratio of 58.5 per cent.39  
Second, in the big cities like Jakarta, where housing is also available in the 
form of apartments or flats, pavilions (part of a main house that can be rented) and 
rental rooms inside a house (kos-kosan), the name of the owner of those properties 
could be the same as the name of the PLN customer who lives in the rental property 
where the individual meter is installed. Thus, the effective number of PLN household 
customers will be larger than the number of actual households because an owner’s 
name could be registered for several meters.  
During our data collection, we could not find the PLN statistics from 1984 to 
1988, even when we searched the archives at the PLN headquarters in Jakarta. To fill 
in the missing values, we interpolate two groups: (i) 1984 to 1985, using data from 
1979 to 1983, and (ii) 1986 to 1988, using data from 1989–1999. After interpolating 
them, we consult PLN to check that the figures are reasonable. 
 
6.3 A Short History of Electricity Diffusion in Indonesia  
The supply and diffusion of electricity in Indonesia started in the period of Dutch 
colonization, and Jakarta was the earliest to benefit, in 1897 (Table 6.1). Other 
provinces with substantial economic activity, such as mining, sugar and tea factories, 
plantations, trading and so on, also started electrification in the early 1900s (McCawly 
1971). After independence, three main private Dutch electricity companies, namely 
Nederlandsch Indische Gasmaatschappij or the Netherland Indies Gas Company 
 
39 In several PLN statistics, we also find that the denominator for calculating the electrification 
ratio was three years behind while the nominator was calculated from the actual or current 
data, so the ratio might be too high compared with the effective one.  
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(NIGM), Gemeentelijk Electriciteitsbedrijf Bandoeng en Omstreken or the Municipal 
Electricity Works for Bandung and Surroundings (GEBEO) and Algemeene 
Nederlandsch-Indische Electriciteits-Maatschappij or the Netherlands Indies General 
Electricity Company (ANIEM), were nationalized by the Government of Indonesia in 
the early 1950s, but the process was fraught with difficulties. This tough transition 
was followed by political instability and hyperinflation in the 1960s. Together with a 
lack of funds, engineers and qualified management, it resulted in PLN running the 
electricity company with poor operating conditions and a lack of expansion 
possibilities (McCawly 1971). After several organizational changes, PLN became the 
only state-owned electricity company that was responsible for connecting people 
throughout Indonesia from 1972 onwards.40 Therefore, the available PLN data that 
we can collect reach back to 1975. 
If we look at the area coverage of electricity (the third column of Table 6.1), 
about 75 per cent of districts in Indonesia were already connected prior to 1970. 
However, the electrification ratio after 4 decades was only 83 per cent in 2018. This 
suggests that the electrification ratio prior to the 1970s was very low and electricity 
connections were concentrated in a few areas only. In Figure 6.1, we show the 
variation in the electrification ratios across provinces. It can be seen that only a few 
people in particular provinces had access to electricity in 1975 (Panel A) and that this 




40 On 27 October 1945, Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, established Jawatan Listrik 
dan Gas (the gas and electricity company) under the Ministry of Public Works and Power 
with an installed capacity of 157.5 MW. In the period from 1 January 1961 until 1 January 
1965, this electricity company was changed into Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan Listrik 
Negara or the General Leader Agency PLN (BPU-PLN) and its capacity almost doubled to 
almost 300 MW. In 1972, the Government of Indonesia issued a Government Regulation, 
which stated that PLN was the only company to serve electricity throughout Indonesia. Since 
1994, PLN has been a state-owned company and it operates under the Ministry of State 
Owned Companies and is supported by the Ministry of Mining and Energy.  
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Table 6.1 Electrification in Indonesia 
Province Name First Time Electrified 
Percentage of Districts Electrified 
Prior to 1970*    
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 1900 96 
North Sumatera  1899 79 
West Sumatera  1900 100 
Riau 1900 100 
Jambi 1900 82 
South Sumatera  1920 53 
Bengkulu 1911 20 
Lampung 1899 27 
Bangka Belitung Islands 1917 43 
Riau Islands 1900 100 
Jakarta 1897 83 
West Java 1900 100 
Central Java 1902 63 
Yogyakarta 1906 100 
East Java 1899 100 
Banten 1901 88 
Bali 1950 33 
West Nusatenggara  1916 60 
East Nusatenggara  1900 14 
West Kalimantan  1921 100 
Central Kalimantan  1899 93 
South Kalimantan  1899 100 
East Kalimantan  1900 60 
North Sulawesi  1901 100 
Central Sulawesi  1900 100 
South Sulawesi  1921 83 
Southeast Sulawesi  1950 79 
Gorontalo 1905 100 
West Sulawesi  1950 83 
Maluku 1903 45 
North Maluku   1900 100 
West Papua  1900 54 
Papua 1900 45 
Indonesia 1897 75 
Source: McCawly (1971), PT PLN (1995), author’s calculation from the PLN database. 
* This column is calculated based on the first time electricity was available, recorded by PLN in the 
particular district, regardless of the number of connections. As a consequence, a district is counted as 
an electrified district even if there is only one customer or one electric pole. 
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Figure 6.1 Electrification Ratio in Indonesia in 1975 and 2018  
based on PLN Regions 
 
Source: PLN, produced by the authors. 
 
PLN expanded steadily after the 1970s, then began to accelerate after 2010, as is 
apparent in the increasing electrification ratio as well as the installed capacity, as 
shown in Figure 6.2. However, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 contributed to some 
delays in the electrification programme, as we can see in the slowing down of the 
capacity expansion and the substantially smaller electrification ratio between 1998 
and 2010. During the crisis, many infrastructure projects, including private power 
plants, were postponed while, at the same time, PLN encountered financial difficulties 
and a lack of investment funds (Sambodo 2016).41 After some renegotiation and 
 
41 As discussed by Sambodo (2016), in the 1990s, domestic money to finance investments in 
the power sector was limited, while borrowing money from international institutions was 
flexible. Therefore, PLN preferred to obtain long-term loans in foreign currencies as a source 
of financing. Moreover, to accelerate the electrification programme, PLN signed 26 power 
purchase agreements (PPA) with private investors to develop power generation. However, the 
economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997/1998 caused PLN to suffer not only from huge 
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rescheduling with the investors, PLN has gradually increased its capacity since 2005 
and intensified it from 2010 onwards through fast-track programmes followed by 
Jokowi’s 35,000 MW programme. As a result, the electrification ratio has also 
increased slightly. This acceleration programme also includes rural electrification in 
433 villages located in Eastern Indonesia, where villages have remained completely 
dark until now (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 2020).  
 
Figure 6.2 Electrification Ratio and Per Capita Installed Capacity in Indonesia, 
1975–2018 
 
Source: PLN statistics, calculated by the authors. 
 
Interestingly, the huge expansion of the national electricity generation capacity did 
not substantially change the spatial distribution of this capacity. The share of islands 
in the national capacity has remained roughly the same over time, that is, Java–Bali 
with the largest share (70 per cent) followed by Sumatera with 20 per cent, Kalimantan 
and Sulawesi with around 6 per cent and the Eastern islands with around 3 per cent.  
 
operating losses due to currency depreciation and very high interest rates but also from an 
international arbitration lawsuit that forced it to pay a penalty for postponed or cancelled 
contracts of PPAs. These financial problems lasted for 6 years after the crisis.  
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Figure 6.3 Actual Electrification Ratio of All Provinces in Indonesia, 1975–2018 
 
Source: PLN statistics, calculated by the authors. 
Note: Jakarta excludes the Seribu Island district in the electrification ratio calculation. 
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Using our new dataset, we can calculate that, on average, the electrification ratio in 
Indonesia increased at 6 per cent per year from 6 per cent in 1975 to 83 per cent in 
2018. However, this ratio varies across provinces and its average is 45 per cent (Table 
6.3). Only Jakarta (excluding the Seribu Islands district) has reached a 100 per cent 
electrification ratio since 2008, followed by Bangka Belitung Island in 2017, while 
the three lowest electrification ratios in 2018 are found in Papua, Jambi and East 
Nusatenggara with corresponding figures of 35 per cent, 47 per cent and 55 per cent, 
respectively (Figure 6.3). 
Table 6.2 shows how fast electricity has diffused across provinces since 1975. 
For instance, only two provinces achieved at least 10 per cent access to electricity in 
1975 and at least 50 per cent in 1990, and only one province was fully electrified in 
2010. Both Bali and Jakarta provinces achieved at least a 50 per cent electrification 
ratio in 1986, while Jakarta and Bangka Belitung were fully electrified in 2008 and 
2017, respectively. It appears that Bali is not as fast as Bangka Belitung in reaching 
full electrification as Bali only achieved 93.3 per cent in 2018. 
 
Table 6.2 Number of Provinces Achieving the Minimum Electrification Ratio, 
1975–2018 
Year Minimum Electrification Ratio 
 ≥10% ≥25% ≥50% ≥75% 100% 
1975 2 0 0 0 0 
1980 6 1 0 0 0 
1985 14 5 0 0 0 
1990 25 13 2 0 0 
1995 26 21 2 1 0 
2000 31 29 15 1 0 
2005 32 31 16 1 0 
2010 33 33 23 3 1 
2015 33 33 31 19 1 
2018 33 33 31 25 2       
Source: PLN statistics, calculated by the authors. 
 
The electrification trend began to accelerate in 2000; at least half of the households in 
15 provinces were connected to the electricity grid in 2000 and at least 75 per cent 
electrification was achieved by 19 provinces in 2015. This relatively quick diffusion 
is due to the national programme to accelerate electrification, that is, the fast-track 
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programmes followed by the 35,000 MW programme. If we set the minimum 
electrification ratio as 10 per cent, most of the provinces reached this threshold in the 
1990s. It seems that the minimum of 10 per cent electrification acted as a threshold 
from which to take off to achieve sustained connection. Further discussion will be 
presented in the next section.   
 
6.4 Empirical Strategy and Data Description 
6.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
Our data show the non-linear pattern of the electrification ratio throughout Indonesia 
(Figure 6.3). The diffusion electricity process follows an S-curve, as discussed by 
Comin et al. (2012). In this chapter, we define the diffusion of electricity St as the 
share of electrified households in the total households; hence, the value of S is 
between 0 and 1 or between 0 and 100 on the percentage scale. The diffusion of 
electricity (Sti) at time t for province i depends on the slope βi of several factors (Xi), 
as presented in equation (6.1). Parameter βi determines the speed of the parameter 
switches due to variations in Xi. As we discussed earlier, each province started 
electrification differently, so the diffusion pattern is non-linear. We assume that the 
diffusion process can be described by a continuous logistic function between 0 and 1, 
given by42: 
  (6.1) 
 
where Sti denotes the diffusion of electricity and the Xi’s refer to the same set of 
explanatory variables, which are measured in logs whenever the variables are not the 
share or the percentage. Therefore, we apply a non-linear least square estimation for 
parameter βi, which determines the speed of the diffusion process within the S-curve 
framework of access to electricity (Stoneman 2002). 
 
 
42 We use this simple equation following Lankhuizen et al. (2011). 
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Figure 6.5 describes how electricity diffuses in a hypothetical province. We adopt the 
typical diffusion of technology curve to explain electrification in Indonesia. In brief, 
the electricity connection is very low and increases slowly in the early period (stage 
1), then it becomes accessible more quickly as time passes, known as the take-off 
period (stage 2). The last stage occurs when the electricity connection reaches 100 per 
cent and the speed remains the same (stage 3).  
Thus, our questions include the following: what is the global pattern of 
electricity adoption in Indonesia, how is it underpinned by regional- and national-
level processes, which provinces adopted electricity first and do the latecomers catch 
up with them? To answer these questions with regard to the electrification ratio in 
Indonesia, we define the concept of “electricity take-off”, which occurs when the 
share of electrified households reaches at least 10 per cent of the total households and 
marks the transition to a sustained connection. Our actual data show that only two 
provinces reached an electrification ratio of at least 10 per cent in 1975, fourteen 
provinces in 1985 and all provinces in 2010 (Table 6.2). Due to a common pattern of 
new technology deployment, the so-called “S-curve” (Stoneman 2002), the take-off 
time can largely explain the subsequent growth of electrification. In the Indonesian 
context, the story of electricity uptake provides lessons for regional disparity 
















Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
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Given the limited data across provinces in Indonesia, our hypotheses are as 
follows: the electricity diffusion process, presented as the electrification ratio in 
province i in year t (electratioit), correlates with internal factors or province 
characteristics i in year t, such as economic activities measured in per capita GDP 
(log_gdpcapit), population density (log_popdensit), geographic structure measured as 
the number of people per island within one province (log_isldistit) and share of 
households living in flat areas (pct_hhflatit) as well as the firm density defined as the 
number of firms per 1000 population (firmdensit). Provinces with more economic 
activities, more densely populated areas, a less scattered population living across 
islands, more people living in flatter areas and more firms operating are expected to 
have a positive correlation with the electricity diffusion.  
We also expect the diffusion process to correlate positively with the power 
supply as an external factor. To electrify an island area, PLN has to build an island-
specific infrastructure, including generation capacity transmission lines and 
distribution sub-stations; Indonesia comprises a series of  autonomous self-contained 
electricity systems, as the islands are not connected in terms of electricity 
infrastructure (except for Java-Bali). Hence, cross-island differences in the timing of 
the arrival of power supply (i.e. investment in the first power plant by PLN) is in this 
context an obvious determinant of cross-islands speeds in the speed of electricity  
diffusion; after all PLN did not install firt-time electricity generation capacity in the 
same year across all islands. We use PLN’s definition of the electricity supply, namely 
installed capacity as the capacity of one generating unit as written on the generator’s 
plate or prime mover. In this chapter, we calculate the per capita installed capacity in 
watts (log_watcapit) as our control variable. A detailed description of the calculation 
of the installed capacity can be found in section 6.2.  
Following the discussion of Figure 6.4, each province has a different speed of 
diffusion; therefore, we include time (timeit) as our independent variable to capture 
time variation in the diffusion process. Thus, our specification to estimate the 
electrification ratio with pooled regression is presentedn in equation (6.2). In this 
model, there are two main dimensions of the diffusion process, that is, cross-sectional 
variation and time variation. We are interested in understanding which is the typical 
province that first adopted electricity and how long it took to reach a certain 
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electrification ratio. Further, we translate the non-linear least square regression 
outcomes into the β parameter in the S-curve. By plugging the estimated βi into our 
sample, we obtain the estimated electrification ratio to produce an S-curve over time 
for each province. 
 
electratioit = 1 / (1 + exp(–1· (β0 + β1· log_gdpcapit + β2· log_popdensit  
+ β3· log_isldistit + β4· pct_hhflatit + β5· timeit  
+ β6· firmdensit + β7· log_watcapit))) + εit         (6.2) 
 
To smooth out the short-term fluctuations in our dataset, we use five-year moving 
averages; that is, we take two years in the past and two years ahead because these 
factors in the expectation and we assume that people at time t have an expectation that 
materializes two years ahead. This strategy helps us to eliminate the odd pattern of 
the predicted electrification ratio. 
In our next discussion, we perform a simulation using two thresholds of 
electrification rate, that is, 50 per cent as the mid-point of the S-curve and 25 per cent 
as an arbitrary level of the electrification ratio above the take-off level of at least 10 
per cent. As a benchmark, we use Jakarta’s characteristics in our simulations because 
Jakarta (excluding Seribu Island district) is the most and the earliest developed 
province, where its electrification ratio reached 100 per cent in 2008. Hence, we 
calculate how long province i took to reach its electrification ratios of at least 50 per 
cent and 25 per cent, respectively, by comparing the predicted pattern of provinces 
with the hypothetical pattern if the provinces add the power supply of Jakarta. Then, 
we can decompose the gap to derive the predicted path by adding the per capita GDP, 
landscape and population density of Jakarta one by one to see which part of the gap 
is contributed by internal and external factors. We argue that provinces located in 
Eastern Indonesia need a longer time to reach those thresholds, mostly due to island 
barriers. 
Our unit of analysis is the province level, so we aggregate all the variables to 
the province level. We use pooled data from 1975 to 2018 for 33 provinces, including 
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7 new provinces following the BPS classification43 and 5 islands, namely Sumatera, 
Java–Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Eastern islands. The latter consist of one big 
island and numerous small islands, specifically East Nusatenggara, West 
Nusatenggara, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and West Papua.  
In our regression framework, we estimate the electrification ratio – i.e. the 
percentage of electrified households to the total number of households – as function 
of a set of explanatory variables: per capita GRDP, population density, geography and 
landscape, and per capita capacity (watt), to capture the power supply of electricity. 
We use the geography and landscape variables to see how these natural conditions 
correlate with the diffusion of electricity in an archipelagic country like Indonesia. 
The geography variable is calculated as the average distribution of people per island 
in each province, while the landscape variable is calculated as the average percentage 
of households living in the flat areas in each village and then aggregated from the 
village to the province level.  
 
6.4.2 Data Description 
Our electricity data mainly originate from various statistics sources by PLN, as 
described in section 6.2, supplemented with data from BPS. However, aggregating 
data at the province level for long time series is challenging. The choice of variables 
is subject to the data availability at the province level for the last 44 years. The 
variables per capita GRDP and population density from 1975 to 2018 are drawn from 
various editions of Statistics Indonesia and Provinces in Figures, and geography and 
landscape are taken from Podes (village potential) 1986–2018. We assume that the 
number of islands per province and the percentage of villages located in flat areas has 
 
43 Aceh, North Sumatera, West Sumatera, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatera, Bengkulu, Lampung, 
Bangka Belitung Islands (a new province splitting from South Sumatera in 1999), Riau 
Islands (a new province splitting from Riau in 2002), Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, 
Jogjakarta, East Java, Banten (a new province splitting from West Java in 1999), Bali, West 
Nusatenggara, East Nusatenggara, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, 
East Kalimantan (including the new province North Kalimantan, established in 2014), North 
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Gorontalo (a new province 
splitting from North Sulawesi in 1999), West Sulawesi (a new province splitting from South 
Sulawesi in 2004), Maluku, North Maluku (a new province splitting from Maluku in 1999), 
West Papua (a new province splitting from Papua in 2003) and Papua. 
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not changed much during the last 10 years, so we interpolate the missing data for 
geography and landscape from 1975 to 1985. The per capita capacity (watt) at the 
province level is calculated from the installed capacity of the PLN statistics 1975–
2018, which we weight by the population (see section 6.2 for a detailed explanation). 
Among the explanatory variables, population density has the highest variation, 
followed by per capita installed capacity (Table 6.3). This suggests that people living 
in scattered areas, mostly inhabited by poor communities, in line with the distribution 
of people per island and the variation in capacity, could explain the difficulties in 
connecting electricity throughout Indonesia, especially in rural areas. Barnes (2007) 
associated rural electrification with a lower number of connections per kilometre of 
line, which leads to high capital and operating costs, a low level of consumption due 
to poor consumers, the lack of an industrial load, a heterogeneous landscape, a lack 
of motivation for private investors and interventions from politicians insisting on 
favoured constituents. Table 6.4 shows that all the explanatory variables are 
statistically correlated with the electrification ratio. Among those variables, per capita 
installed capacity has the highest correlation, followed by per capita GDP and 
population density. This table also indicates that there is no multicollinearity as none 
of explanatory variables are strongly correlated with each other. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics: Key Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.       
Electrification Ratio 1125 0.45 0.24 0.01 1 
Per Capita GDP (in Million Rupiah) 1282 7.66 8.8 0.18 54.3 
Population Density 1286 648.8 2,280 3.3 15,589 
People Distribution per Island (in Thousands) 1286 43.44 62.82 0.3 366 
Share of Households Living in Flat Areas 1257 0.66 0.19 0.09 1 
Firm Density 1286 0.06 0.05              0.00   0.3 
Per Capita Installed Capacity (in Watts) 1286 76.88 73.17 2.85 650.07 
      
Log per Capita GDP 1282 15.42 0.9 12.1 17.81 
Log Population Density 1286 4.67 1.66 1.19 9.65 
Log People Distribution 1286 9.58 1.66 5.71 12.81 
Log per Capita Installed Capacity 1286 3.96 0.94 1.05 6.48 
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Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix: Key Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Electrification Ratio 1       
2. Per Capita GDP (in Million 
Rupiah) 0.39* 1      
3. Population Density 0.32* 0.41* 1     
4. People Distribution per Island (in 
Thousands) 0.09* –0.12* 0.09* 1    
5. Share of Households Living in 
Flat Areas 0.29* 0.11* 0.29* 0.19* 1   
6. Firm Density 0.31* 0.29* 0.61* 0.38* 0.27* 1  
7. Per Capita Installed Capacity (in 
Watts) 0.68* 0.16* 0.15* 0.27* 0.25* 0.35* 1 
        
Note: * p<0.01. 
 
6.5 Estimating the Diffusion Patterns  
This section presents the econometric results to identify the relative contribution of 
the different factors in driving the diffusion speed of electricity in the context of the 
S-curve i.e. level of the economy, population, geographical barriers, landscape, firm 
density, time and installed capacity of power supply. As previously noted, the latter 
can be considered as an exogenous factor in this context because it essentially captures 
cross-island differences in the timing of the arrival of power supply (i.e. investment 
in the first power plant by PLN). The island structure defines the electricity system of 
Indonesia as a series of autonomous systems (the main islands are not connected in 
terms electricity infrastructure), the first year of investment in power supply by PLN 
differs across islands and the investment size was obviously not driven by actual 
electricity demand.  
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Table 6.5 Identification of the Relative Contribution of Several Potential 
Determinants of the Speed of Electricity Diffusion 
Variable 
(1) 
Expected Sign of β  
(2) 
Operational Variable  
(3) 
Predicted  β 
(4) 
Dependent Variable    
electrification ratio  electratio  
    
log per capita GDP + lgdpcap 0.112*** 
   (0.02) 
log population density + lpopdens 0.180*** 
   (0.02) 
log island distribution – lisl_distr –0.159*** 
   (0.01) 
share pop in flat area + pct_hhflat 0.429*** 
   (0.09) 
time + time 0.0457*** 
   (0.002) 
firm density + firmdens 0.176 
   (0.60) 
log per capita capacity  + lw_watcap 0.717*** 
   (0.04) 
Constant   –5.715*** 




Observations   1,112 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Our results show that an increasing per capita GDP, higher population density, less 
scattered population living across islands, larger share of households living in flat 
areas, higher firm density and higher per capita capacity will speed up the diffusion 
of electricity. These coefficients are statistically significant except for firm density 
(Table 6.5). The latter result might be due to the fact that firms’ location is 
concentrated only in a few areas within provinces; many big factories have their own 
generators to ensure that they can operate uninterruptedly, so the concentration of 
firms is not statistically significant in the relationship with electrification ratio. This 
implies that connecting people involves more pressure than providing electricity to 
firms. 
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Table 6.6 Marginal Effects of he Determinants of the Speed of Electricity Diffusion  
Variable Marginal Effect 
log per capita GDP 0.0217*** 
 (0.005) 
log population density 0.0349*** 
 (0.003) 
log island distribution –0.0308*** 
 (0.002) 




firm density 0.0341 
 (0.12) 
log per capita capacity  0.1390*** 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The magnitude of the respective variables’ correlation with the electricity ratio is 
reported in Table 6.6. As expected, the installed capacity of power supply at an island 
is an important driver of the speed up of electricity diffusion. If we increase the 
installed capacity per capita by 1 watt, then we expect the share of electrified 
households to increase by 0.139 percentage points. Since the electricity supply is an 
autonomous self-contained system on each island, and the timing of investments in 
installed power supply capacity by PLN differs across islands, this suggests that the 
geographic island barrier is a main determinant of the (lack of) speed of electricity 
diffusion. Our analysis also shows that the geographic structure, as presented by the 
share of the population living in flat areas, contributes to speeding up the electricity 
diffusion process. Comin et al. (2012) suggested that geography plays a significant 
role in determining technology diffusion across countries. For instance, to increase 
the electrification ratio, off-grid technologies have been successfully supplemented in 
the on-grid programme in remote areas in Bangladesh (Rahman et al. 2013), in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Dagnachew et al. 2017) and in China (Bhattacharyya and Ohiare 
2012). 
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 Indonesia has a high variation in population density, ranging from 3.3 to 
15,589 people per square kilometre (Table 6.3). Our results show that, if the 
population density increases by 1 point, we expect the electrification ratio to rise by 
0.035 percentage points. Time also contributes to speed up the electrification. For 
every additional 10 years, the electrification ratio increases by 0.089 percentage 
points. This could explain why the provinces in Java and on other islands that have 
already been connected since the early 1900s also experience a higher electrification 
ratio. 
 If we look at the diffusion pattern at the province level for the last 44 years, 
the electrification ratio tends to increase at different rates. As the electrification ratio 
is calculated from the number of households subscribing to PLN, the predicted 
connections could only increase in this research (Figure 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5 Predicted Electrification Ratio All Provinces, 1975–2018 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
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Our results show that Jakarta, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali reached 
the minimum of 50 per cent electrification around the mid-1990s, while Papua, East 
Nusatenggara, Central Kalimantan, Maluku and Jambi reached that threshold in 2010 
or later. This is a similar pattern to the first provinces, which achieved the minimum 
25 per cent access around the mid-1980s, but some provinces seem to have been very 
slow and found it hard to catch up with others, namely Bengkulu and Jambi in the 
early 1990s, Central Kalimantan and East Nusatenggara around the mid-1990s and 
Papua in 2000. Details of the predicted time to reach the minimum 50 per cent and 25 
per cent electrification ratios in each province are presented in Table 6.8 and Table 
6.9. 
However, if we compare the predicted with the actual patterns, which show 
some spikes in particular provinces and years, Figure 6.6 reveals the problem in our 
data. First, after decentralization, several provinces opted to split from their parent 
provinces. Those new provinces are Bangka Belitung islands splitting from South 
Sumatera, Banten from West Java, Gorontalo from North Sulawesi and West Papua 
from Papua.44 This change, however, cannot be automatically responded to by PLN 
because PLN has its own regional system to record its customers. As a consequence, 
some fluctuations occurred in the transition period.  
Second, the PLN regional coverage crossed several provinces, suggesting that 
we should apply a pragmatic strategy to calculate individual provinces, as discussed 
previously in section 6.2. For instance, West Sumatera and South Sumatera show that 
their actual patterns have been slightly higher than the predicted ones since the early 
years. This gap might be due to the PLN regional classification, which recorded West 
Sumatera as Region III, which also included Riau and Riau island provinces, and 
South Sumatera as Region IV, which covered South Sumatera, Bangka Belitung, 
Jambi, Lampung and Bengkulu provinces. Consequently, the actual electrification 
 
44 The actual electrification ratio of Papua dropped in 2013 due to the termination of the rural 
electrification programme for Eastern Indonesia. This programme was initiated by the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) and collaborated with banks. The 
households who received a connection had to pay their monthly installment collectively or 
directly to the cooperatives, then the cooperatives channelled this instalment to the banks. 
However, this mechanism was not sustainable because many households could not pay 
regularly; hence, the banks were threatened by increasing non-performing loans. An increase 
in access to electricity from 2014 onwards is due to the national programme of acceleration 
electrification (fast-track programme). 
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ratio of West Sumatera and South Sumatera could be slightly overvalued. Another 
possible explanation is the model specification, which could not capture unobservable 
variables, such as the centre of activities during colonialization, development stages, 
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Figure 6.6 Predicted and Actual Diffusion of Electricity Pattern for Selected 
Provinces, 1975–2018 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation 
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6.6 Drivers of Diffusion Patterns  
This section discusses how fast the provinces increase their electrification ratio if we 
conduct a simulation using Jakarta’s characteristics, that is, the power supply, per 
capita GDP, landscape and population density. We apply two scenarios: (i) at least 50 
per cent and (ii) at least 25 per cent access to electricity for all provinces. At the island 
level, we calculate the average time across provinces within islands to reach those 
thresholds. For instance, if provinces in the Eastern islands have all of Jakarta’s 
characteristics, they would reach the threshold of 50 per cent access to electricity more 
quickly. On average, they reach it 26 years faster than the provinces on other islands. 
Among other factors, the supply availability as in Jakarta contributes 45 per cent 
followed by the population density, per capita GDP and landscape of Jakarta, with the 
corresponding figures of 34 per cent, 12 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively, to 
accelerate the access in the Eastern islands (Table 6.7).  
The same pattern is also apparent for the second simulation with at least 25 
per cent electrification. This suggests that the availability of the power supply varies 
across islands and represents an island barrier in slowing down the diffusion process, 
especially in the Eastern islands. The slow diffusion of electricity in the Eastern 
islands is in line with the findings of Comin et al. (2012). They concluded that 
technology diffuses more slowly to locations that are farther away from the adoption 
leaders. As we can see from the map (Figure 6.1), the Eastern islands are much farther 
away from the Java islands as the adoption leader. 
Sinaga et al. (2019) identified five key barriers to electrifying Eastern 
Indonesia, namely: (i) difficulties in reaching the location and its geographical 
conditions, (ii) poor inter-sectoral coordination, (iii) a lack of government funding, 
(iv) difficulties in land acquisition and (v) inadequacy in equipment, material and 
human resources. Moreover, they found that the lack of road and bridge infrastructure, 
the long time required to obtain permits and social resistance from the community 
exacerbate the existing initial barriers in the system. To overcome these barriers, inter-
sectoral coordination among ministries in association with the local government and 
the community leaders is required. 
Other islands show a different pattern whereby the population density plays a 
more important role in reaching at least 25 per cent electricity access compared with 
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the first threshold of at least a 50 per cent electrification ratio. It seems that the 
population density becomes the main consideration to electrify provinces with a very 
low electrification ratio. 
 
Table 6.7 Average Time Required and Its Decomposition to Accelerate 50 Per Cent 
and 25 Per Cent Electricity Access by Islands 
  
Average Time Acceleration 
(Years)  
Decomposition of Average Time 
Acceleration 
  












At Least 50% Access       
Sumatera 18 10 9 6  47% 7% 16% 31% 
Java Bali 7 3 2 0  64% 11% 25% 0% 
Kalimantan 19 8 6 5  54% 12% 7% 26% 
Sulawesi 21 13 11 9  38% 9% 9% 44% 
Eastern 26 17 15 12  34% 9% 12% 45% 
          
At Least 25% Access        
Sumatera 11 4 3 2  61% 9% 13% 17% 
Java Bali 5 2 2 0  65% 4% 31% 0% 
Kalimantan 13 4 3 2  71% 4% 8% 18% 
Sulawesi 12 5 5 4  60% 0% 9% 32% 
Eastern 18 11 10 8  42% 5% 8% 44% 
           
Note: Authors’ calculation from Table 6.8 and Table 6.9. 
Sim1 (with supply of Jakarta), Sim2 (with supply and per capita GDP of Jakarta), Sim3 (with supply, 
per capita GDP and landscape of Jakarta) and Sim4 (with supply, per capita GDP, landscape and 
population density of Jakarta). 
 
At the province level, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 present two simulation results as well 
as the factor decomposition in contributing to the gap. Figure 6.7 describes the gap 
from each simulation for selected provinces representing each island. For instance, 
Papua, located in the Eastern islands, shows the largest gap in Simulation 4 (using all 
Jakarta’s characteristics) in reaching the thresholds of all the provinces. It would reach 
the minimum 50 per cent of electricity access 30 years faster if it had all Jakarta’s 
characteristics. If we simulate Papua using only the power supply of Jakarta 
(Simulation 1), the power supply and per capita GDP of Jakarta (Simulation 2) or the 
power supply, per capita GDP and landscape of Jakarta (Simulation 3), then Papua 
will take 10, 13 and 17 years faster to reach the threshold of having at least half of its 
households electrified (Table 6.8). For the second scenario, Papua will take 9, 11, 13 
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and 23 years faster if we apply Simulations 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, to reach at least 
25 per cent access (Table 6.9). In contrast, West Java, as part of Java Island, where 
the power supply system is the same as that of Jakarta and which has been electrified 
since 1900, shows the smallest gap in our simulation (Figure 6.7). To reach at least 
50 per cent electrification, West Java will take 7, 3 and 2 years faster if we apply 
Simulation 4, Simulation 3 and Simulation 2, respectively. The population density 
contributes 57 per cent to speeding up the accessibility (Table 6.8). 
From these simulations, it appears that the population density as an internal 
factor and the power supply availability as an external factor mainly contribute to 
speeding up the electrification ratio in most provinces. A different pattern is shown in 
the provinces located in the Eastern islands, where the availability of the power supply 
as in Jakarta becomes the first factor to speed up the access to electricity to at least 50 
per cent. Provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia, that is, Sulawesi (except North 
Sulawesi), Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua islands, will reach the minimum 50 per 
cent electrification 10 to 14 years faster if they are supplied as Jakarta’s capacity. 
However, this is not the case when the minimum threshold is 25 per cent 
electrification, whereby those provinces will take a shorter time of less than 10 years. 
These results suggest that the availability of the power supply could be translated into 
an island barrier due to an autonomous self-contained electricity system, and the 
availability of the supply is more important when the population density has reached 
a sufficient number to access electricity.  
Moreover, our findings imply that the heterogeneity at the province level 
contributes to shaping the diffusion pattern. Connecting the last unserved populations 
is more challenging than past electrification efforts, especially as many of them live 
in remote areas where there is no transmission and distribution line. The investment 
cost per customer in this typical area outside Java island is very expensive up to 
$10,000 while it costs about $700 and $100 in non-remote areas outside Java and in 
Java island, respectively (PLN 2017). As of 31 December 2019, about 79,041 villages 
or 94.2 per cent of the total villages, including those in remote areas, have been 
electrified through the Rural Electrification Programme. The remaining non-
electrified villages consist of 325 in Papua, 102 in West Papua, 5 in East Nusatenggara 
and 1 in Maluku (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 2020). For small islands 
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in developing countries, Surroop et al. (2018) found that the inability to extend grids, 
high upfront costs for rural electrification, inadequate policy mechanism, limited 
knowledge base and continued high dependence on energy imports are the main 
problems in energy access. 
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Figure 6.7 Simulations to Reach Electrification Ratios of  
at Least 50 Per Cent and 25 Per Cent 
 
Note: Simulation 1 (with the supply of Jakarta), Simulation 2 (with the supply and per capita GDP of 
Jakarta), Simulation 3 (with the supply, per capita GDP and landscape of Jakarta) and Simulation 4 
(with the supply, per capita GDP, landscape and population density of Jakarta). 
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6.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The disparity in access to electricity and its supply is high across Indonesia. Despite 
the fact that electrification started in the early 1900s and is today nearly 100% in paet 
of country, more than one hundred years later, the electrification ratio in some regions 
in Indonesia is still low and the speed of electricity technology diffusion slow. What 
drives this inequality in diffusion of access to electricity across time and space? Of 
course, Indonesia’s particular geography shaped by its archipelagic nature implies that 
the country needs huge investments to build new lines to bring electricity to people 
on the different islands, making the up-front costs of electrification especially very 
high. Unlike the situation in non-archipelagic countries, new connections across space 
can often not be provided by extending existing lines – the different islands are in fact 
autonomous self-contained electricity systems. How important is this geographic 
feature in explaining spatial variation in the speed of electrification over time?  
To answer this question, we first had to construct a dataset with information 
on electricity access a across time and space on the basis of unpublished statistics kept 
by PLN, Indonesia’s national electricity utility company. We complemented our 
dataset with information on per capita GDP, population density, firm density, 
landscape complexity (measured as the share of households living in flat areas) and 
per capita installed electricity generation capacity across provinces and islands. Using 
this rich dataset, we then developed a non-linear least square estimation to estimate 
the speed of the diffusion process within an S-curve framework of access to 
electricity. To this aim, we regress the electrification ratio in various provinces over 
time on a set of explanatory variables. Next, we translated the non-linear least square 
regression outcomes into the β parameter that defines the speed of diffusion in the S-
curve framework. By plugging the estimated βi into our sample, we obtain the 
predicted electrification ratios for each province in terms of an S-curve over time. 
Finally, we calculate for each province the gap between its own electrification 
performance and that of the leading island (Java-Bali) and use our regression 
outcomes to decompose this gap into the respective contribution of the driving forces 
of electrification mentioned above, which differ across space.    
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Our main findings are as follows. The relatively fast electricity diffusion 
process in the provinces located at the Java–Bali islands is mainly driven by their 
relatively high population density as well as the power supply availability. In contrast, 
the provinces on the Eastern islands have difficulties in catching up to the 
electrification levels in other provinces. We find that lack of power supply facilities 
is the main factor that explains the delay in electrification at the Eastern while the 
population density plays an important role to explain slower electrification patterns at 
Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi islands. Since the spatial variation in power 
supply availability is of course shaped by the geographical constraints inherent to 
Indonesia’s island structure, our results imply that spatial heterogeneity at the 
province level contributes substantially to shaping the diffusion pattern.  
These findings suggest that, in order to speed up the electrification ratio the 
Indonesian government may need to consider different policy instruments to stimulate 
the electricity diffusion across the islands that are underserved sofar. For instance one 
can think of a fiscal incentive that stimulates the use of small stand-alone generators 
in remote areas or on small islands in the Eastern islands, strengthening the 
transmission line infrastructure between large islands, namely Sumatera, Kalimantan 
and Sulawesi, and regulations to improve the quality of the electricity on Java–Bali 
islands or in areas where access is much higher than on other islands. 
Understanding the role of regional interconnections across provinces is a first 
prerequisite to improve the accessibility of electricity. We suggest that future research 
in this area for Indonesia focusses on the question whether people with an electricity 
connection can actually afford to use the energy that they really need, how they benefit 
from the electricity and so on. Further, it remains interesting to modify and implement 
our model at the district or the village level to understand the variation in the diffusion 
pattern at the lower level of aggregation as the second avenue for future research.  
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Appendix A6 – Constructing the Electricity Dataset 
 
A.6.1. Dynamics of PLN’s Business Units 
In this section, we will discuss the practicalities and problems encountered in 
constructing electricity dataset from PLN statistics. As a state company and main 
electricity provider served customers throughout Indonesia, the structure of PLN’s 
organization is determined by the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises (MSOE), and 
the business units are established accordingly.  Prior to 2008, PLN did not have any 
regional directors, only a functional management. As a consequence, all the strategic 
decisions concerning the regions should be taken at the PLN headquarters in Jakarta. 
This of course affected the decision-making process. From 2008 onwards, the ministry 
added regional directors so that regional problems could be settled faster by the 
regional directors without waiting too long for decisions to be made at the 
headquarters in Jakarta.45 Given changing in organization structure and the needs to 
accommodate the electricity development, PLN frequently changes its business units 
that affect our data collection processes. 
Prior to 1981/1982, PLN had one Pembangkit (generation unit), two Kantor 
Distribusi (the distribution offices) in Jakarta and West Java and thirteen Kantor 
Wilayah (the regional offices), namely (1) Aceh, (2) North Sumatera, (3) West 
Sumatera, Riau and Riau Island, (4) South Sumatera, Jambi, Lampung, Bengkulu and 
Bangka Belitung, (5) West Kalimantan, (6) Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan 
and East Kalimantan, (7) North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and Gorontalo, (8) South 
Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and West Sulawesi, (9) Maluku and North Maluku, (10) 
Papua and West Papua, (11) Bali, West Nusatenggara and East Nusatenggara, (12) 
East Java and (13) Central Java. The last two regional offices have been altered to the 
distribution offices of East Java and Central Java since 1982/1983, so the number of 
PLN business units became 11 Kantor Wilayah and 4 Kantor Distribusi until 2001.  
 
45 The number of regional directors was amended based on PLN’s needs. For example, two 
regions distinguished from 2008 until 2015 expanded into seven regions from 2016 to 2019 
and were then merged back into the current four regions.  
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In addition, since 1982/1983, two generation units in Eastern and Western Java 
have been established, and since 1985 they have been integrated with their 
transmission units as Pembangkitan dan Penyaluran (Kitlur): generation and 
transmission in Eastern and Western Java. Moreover, PLN established two subsidiary 
companies, PT Pembangkit Jawa Bali (PT PJBI and PT PJB II), focusing on power 
generation in Java and Bali, in 1995. Since then, those generation units have been 
handed over as part of subsidiary companies while the transmission lines have been 
managed separately by Pusat Pengatur dan Penyaluran Beban (P3B) or the 
Transmission Load and Dispatch Centre Java Bali. Following Java–Bali 
interconnected system, PLN has operated this system in Sumatera since 2014 and built 
this system in Sulawesi and Kalimantan since 2018.  
PLN split its regional offices by establishing six new Kantor Wilayah and one 
Kantor Distribusi in 2002, namely the Kantor Wilayah Riau, Bangka Belitung, 
Lampung, East Kalimantan, East Nusatenggara and West Nusatenggara and the new 
Kantor Distribusi Bali. Furthermore, since 2012, Kantor Wilayah Lampung has been 
altered to Kantor Distribusi, and, since 2016, the Banten branch has split from the 
Kantor Distribusi West Java and established an independent Kantor Distribusi 
Banten; thus PLN currently has 15 Kantor Wilayah and 7 Kantor Distribusi. 
Table A6.1 describes the dynamics of PLN’s business units, which have been 
split into specialized and independent distribution, transmission and production units. 
The latter refers to the installed capacity that we use in this chapter. We apply the 
same names of Kantor Wilayah and Kantor Distribusi in both the connection and the 
installed capacity dataset. Table A6.1 also shows how the electricity data were 
recorded and stored in several PLN units. Therefore, the consistency in the annual 
PLN statistics needs to be taken into consideration.  
Further, PLN has established several new development units (IUPs) to respond 
to President Jokowi’s programme of 35,000 MW, which was launched in 2015. After 
the recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis, the former president of Indonesia Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) initiated two fast-track programmes (FTPs) aiming to 
accelerate the development of electricity; specifically, FTP I 10,000 MW commenced 
in 2006 to substitute diesel or fuel power plants for coal-fired power plants and FTP 
II 17,400 MW was launched in 2010 to increase the use of renewable power plants. 
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Almost 100 per cent of FTP I was completed, but only 28 per cent of FTP II 
materialized, which was then carried over to the 35,000 MW programme. To operate 
and manage the new completed power plants resulting from the FTPs, PLN formed 
Unit Pembangkitan Jawa Bali (UPJB) or generation unit Java–Bali in 2012 (Table 
A6.1). This unit was also responsible for handing over these power plants to PLN 
subsidiary companies (PT PJB and PT IP) in 2016, and it was dissolved afterwards. 
 
Table A6.1 Summary of Business Units Related to Customers and Production  
1975–2018* 
Period Number of Business 
Units Related to 
Customers (Connection) 






13 regions, 2 distributions, 1 generation (K) 
1982/1983 11 regions  
4 distributions 





11 regions, 4 distributions 
New units: generation of Eastern and Western Java 
1992–2001 11 regions 
4 distributions  
Batam (as a special 
region in 1993 and as 
a subsidiary 
company, PT PLN 
Batam, in 2000) 
11 regions, 4 distributions, generation of Eastern and 
Western Java 
New units:  
 Batam (as a special region in 1993 and as a subsidiary 
company, PT PLN Batam, in 2000)  
 Transmission Load and Dispatch Centre Java Bali or 
Pusat Pengatur dan Penyaluran Beban (P3B) to 
expand the former load dispatch centre (P2B)  
 Subsidiary generation company: 
o PT Pembangkit Jawa Bali I in 1995, which then 
changed to PT Indonesia Power (PT IP) in 2000  
o PT Pembangkit Jawa Bali II in 1995, which then 
changed to PT Pembangkit Jawa Bali (PT PJB) in 
2000  
 Generation of Northern and Southern Sumatera 
(1997) 
2002–2011 16 regions 
5 distributions 
PT PLN Batam 
16 regions, 5 distributions, PT PLN Batam, PT IP, PT 
PJB, generation of Northern and Southern Sumatera  
New units:  
 Subsidiary company PT PLN Tarakan (2004) 
 Power plants (Muara Tawar in 2005, Tanjung in Jati 
B 2006, Lontar Unit 1 in 2010, Indramayu Unit 1 in 
2011)   
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  Continued 
2012–2013 15 regions 
6 distributions 
PT PLN Batam 
PT PLN Tarakan 
15 regions, 6 distributions, PT PLN Batam, PT IP, PT 
PJB, generation of Northern and Southern Sumatera, 
PT PLN Tarakan, Muara Tawar, Tajung Jati B, 
Indramanyu Unit 1, Lontar Unit 1  
New units:  
 Unit Pembangkitan Jawa Bali (UPJB) or the 
generation unit of Jawa–Bali focused on managing 
and operating power plants under Fast Track 
Program (FTP) I, namely Indramayu Unit 2 and Unit 
3 (2012) and Lontar Unit 2 (2013) 
2014–2015 15 regions  
6 distributions 
PT PLN Batam 
PT PLN Tarakan 
15 regions, 6 distributions, PT PLN Batam, PT IP, PT 
PJB, generation Northern and Southern Sumatera, PT 
PLN Tarakan, Tanjung Jati B, UPJB (Indramayu and 
Lontar) 
New units:  
 Pusat Pengatur dan Penyaluran Beban (P3B) or 
Transmission Load Dispatch Centre Sumatera 
 Development Units (UIP) Eastern Kalimantan, 
Nusatenggara, Eastern Java and Bali (2014), Sumatera 
and Centre of Kalimantan (2015) 
2016–2018 15 regions  
7 distributions 
PT PLN Batam 
15 regions, 7 distributions, PT PLN Batam, PT IP, PT 
PJB, generation in Northern and Southern Sumatera, 
Tanjung Jati B, P3B Sumatera, P2B Jawa–Bali,  IUP 
(Eastern Java–Bali, Sumatera, Centre of Kalimantan, 
Eastern Kalimantan). PT PLN Tarakan was closed and 
merged back with Region East Kalimantan in 2017 
New units:  
 Generation of Western Java, Centre of Java, Eastern 
Java and Bali (2016) and Nusatenggara (2018) 
 Development Unit (IUP) Southern Sulawesi (2017), 
Western Kalimantan, and Papua and West Papua 
(2018) 
 Unit Induk Pembangkitan dan Penyaluran (UIKL) or 
Unit of Generation and Transmission Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi (2018) 
Notes: * We use the terms generation, region and distribution to refer to PLN’s business unit names in 
Bahasa, that is, Pembangkit, Kantor Wilayah and Kantor Distribusi, respectively. 
 
After reclassifying PLN business units to obtain customers and production data, we 
recode the PLN’s area into BPS province as described in Table A6.2. In response to 
PLN’s needs and electricity development, PLN established new business units in 
some provinces. In those cases, we reclassify new PLN business units back to the 
parent regions or provinces, as we did for PLN Batam and PT PLN Tarakan, to make 
our dataset consistent at the province level overtime. PLN Batam was established in 
1993, when Batam was treated as a special economic zone and turned into a subsidiary 
company, PT PLN Batam, in 2000. On the other hand, Riau Island province, where 
PLN Batam is located, was established in 2002 after splitting from Riau province. 
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Thus, we add PLN Batam to Riau province from 1993 to 2001, then, after 2002, we 
add PLN Batam to Riau Island province.   
 
Table A6.2 Coverage Area of PLN Business Units, BPS Provinces and Islands 
PLN Business Unit BPS Province Island  
Region I (Banda Aceh) Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Sumatera 
Region II (Medan) North Sumatera Sumatera 
Region III (Padang)* West Sumatera, Riau, Riau Island Sumatera 
Region IV (Palembang)* South Sumatera, Bangka Belitung, Jambi, 
Lampung, Bengkulu 
Sumatera 
Region V (Pontianak) West Kalimantan Kalimantan 
Region VI (Bnjarmasin)* Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East 
Kalimantan 
Kalimantan 
Region VII (Manado) North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Gorontalo Sulawesi 
Region VIII (Makassar) South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, West 
Sulawesi 
Sulawesi 
Region IX (Ambon) Maluku, North  Maluku Eastern 
Region X (Jayapura) Papua, West Papua Eastern 




PT PLN Batam Riau island Sumatera 
Dist. East Java (Surabaya) East Java Java-Bali 
Dist. Central Java (Semarang) Central Java, Jogjakarta Java-Bali 
Dist. W. Java and Banten 
(Bandung)* 
West Java, Banten Java-Bali 
Dist. Jaya and Tangerang 
(Jakarta) 
Jakarta, Banten (Kota Tangerang, Kabupaten 
Tangerang, Kota South Tangerang)  
Java-Bali 
   
Parentheses refer to the capital city where the region or distribution office is located. 
* Riau, Bangka Belitung, Lampung, East Kalimantan, West Nusatenggara, and East Nusatenggara have 
been established as independent regional office (Kantor Wilayah) and Bali as a distribution office 
(Kantor Distribusi) since 2002. Lampung’s regional office was changed to Lampung’s distribution 
office in 2012, while Banten’s branch was established as an independent distribution office in 2016. 
 
Moreover, East Kalimantan’s region was established in 2002 after splitting from 
Region VI while PT PLN Tarakan, as a subsidiary company located in East 
Kalimantan province, was established in 2004. Therefore, we combine PT PLN 
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Tarakan with East Kalimantan province from 2004 to 2016, then we add the new 
province North Kalimantan back to its parent province East Kalimantan after 2014. 
Other regional offices or distribution offices are coded as they are as long as they 
represent the province where these business units are located. For example, 
Lampung’s regional unit, which changed into a distribution unit in 2012, is still coded 
as Lampung province in our dataset. Through this procedure, our dataset becomes 
more consistent with the BPS’s classification at the province level overtime. 
 
A.6.2 Area Coverage in Kantor Distribusi Jakarta, West Java and 
Banten  
Prior to 2015, the Banten’s branch was part of Kantor Distribusi Jawa Barat dan 
Banten or the distribution office of DJBB. Due to an increasing demand for electricity, 
especially from large-scale industrial customers, and the growing development of 
Banten province, PLN separated the Banten’s branch from DJBB in 2015 and the 
Banten’s branch became an independent distribution office (Kantor Distribusi 
Banten). As a consequence, the Tangerang’s branch, which was originally part of 
Kantor Distribusi Jakarta Raya dan Tangerang or the distribution office of Disjaya, 
should be recorded not as Disjaya but as Kantor Distribusi Banten by reclassifying it 
at the branch level and recalculating the number of connections and the capacity of 
these three distribution offices of Jakarta, West Java and Banten. 
Without this procedure, our data would be misleading. For instance, when we 
calculate access to electricity as a percentage of electrified households in the total 
households, the figure is much higher for Jakarta province and much lower for Banten 
province due to different definitions of Tangerang’s coverage between BPS and PLN. 
The total number of households as the denominator is calculated by the BPS according 
to the administrative definition of the Ministry of Home Affairs; on the other hand, 
the number of electrified households as the nominator is recorded by PLN based on 
the technical area of PLN, and the discrepancy due to this area definition is significant. 
Below is a detailed description of the coverage area of the BPS and PLN. 
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Administrative area of the BPS 
Our dataset at the province level following the BPS coding is in line with the definition 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs: Jakarta province, West Java province and Banten 
province. The latter was established in 1999 after splitting from West Java province. 
Hence, prior to 1999, Banten was part of West Java province. Banten province 
comprises four cities (kota) and four districts (kabupaten), and three out of those eight 
autonomous regions are neighbours of Jakarta province, namely Kota Tangerang, 
Kabupaten Tangerang and Kota South Tangerang.  
 
Technical area of PLN  
The lowest level in the distribution office is the branch, which is formed on the base 
of technical aspects and is likely to cross the administrative area of the BPS. 
Tangerang branch was part of Kantor Distribusi Jakarta Raya dan Tangerang, while 
Tangerang branch itself covered four administrative areas of the BPS, namely (i) Kota 
Tangerang (sub-branch Cikokol), (ii) Kota South Tangerang (sub-branch Serpong), 
(iii) Kabupaten Tangerang (sub-branch Sepatan, Teluk Naga, Curug, Cisoka and 
Cikupa) and (iv) Kota West Jakarta (sub-branch Cengkareng and Kalideres). It is 
obvious that Tangerang branch crossed two provinces i.e. Banten and Jakarta. 
 The main implication of those different area definitions is that the 
electrification ratio could be overestimated for Jakarta province but underestimated 
for West Java province for the period 1975–1998 and for Banten province for the 
period 1999–2018. Due to this problem, we reclassify our household customer dataset 
at the branch level. We unbundle the Tangerang branch from Jakarta province and 
then tally it up with West Java province for the period 1975–1998 and with Banten 
province for the period 1999–2018. For incomplete years, we interpolate using the 
moving average. Hence, our new dataset for Jakarta, West Java and Banten provinces 
is now more sensible. 
Figure A6.1 presents the number of PLN household customers before and after 
reclassification, as we discussed. The new Jakarta blue line after excluding the 
Tangerang branch is lower than the old Jakarta blue dashed line, while the new Banten 
maroon line after including the Tangerang branch is higher than the old Banten 
maroon dashed line; the new West Java orange line is slightly higher than the old West 
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Java orange dashed line before 1999 or when Banten was still part of West Java, then, 
after 1999, the two lines of West Java appear to overlap. Spikes are shown in two 
transition periods: (i) around 1999, when Banten administration split from West Java 
province and was established as a new province, and (ii) around 2015, when Banten 
area split from the distribution office of West Java and Banten (DJBB) and became a 
new independent distribution office. 
 
Figure A6.1 Number of Electrified Households in Jakarta, West Java and Banten 
before and after Reclassification, 1975–2018 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors. 
 
In addition, high spikes in the number of customers Jakarta in 2011 was partly due to 
the programme Gerakan Sehari Sejuta Sambungan (GRASS), or 1 million customers 
per day, launched in 2011, in which 1 house was allowed to have more than 1 meter 
at that time. As a result, there are 4,040,310 household customers in Jakarta (PLN 
Statistics 2018) while the number of households issued by the BPS is 3,393,014; 
hence, if we calculate the electrification ratio for Jakarta, the figure is 119 per cent. 
This measurement error leads to an incorrect picture of the electrification programme. 
To overcome this problem, we recalculate the denominator in 2011 by dividing the 
total population of Jakarta by 3, the average number of household members in Jakarta 
so the electrification ratio is corrected accordingly.  
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A.6.3 Tariff Transformation 
PLN has recorded number of customers based on tariff classification and changed this 
classification regularly as electricity develops. Table A6.3 describes the 
transformation of electricity tariff. We encountered some problems in calculating 
number of household customers as follows. The very poor households without a meter 
were sometimes categorized as S1 (social users) in PLN statistics, so we reclassify 
them as households after consulting PLN. This specific problem was relevant to the 
Tangerang branch. Therefore, we sum up the number of customers under tariffs S1, 
R1, R2, R3 and R4 to arrive at the total number of household connections in Tangerang 
in 1992, 1993 and 1997.  
 
Table A6.3 Tariff Classification 1975–2018 
Period Tariff Classification/Customer Type Household Industry Business Other 
Before 
1980/1981 
A1 and A2 B1 and B2 C1 and C2 D: gov. office  
E: social 
F: street lighting  




R1: simple house 
R2: small house 
R3: medium house 
R4: large house 
 
I1: micro industry 
I2: small industry 
I3: medium 
industry 
I4: large industry 
U1: small enterprise  
U2: medium 
enterprise 
U3: large enterprise 
H1: simple and  
small 
accommodation 
H2: hotel industry 
S1: very small user 
S2: social foundation 
G1: medium gov. 
office 
G2: large gov. office 





R1: simple house 




I1: micro industry 
I2: small industry 
I3: medium/ large 
industry 
B1: small business  
B2: medium 
business 
B3: large business 
 
S1: very small user 
S2:  small social 
foundation 
S3:  medium social 
foundation 
P1:  medium gov. 
office 
P2:  large gov. office 
P3:  street lighting 
T :  traksi (train, 
MRT) 
C :  curah (special 
tariff) 
M : multipurpose 
Source: PLN statistics 
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Regarding the payment method, PLN initially applied a post-paid method, but, since 
2007, it has introduced a prepaid method to reduce the cost of collection.46 A mistake 
occurred in PT PLN Batam that required reclassification before calculating the 
electrification ratio. PT PLN Batam recorded prepaid household customers as 
business type customers due to the multipurpose (Multiguna) tariffs from 2011 to 
2016, but in fact those customers were household customers who merely changed 
their payment method. Therefore, we subtract prepaid customers from “business” and 
add them to “household” for the period 2011–2016. In some cases, we also find two 
different numbers of customers, by tariff as well as by type, in the PLN statistics. If 
this is the case, we choose the number of customers by type rather than by tariff, which 











46 The number of prepaid customers is continuing to increase and was almost half of the total 
number of PLN household customers in 2019. However, this prepaid method will no longer 
be implemented in the future. According to PLN, it is now preparing to replace the existing 
meter with a smart meter that could reduce the collection fee and implement the post-paid 





Chapter 7 Conclusion 
In this thesis we developed a series of empirical studies to provide insight into the 
nature, causes and consequences of inequality dynamics in Indonesia during the past 
decades. These decades have been characterized by rapid and far-reaching 
decentralization and democratization processes that strongly impacted the entire 
society. These institutional reforms have had broad consequences for, amongst others, 
the level and evolution of inequality across individuals and regions as well as the 
organization and accessibility of public services like health and electricity.  
The different chapters of this thesis implicitly asked the question as to how 
inclusive Indonesia is today by looking at various dimensions. We analyzed the 
relationship between inequality and economic development across regions and the 
evolution of the accessibility of basic public services, i.e. health and electricity. Social 
inclusiveness is a central notion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), and as 
such the thesis has been motivated by the pursuit of SDG in Indonesia as a rapidly 
changing and emerging economy. The archipelagic nature of Indonesia of course 
make it especially relevant to assess the spatial dimension of inequality and 
inclusiveness – with the vast territory of Indonesia people are unevenly distributed 
across five big islands and hundreds of small islands, which makes that national 
aggregate scores on the various SDGs often mask substantial  regional differences. In 
this concluding chapter we reflect upon the main findings of our analyses and suggest 
some avenues for future research. 
 
7.1 On Income Inequality and Development  
We started this thesis with a descriptive analysis of inequality dynamics in Indonesia 
over time and over space, distinguishing three levels of spatial aggregation namely (i) 
the national level (in an international perspective); (ii) the regional level (islands and 
provinces); (iii) the individual level (income classes). Chapter 2 analyzed at the 
(cross–)country level and at the province level covers the period 1961–2015, while 
our analysis for income classes is based on micro data (from Susenas) for the period 
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1987–2015. This approach allows us to present new insights into the inequality 
dynamics in Indonesia. The key messages of this chapter are as follows: over the last 
decades relatively high economic growth in Indonesia is associated with rapidly 
increasing income inequality. Regional convergence of inequality across islands and 
provinces is driven by the fact that higher income class in the relatively poor regions 
grew faster than the lower income class in the relatively rich regions. In other words, 
the middle class and especially the top incomes seem to benefit most from the 
economic growth dynamics in Indonesia. 
Chapter 3 investigated whether and to what extent the number, size and 
distribution of cities might explain the evolution of inequality across provinces in 
Indonesia. In a cross-country analysis Castells-Quintana (2018) found that beyond 
Kuznets’ hypothesis there is a U‐shaped relationship between average city size and 
inequality; inequality first falls and then increases with average city size. A key result 
of our analysis across provinces within one country is that this U-shaped relationship 
was only found if we include Jakarta as one bundled city in our sample. In contrast to 
Castells-Quintana (2018), this result did not hold when we excluded Jakarta or when 
we considered unbundled Jakarta. However, if we included small cities with less than 
300 thousand inhabitants in our sample, and we add urban primacy, we found a U-
shaped relationship for the case of small cities but an inverted U-shaped for the case 
of urban primacy. The N-shaped relationship where inequality first decreases with 
small city size, then increases with larger city size, and finally declines again with 
extra large city size, might be associated with the fact that larger cities provide more 
job opportunities for people with different abilities and skills. The interaction between 
city size and income is negative for all the specifications, suggesting that part of the 
association between average city size and inequality could be explained by the 
association between average city size and economic performance: larger cities are 
more productive, benefit from more highly skilled workers and usually involve 
spillover, and hence income increase. The main message drawn from this chapter is 
that, if the current trend of an increasing average agglomeration size continues, we 
can expect inequality to climb further. This message implies that larger average 





average agglomeration size is undesirable, so the medium city size may be more 
desirable. 
In Chapter 4 we basically examined the relationship between economic growth 
and inequality across districts in Indonesia. A large empirical literature has been 
devoted to the impact of inequality on growth but it is very difficult to answer the 
question as to whether rising inequality in a country is good or bad for its economic 
growth performance. For a long time, most of the empirical research routinely 
imposed a linear structure on the data, whereby the different variants of the basic linear 
model generated very different conclusions on the inequality–growth relationship. 
Finding inconsistency in the results of the relationship between inequality and growth, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) searched for a non-linear relationship by developing a 
simple political-economy model to argue that there are no a priori theoretical reasons 
to assume that the relationship between inequality and growth is monotonic. Their 
results show that growth is inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality. 
Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with lower future growth rates.  
It implies that an economy’s growth rate is maximized when there are no changes in 
inequality and that any deviation of inequality, in other way, lowers growth. 
Adopting Banerjee and Duflo’s approach, we empirically tested whether 
actual changes in inequality in the past associate with subsequent economic growth 
and whether this relationship is non-linear. We also examine the role of institutional 
quality in the relationship between past inequality and economic growth in the next 
period. Similar approach is applied to test whether changes in inequality in the past 
correlates with growth of development indicators in the future.  Our results are in line 
with Banerjee and Duflo (2013). We consistently found an increase in a level of 
inequality has a significant and positive relationship with subsequent growth in 
various specifications. However, large changes in inequality in any direction were 
found to be associated with a large decline in economic growth, as revealed by a 
hump-shaped relationship between economic growth and the actual change in 
inequality. These relationships held in all the specifications of the basic and the 
modified models, which included institutional quality. In this thesis, we are not aiming 
to search for the causal relationship but the correlation. 
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Our main messages from this chapter are as follows: high inequality in the past 
is associated with relatively high subsequent growth, this high growth is then 
associated with high inequality in the current period. If this current inequality is too 
high, then the change in inequality will be positive and large enough to reduce growth 
in the future. In other words, the high inequality in the past is associated with the 
slowing down the economic growth and worsening the existing inequality. It seems 
that our results support the Piketty’s (2014) argument that inequality keeps increasing 
as societies accumulate wealth. With regard to the institutional quality, the type of 
institutional quality plays a significant role in shaping the relationship between past 
inequality and economic growth in the next period. This role appears more important 
if we interact institutional quality with the initial inequality, suggesting that a 
combination of a certain degree of inequality and institutional quality is positively 
correlated with economic growth. 
In addition, our results show that a high initial level of inequality is highly 
associated with the growth of roads and the poverty reduction.The relationship with 
the change in inequality shows an inverted U-shaped for the growth of roads and a U-
shaped for the poverty rate, suggesting that existing inequality is positive correlated 
with growth of roads while current inequality is negative correlated with growth of 
poverty until the this current inequality passes a threshold. If current inequality keeps 
increasing, it tends to reduce the growth of roads and increase the growth of poverty 
in the future. These findings indicate that the rising inequality may go at the expense 
of the accessibility of certain basic public services that we study in Chapters 5 and 6 
of this thesis. 
 
7.2 On Accessibility  
The second part of this thesis delved deeper into the questions regarding the 
accessability of basic public services, namely health and electricity. In Chapter 5 we 
hypothesize that there might be an ex ante moral hazard problem for insured people 
in the sense that they tend not to care sufficiently of their health situation that causes 
illness. This behavior may be associated with demand for health treatment, and hence 





behavior of insured people is essential to seek the solution for BPJS problem. In this 
chapter, due to data availability, we only observe individual behavior prior to the 
universal healthcare program (JKN) era or when health insurance has been provided 
by the central government since 1998. We assume that the behavior of insured people 
remains the same over time, so we use the latest household data prior to the JKN era 
to inform us about the effects of insurance schemes. Our research aims to contribute 
to our understanding of how people’s behavior towards health influences their demand 
for unhealthy consumption, which has an impact on outpatient and inpatient care and 
thus correlates with the sustainability and affordability of the BPJS programme. In 
particular, we try to identify ex ante moral hazard among insured people to help the 
government to formulate policy recommendations.   
From the results in Chapter 5, given the health reform promoting inclusiveness 
in health access, we can conclude that insured people behave differently than 
uninsured people, and within the insured group, the subsidized people behave 
differently from the non-subsidized people. Our findings show that there is ex ante 
moral hazard whereby people do not prevent health status as they consume more 
unhealthy food once insurance exists. Insurance program with or without subsidy 
improves accessibility of health care. Getting older and richer are associated with 
more use of inpatient treatment for the insured households, but being knowledgeable 
is more important for the subsidized people to understand the procedure of free 
healthcare. Further, education turns out to play an important role in improving health 
status. Since moral hazards could exist on both sides – insured people and providers 
– the next avenue for future research is to identify the incentives for both parties to 
control moral hazard effects in health care system. Further, the JKN has been 
implemented for at least five years, so it remains interesting to test our hypothesis 
among JKN members to determine whether they show ex ante moral hazard. These 
future empirical research avenues could generate policy implications to improve 
universal health care in Indonesia. 
Chapter 6 analyzed the spatial patterns of inequality in access to electricity and 
its supply provision. Evidently, Indonesia is a particular interesting country to study 
the spatial diffusion pattern of electrification. Indonesia is an archipelagic country 
where people are unevenly distributed across five big islands and hundreds of small 
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islands. Unlike the situation in non-archipelagic countries, where new connections 
can be provided by extending the existing lines, Indonesia needs huge investments to 
build new lines to bring electricity to people on the different islands, and the up-front 
costs are very high. Therefore, electrification in Indonesia is an exceptionally spatially 
heterogeneous process due to an extreme form of discrete electricity planning caused 
by the geographical island barriers, with the main islands essentially being 
autonomous self-contained electricity systems. In this chapter, we aim to identify the 
relative contribution of several potential determinants of electrifitation to the the speed 
of electricity diffusion across Indonesian provinces.  
From the results in Chapter 6, given the complexity of connecting all people 
including from all the relative small islands with huge disparities in terms of income 
and geography, we can conclude that the disparity in access to electricity and its 
supply is high across Indonesia. The electrification ratio remains low and the speed of 
technology diffusion is slow. A faster electricity diffusion process is experienced by 
the provinces in Java–Bali islands. The electrification ratio at the province level is 
positively correlated with population density as an internal factor and installed 
capacity of power supply availability as an external factor mainly contribute to 
increasing electrification ratio at the province level. We find that lack of power supply 
facilities is the main factor that explains the delay in electrification at the Eastern while 
the population density plays an important role to explain slower electrification 
patterns at Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi islands. Since the spatial variation in 
power supply availability is of course shaped by the geographical constraints inherent 
to Indonesia’s island structure, our results imply that spatial heterogeneity at the 
province level contributes substantially to shaping the diffusion pattern.  
To improve accessibility on electricity, the first prerequisite is to better 
understand the connection pattern across provinces. The next avenue for future 
research is to study whether people with an electricity connection can really afford to 
use the energy that they really need, how they benefited from the electricity and so 
on. A second promising avenue is to analyze diffusion pattern at the lower level of 
aggregation i.e. at the district or the village level. Analyzing diffusion patterns as well 
as energy consumption patterns at the household level would be very interesting as 





implications especially regarding accessibility of key determinants of human well-
being. 
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This thesis aims to answer what is happening to inequality in Indonesia for the past 
years. This empirical research consists of two parts, first, how is the relationship 
between inequality and development in Indonesia along with various aggregation 
levels; second, whether the accessibility to basic public services is the implication of 
inequality.  
The key messages of the first part of this thesis are as follows: over the last 
decades relatively high economic growth in Indonesia is associated with rapidly 
increasing income inequality. Regional convergence of inequality across islands and 
provinces is driven by the fact that incomes of the rich in poor regions grow faster 
than those of the poor in rich regions. In other words, the middle class and especially 
the top incomes seem to benefit most from the economic growth dynamics in 
Indonesia. In relation to urbanization, our examination shows that if the current trend 
of increasing average agglomeration size continues, we can expect that inequality will 
further go up. Further, high inequality in the past will increase the subsequent growth, 
this high growth is then associated with high inequality in the current period. If this 
current inequality is too high, then the change in inequality will be positive and large 
enough to reduce growth in the future. In other words, the impact of high inequality 
in the past is associated with the slowing down economic growth and worsening 
existing inequality. It seems that our results support the Piketty (2014) argument that 
inequality keeps increasing as societies accumulate wealth. With regards to the 
institutional quality, the type of institutional quality plays a significant role in shaping 
the association with economic growth in the future. This role looks more important if 
we interact with the initial inequality suggesting that a combination of a certain degree 
of inequality and institutional quality is required to boost the economic growth. 
The key messages of the second part of this thesis are as follows: given the 
health reform promoting inclusiveness in health access and given the complexity of 
connecting all people including from all the relatively small islands with huge 





uninsured people, and within the insured group, the subsidized people behave 
differently from the non-subsidized people. Ex ante moral hazard exists in insured and 
subsidized groups. The disparity in access to electricity and its supply is high across 
Indonesia. Despite the fact that electrification already started more than one hundred 
years ago, the electrification ratio remains low and the speed of technology diffusion 
is slow. Population density as an internal factor and power supply availability as an 
external factor contribute to increasing the electrification ratio at the province level. 
This external factor can be translated as island barrier. Hence, the heterogeneity at the 
province level contributes in shaping the diffusion patterns. 
 
 
 
  

